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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FRANCE, ENGLAND,
AND THE UNITED STATES
RAYMOND K. BERG
INTRODUCTION
N MANY COUntries today, traditionalism plays a great part in the
policy of their criminal procedure. As a corollary of such tradi-
tionalism, popular misconceptions and vague notions prevail
which often serve to hamper the achievement of better criminal pro-
cedure and further disguise and confuse the real problems of our
systems. The general use of such words as "justice," "liberty," or
"freedom" cannot by itself solve problems nor can the general ideal-
ism of a given philosophy untangle a particular, concrete problem.
Misconceptions of accepted principles such as the "privilege against
self-incrimination" or "the presumption of innoncence" have an emo-
tional content which can often defeat the rational approach of prog-
ress. Further, as criminal procedure became more complex through
the years, many separate and distinct principles of evidence and pro-
cedure which developed logically became illogical in application and
result when they became involved or in conflict with other principles.
Worse, many of these principles are today archaic in that the reasons
for their existence have long since disappeared.
Change comes hard to traditionally minded nations. Therefore, it
is felt that a historical development and clarification of certain prin-
ciples as well as criminal procedure in general will act to pave the way
for such change. Instead of approaching change in terms of ideals, the
historical, analytical approach will be used, picking up certain of the
principles in their proper places as they arose in history and bringing
them down to date together with all entanglements and conflicts. By
comparing English, French and American systems which all began
basically in the same way, a more complete understanding can be
gained of each system whose mistakes and advantages will then be-
come more obvious. It cannot be denied that such comparative study
may also aid in the furtherance of uniform law among the nations of
the world through understanding and appreciation which in turn will
aid the achievement of world peace.
MR. BERC is a member of the Illinois Bar. This article is the result of a year's study
at Cambridge, England. Mr. Berg received his J.D. from De Paul University in 1957.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Criminal procedure began in vengeance. Physical force, the natural
way of redressing private wrongs was employed directly against the
offending person or thing. Then, as men grouped together in small
families or communities, a man's kindred became his avengers, giving
rise to the oft heard of "blood feuds." But, when these small groups
developed into large tribes, feudal kingdoms and states, private re-
venge was necessarily harnessed for the welfare of the whole. It is
here that the true beginnings of criminal procedure are found because
in regulating private revenge, some method for determining the guilt
or innocence of an accused man had to be found. Since logically the
accused should know better than anyone else whether he was guilty
or innocent of an accused wrong, the search for and development of
a method of trial necessarily involved some action on his part. In earlier
days he was often put to an ordeal or perhaps proof would be in the
form of trial by battle or in some cases by his own testimony under
oath. In a sense it is probably better to refer to these methods as
"proofs" rather than as "trials" since the accused was calling on God
to witness his innocence.
Today, great importance is still placed upon the testimony of the
accused and the history of his role in criminal procedure is one of
interest marked with the birth and interplay of some of the greatest
principles in evidence and criminal procedure. Therefore, though an
attempt will be made to survey the historical development and pres-
ent-day comparison of the English, French and American systems, a
greater part of study will be devoted to the testimony of the accused.
FRENCH HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
EARLY FRENCH PROCEDURE
In the most primitive German society, the familiar pattern of ven-
geance was present whereby each person acted as judge and execu-
tioner. The individual was the protector of his own rights by what-
ever power he possessed and was in the same manner, the avenger of
his wrongs. Slowly society imposed restrictions on private revenge.
An injured person was forced to submit his cause to a tribunal or he
was forced to accept payment in recompense for injury. Society be-
came organized so that all free men were in pledge to report crimes
which in turn helped to preserve the peace and prevent private re-
venge.'
1 Ploscowe, Development of French Procedure, 23 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 372,
437 (1932). Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, pp. 30, 31 (Bost.,
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The earliest tribunals were a kind of popular assembly to which
all free men had the right and duty to attend. Justice, as in Greece,
was democratic. Later, a group of wise and experienced men called
the Schdffen were organized who passed judgment in an increasing
number of cases.2 In these early days any private accusation amounted
to a challenge and the accused, perhaps as a concession to the earlier
days of private vengeance, would have the right to trial by battle.
This was considered one of the most esteemed methods of calling for
the intervention of God.3 Proceedings other than trial by battle were
oral. The accuser and accused were bound to a strict formula where
a slip of the tongue would be fatal. In less serious offenses, the accused
could clear himself by his oath. In more serious cases, his oath was
strengthcned by fellow-swearers or compurgators who pledged their
persons and their salvation as security for the correctness of the asser-
tion of their party. If the accused was not oathworthy, or could not
obtain a sufficient number of compurgators, he would have to submit
to one of the ordeals. It is clearly seen that the religious element per-
meated every method of proof.4
The first break away from private accusations occurred when an
individual was caught in a criminal act or after pursuit. He could be
executed on the spot by those who had caught him.' Public officials
then began holding malefactors who had not been accused, on sus-
picion and then calling on the victim or his relatives to accuse the
man. The Carolingian kings instituted a system of interrogation for
discovering criminals. Previously they had interrogated communities
under oath in order to settle financial and governmental disputes and
so they began using the same method to interrogate the community
for criminals.' In this type of accusation which may be termed an
indictment, the accused still had to clear himself by the accepted modes
of proof (except for trial by battle since there was no private accuser
to do battle with).
1913.) It may be said that the growth of the conception of a crime against the civic
community as wcll as the fact that the public authority shared in the fine contributed
to this limitation on private revenge. This same development, as will be shown, took
place in England.
2 Ploscowe, ibid., at pp. 438, 439; Esmcin, ibid., at pp. 32-34.
3 Esmein, ibid., at p. 59.
4 Ploscowe, ibid., at pp. 439, 440; Esmein, ibid., at pp. 56-60.
5 Ploscowe, ibid., at p. 441; Esmein, ibid., at p. 61. 6 Esmein, ibid., at pp. 62-64.
7 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 441, 442; Esmein, ibid., at pp. 64-68,94-99.
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ECCLESIASTICAL PROCEDURE
In feudal times there were royal courts, municipal courts, seigniorial
courts and ecclesiastical courts. Their varying jurisdictions were grad-
ually encroached upon by the royal courts with the growth of the
state, so that eventually their jurisdictional powers were virtually ab-
sorbed.8 However, the effect and influence of the ecclesiastical courts
upon subsequent criminal procedure is of great importance and there-
fore must be considered separately. In discussing ecclesiastical pro-
cedure two very important factors must be kept in mind. First, the
early Church was highly organized and centralized with many edu-
cated men to occupy various positions in the hierarchy. Secondly, the
Church fathers were great students of philosophy who believed in the
reason of man and the rational way of doing things. They therefore
modeled early ecclesiastical procedure upon the Roman accusatorial
procedure because it seemed the rational way of discovering the guilt
or innocence of the accused. As centuries passed and the dark ages
descended the influence of the barbaric tribes and customs of the
people began to affect ecclesiastical procedure. Finally, during the
Carolingian period, the Church gave up the rational Roman method
of trial and in its stead adopted the irrational methods of trial used
customarily by the people. Though there was much opposition, the
Church began to try men by oath and ordeals.' About 800, the Church
introduced something new into its procedure. When a crime was
suspected by public opinion the accused became obliged to exculpate
himself and if he failed to do so, he was convicted and sentenced. 1
From this beginning, there developed an inquisitorial system which
culminated in the Lateran Council of 1215 and the Decretals of Pope
Innocent III which were passed to repress heresy and scandalous con-
ditions in the clergy." It became the duty of the judge to make a
secret investigation when there were public rumors that someone sub-
ject to ecclesiastical law had committed a crime. The accused and
anyone believed to have any knowledge of the crime were interro-
gated under oath.' 2 Since tile Church was very highly organized and
centralized, it is easy to understand why such procedure was adopted.
If, for example, a Bishop heard some rumor regarding someone under
8 Esmnein, ibid., at pp. 48-54. 9 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 447.
10 Esmein, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 79, 80.
11 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 447; Esmein, ibid., at p. 81.
12 Ploscowe, ibid., at p. 447.
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his authority, what would be more logical and rational than calling in
the person in question and asking him whether the rumor was true or
false. Later, instead of public rumor, the same procedure was employed
upon the charge of an individual or a "denunciation" as it was called.1 3
It was about this time that scholars discovered that later Roman law
authorized such procedure as well as torture. 4
Parallel to this development in the ecclesiastical procedure, the ex-
isting modes of proof were falling more and more into disfavor. The
growth of trade and commerce rendered ineffectual the oath and
compurgation which had worked so well in the intimate life of the
community. The Church having adopted ordeals with much opposi-
tion became completely dissatisfied and banned them in 1215. Trial
by battle also fell into disuse and was forbidden in France in 1260 and
in Germany in 1290.'" At the same time private accusations, that is
those brought by an individual, were giving way to public accusations,
those brought upon inquiry of the community, in increasing num-
bers. 6
The 13th century saw new wealth through increased commerce
business and trades. Towns, cities and states became stronger and
more complex. Royal jurisdiction was encroaching more and more
upon the jurisdictions of other courts in order to maintain unity, cen-
tralization and strength. A spirit of the state and nationalism was be-
ginning to grow. Men were reading about the classical days of Greece
and Rome, rediscovering their cultures, philosophies and governments.
At the same time, crime was increasing and becoming more difficult
to suppress. This lawlessness was of great danger to the state and new
systems had to be devised for the discovery, suppression, prosecution
and trial of crimes. Of major importance was the trial of an accused
person because when the primitive methods of trial were abolished,
states found themselves with no way of trying an accused person. In
light of the success of the Church's inquisitional procedure and the
fact that the Romans had used a similar kind of procedure, it is not
surprising to find this inquisitional system adopted by lay courts
throughout the continent. 7
THE INQUISITIONAL SYSTEM
France adopted a facsimile of Church procedure in the 1200's. Such
proceedings were known as an "aprise" and allowed the judge to in-
13 Esmein, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 85. 16 Ploscowe, ibid., at pp. 443, 444.
14 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 447, 448. 17 Ploscowe, ibid., at p. 448.
15 Ploscowe, ibid., at pp. 442, 443.
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terrogate the accused and witnesses of a crime of public notoriety.
The accused would be punished under a theory which was merely an
extension of the older principle which allowed summary execution
when the accused was caught in the act.18 The "aprise" led to the
"denunciation," again a copy of Church procedure, whereby a person
could make a complaint to a judge who would then prosecute offi-
cially.19 In a short time, torture was introduced into these inquests.
Why torture was used is hard to explain. The fact that the later Ro-
mans had used torture was of great influence. Also, the "aprise" had
been primarily based on the testimony of a sufficient number of wit-
nesses. If these witnesses failed, the only manner left of convicting the
prisoner was his own confession and thus, torture could have been
used primarily for this purpose. A confession by the accused had
always been looked upon as the highest form of conviction and per-
haps the extreme desire to gain a confession, even by torture, was the
result of a psychological necessity upon the part of the judge to be
sure that the accused, whom he felt was guilty, was in fact guilty.20
Historically, the king's procurators were originally men of business
who among their duties supervised the collection of fines, a principal
source of revenue to the king. Because of the fines involved in criminal
cases and because the king wanted to keep the prosecution of crime
under his supervision, it was arranged for these procurators to consti-
tute themselves parties in criminal actions on behalf of the king. They
became a kind of official denunciator intervening in all prosecutions.
These men were the nucleus of what today is known as the public
prosecutor.2
This inquisitional procedure was enacted into law by ordonnances
in 149822 and 1539.23 It was finally codified by the Ordonnance Crimi-
18 Esmein, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 94-99.
19 Esmein, ibid., at pp. 99-101. The denunciation became particularly popular be-
cause by this method an accuser could avoid duels.
20 Esmein, ibid., at pp. 107-114. 21 Esmein, ibid., at pp. 114-118.
22 The ordonnance of 1498 distinguished between "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
procedure. "Ordinary" procedure took place in public; torture was not employed
and it allowed the accused an unfettered defense. It was employed when there was an
accusation by a formal party. "Extraordinary" procedure allowed torture and was
conducted in secrecy with little defense. This procedure was used in heinous crimes
when the accused was under suspicion. Esmein, ibid., at pp. 126-130, 145-148.
23 The ordonnance of 1539 divided the action into examination and judgment.
Everything was in writing and everything was secret. Upon complaint, inquiry or in-
formation the accused was interrogated immediately by the judge without counsel and
without any information of the charge. He was confronted by witnesses and was al-
lowed at that time only to make objections or contest the charge. If the offense was
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nelle of 1670 which governed French criminal procedure down to the
revolution. Upon complaint of a private individual or the king's prose-
cutor, the investigating magistrate investigated the crime by secret
interrogations, inspections and inquiries. He could then order the
accused to be brought before him for interrogations which were in
secret and without counsel. Then the witnesses were summoned be-
fore the magistrate and questioned again. After this, the accused was
confronted with the witnesses. It was his sole chance to make objec-
tions. During this whole preliminary stage, the king's prosecutor was
present. The trial itself was in secret before 7 judges. The accused was
interrogated by the presiding judge and then the whole report of the
preliminary investigation was read. Thus, the judges passed judgment
on this second-hand evidence. Torture was still allowed under the
Ordonnance.14
THE ADOPTION OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Protests against the brutality of this procedure were heard shortly
after its enactment but it was not until the great movement in philos-
ophy began which had as its battle-cry, reason, toleration and human-
ity, that criticism grew in fury. For 50 years prior to the adoption of
English criminal procedure by the Constituent Assembly in 1791, legal
and philosophical thinking had been directed towards England where
the "men of reason" in France and finally the public in general, saw
a practical procedural system incorporating their principles and
ideals.2  Therefore, when public opinion demanded reform in criminal
procedure, it was only natural that the legislators would turn to Eng-
land for a model. In adopting English procedure the task proved diffi-
cult because to begin with, the two systems were quite diverse.
France had no jury or grand jury. Their prosecution was entirely in
the hands of a public prosecutor while private parties could only sue
for damages. England still maintained the private prosecutor. In
nearly verified and only a confession lacking, torture could be applied. In some cases
the accused was allowed to bring in justificative facts when the prosecution rested.
After the examination, the matter was brought before the assembled bench and the
accused was interrogated by the whole court who were to judge him. Esmein, ibid., at
pp. 148-159.
24 Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 449-453; Esmein, ibid., at pp. 218-236.
25 Their greatest interest lay in the English jury system whereby an accused person
was tried by 12 of his countrymen, Esmein, ibid., at p. 408.
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France, the preliminary investigation was the main part of a man's
trial. In England, the examination prior to trial, entrusted to justices
of the peace, did not amount to much. In France, writing played a
preponderant part, actions being judged mainly on written docu-
ments. English procedure was oral. England had particular rules of
evidence, France had very few. It seemed quite plain to the legislators
that France would have to revolutionize its whole system and so they
sacrificed their traditional institutions and provided for the wholesale
importation of English criminal procedure. 6
However, the French were so steeped in their own tradition and
usage that they could not in effect adopt the English system. After
centuries of a logical and rational method of discovering truth, the
introduction of a jury was an unwelcome intrusion which proved
ineffectual in the French environment. Often, the French philosoph-
ical sense of humanity swayed the juries' sense of justice into a feeling
of sympathy for the accused. Often, jurors were threatened and bribed
which resulted in frequent miscarriages of justice. The preliminary
investigation, once the strong point of French criminal procedure, had
become enfeebled and thus cases were badly prepared and poorly
prosecuted with the result that many criminals were acquitted. At
this time, crime and political passion were ravaging France and the
people were not so much concerned with individual liberty as they
were with security. Thus, France in this period of crisis, necessarily
amended its system more in keeping with its older traditional meth-
ods.27
When Napoleon came into power, England had become France's
enemy and thus it was quite natural to find people looking unfavorably
at the English system. Napoleon, desiring to centralize and strengthen
his government wanted to do away completely with the system and
return to the Code of 1670 which would help achieve this aim. Public
opinion mounted, which together with Napoleon's influence resulted
in the Code of 1808.28
26 In adopting the jury they varied it from the English model. They also varied the
system of legal proofs allowing jurors to decide on their own "personal conviction."
Jurors were not allowed to give a general verdict but answered yes or no to specific
questions. The jurors were also allowed to give a decision by majority vote in contrast
to the English rule of unanimity. The preparatory examination was also reduced to a
mere trifle. Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 377; Esmein, ibid., at pp. 409, 415-419.
27 Ploscowe, ibid., at p. 378; Esmein, ibid., at pp. 437,450, 451.
28 Ploscowe, ibid., at p. 379; Esmein, ibid., at pp. 465-476.
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ENGLISH HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
EARLY PROCEDURE
Early England was invaded successively by Angles, Saxons, Jutes
and Danes who brought with them their Germanic customs. 29 There-
fore, the development of criminal procedure in England was very
similar to the development in early Germanic Society. Private revenge
was first limited by the alternative of accepting a fitting compensation.
Then the acceptance of a compensation was made compulsory.80 Fi-
nally, as the personal dignity of the king increased, the concept of a
crime against the king was created. It became unlawful to break the
"king's peace ' 8 1 and such violation resulted in a fine. This fine was
incentive enough, besides the desire for centralization, for the early
kings to enlarge the jurisdiction of the royal courts.
The early kings had their kingdoms (shires) divided into counties.
The county was divided into hundreds and the hundred was divided
into vills or townships.8 2 Through a system of organization, the king
kept every man in pledge by groups of ten to report crimes and to act
as sureties for those in their pledge group. 3 Procedurally, as in the
Germanic societies, there was a growth from direct vengeance into a
system of composition and summary justice and finally into a method
of accusation and trial. Later Anglo-Saxon law allowed accusations to
be made by a committee of the witan or by four men and a reeve of a
township or by a private accuser.84 Once a man was accused under
29 Plucknert, A Concise History of the Common Law, pp. 7-10 (4th ed. London,
1948); Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, p. 11 (Oxford, 1887);
Pike, A History of Crime in England, Vol. I, p. 41 (London, 1876).
30 The compensation or fines were called wer, bot and wite. The wer was the price
of a man's life according to his rank. The hot was compensation paid to a man for his
injuries. The wite was a fine paid to the king or lord in respect of an offense. Pollock
and Maitland, The History of English Law, Vol. I, pp. 44-48, 450, 451 (2d ed. Cam-
bridge, 1911); Stephens, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. I, p. 57 (Lon-
don, 1863); Pike, ibid., at pp. 41-45.
31 Pollock & Maitland, ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 44-46; Stubbs, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. 1,
pp. 198-202; Stephens, ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 184, 185.
32 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. I, p. 5 (Bost., 1927); Stubbs, ibid.,
at Vol. 1, pp. 76, 77, 88, 103-124; Stephens, ibid., at Vol. 1, p. 65.
33 This system of pledge was known as fri-borg, frank-pledge or tithing. If one man
of the tithing committed an offense, the other nine had to produce him for trial or
make good the damage and pay a fine. Allen, Law in the Making, p. 262 (4th ed. Ox-
ford, 1946); Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 13-15; Stubbs, ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 91-96;
Stephens, ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 65-67; Pike, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. I, pp. 57-61.
34 The witan was a representative council of the kingdoms. A reeve was an official
somewhat like a bailiff who later became known as the sheriff (Shire-reeve). Stephens,
ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 68, 69.
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Anglo-Saxon law, he was tried as in the Germanic system by corn-
purgation or ordeal depending on the character of the accused. Trial
by battle was never used by the Anglo-Saxons. The Anglo-Saxon and
Germanic methods of trial were not really trials in the modem sense
of the word, but merely methods of proof. 5
William the Conqueror and his sons did not change the system of
courts as developed by the Anglo-Saxon kings, but they did increase
their royal jurisdiction and unify England. 6 In 1166, the Assize of
Clarendon was issued by Henry II which provided that sheriffs and
justices should make inquiry upon oath of 12 men of every hundred
and 4 men of every township, whether any man in the township was
a thief. The man so accused was brought before the sheriffs and by
them before the justices. This was obviously a carry over from the
Germanic inquest previously described.37
At this time there were three methods of accusation. The principle
of private vengeance was continued through the private accusation
known as an appeal. Then there was the accusation by the countryside
as instituted by the Assize of Clarendon which was known as an in-
dictmnent. This proceeding later evolved into the grand jury. Finally,
there was the accusation set in motion by the king who would "in-
form" his court of some fact which had legal consequences and ask
them to act. This type of accusation became known as an information
and later these were filed by the Master of the Crown and the Attor-
ney General.3" The trial of these accusations was held by compurga-
tion, ordeal, or battle, the latter being introduced by the Normans.
Trial by battle could only be used against a private accuser and could
not be used in the case of indictment or information which were tried
by compurgation or ordeal.
Conpurgation and ordeal, as on the continent, fell into disfavor and
finally were done away with. Compurgation disappeared because it
was inconsistent with the inquest where 12 men swore under oath that
the accused was guilty. Also, cities, towns and England itself were
• 5 Plucknett, op. cit. supra note 29, p. 427; Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. 1,
pg. 299-311, Vol. IX, p. 130; Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. 1, pp. 39,
Stubbs, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. 1, p. 653; Stephens, ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 70-74;
Pike, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. 1, pp. 53-56.
96 Stephens, ibid., at Vol. 1, p. 75; Pike, ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 106-109.
3 7Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. 1, pp. 312-316; Stephens, ibid., at Vol. 1,
pp. 185, 254; Pike, ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 119-123.
38 Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. IX, p. 237; Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 30,
Vol. Il, p. 662; Stephens, ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 244, 294.
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becoming too complex for so intimate a proof as compurgation.8 9 The
Church, dissatisfied with the barbarism of the ordeals, had abolished
them in 1215. This led to the formal abolition of ordeals in England
in 1219.40 Thus, England was a state with an accusatorial system which
had no method for trying a man when he was accused by indictment
or information. Trial by battle, the only traditional method of trial
left, could only be used against a private accuser. At this point Eng-
land was faced with the same problem that France solved by adopting
the inquisitional procedure of the Church and Roman law. England
did not adopt this inquisitional procedure but instead introduced an
entirely new method of trial into criminal procedure, that is trial by
jury. It has been suggested that England could not adopt the inquisi-
tional system of France because England was not as centralized as
France and did not have the proper administrative officials, such as
clerks to carry out this type of trial. It may also be that England was
too far removed from the continent to become familiar enough with
the inquisitional method so as to model any procedural system on it.
Also, at the time of the Pope's Decree, banning ordeals, King John
had just died and his heir, Henry III was just an infant. French armies
were fighting on English soil with certain rebellious barons beside
them. The government was in serious disorder with grand juries piling
up indictments and gaols full of prisoners waiting trial. Therefore,
because of the turmoil and uncertainty much was left to the discretion
of the individual judge when it came to a method of trial. Though
there was probably much experimentation, there soon developed the
practice of trying a man by the countryside.4 1 How this happened is
hard to say.
It has been suggested that trial by jury was adopted from one of
the famous land laws of Henry II. When the title of land had been
in dispute, men had been drawn from the neighborhood who had
knowledge of the relevant facts. They answered under oath which of
the two parties was entitled to the land and when one party received
12 oaths in his favor, he won. Perhaps trial judges thought that this
would be a good way to settle criminal disputes as well and thus began
3 Pike, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. I, p. 131.
40Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. I, p. 323; Pollock & Maitland, op. cit.
supra note 30, Vol. I, p. 599; Pike, ibid., at Vol. I, p. 204.
41 Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. I, p. 323; Stephens, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, p. 254;
Pike, ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 206-208.
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using the same system to try an accused person.42 Whether this was
the case or whether trial by jury was merely an extension of the in-
dictment by the countryside, the jurors had knowledge of the facts
in early criminal cases. They were in a sense witnesses, but more than
that, they were a method of proof. Like the traditional, primitive
methods of proof, trial by jury was permeated with the religious
element.43
At first when a man was indicted by the countryside, the judges
merely tried him by these same men." This necessarily meant that
nearly every indictment was itself a conviction despite the fact that
the accused could challenge the jurors and the judge often questioned
them as to their information. 45 When a person was privately accused
by an appeal he could have resort to trial by battle but often did not
want to do so. Thus, the practice arose in private accusations of ask-
ing a man how he would be tried which gave him a chance to answer,
"by my country. ' '4 Eventually, due to obvious injustice, the present-
ing jury was separated from the trying jury.4 7 However since the
trying jury was originally a body of witnesses, the jurors were still
allowed to decide a case upon their own knowledge. This procedure
was later done away with and the members of a trying jury were not
allowed to decide a case on their own knowledge, but had to rely on
the evidence as presented in court.48 The accused was not allowed to
introduce witnesses, to have counsel or to give testimony under oath
because all this would be unnecessary in a trial which was a method
of proof.49
After the abolition of the ordeal, a very strange thing occurred in
the criminal procedure of England. A principle had been established
that no man should be convicted of a capital crime by mere testi-
42 Devlin, Trial by Jury, pp. 7-10, (The Hamlyn Lecture Series, London, 1956).
43 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. I, p. 317, Vol. III, p. 612.
44 Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. I, p. 322; Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 30,
Vol. 11, pp. 647, 648; Pike, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. I, pp. 205-208.
45 Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. I, p. 324; Pollock & Maitland, ibid., at Vol. I1, p. 649;
Stephens, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, p. 301; Pike, ibid., at Vol. I, p. 206.
46 This phrase is still heard today. Devlin, op. cit. supra note 42, p. 10; Pike, ibid., at
Vol. I, p. 207.
47 Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. II, pp. 648, 649; Pike, ibid., at Vol.
1, pp. 207, 208.
48 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. 1, pp. 332-337; Pike, ibid., at Vol. 1, p. 208.
49 Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. 1, pp. 325, 326, Vol. IX, p. 195.
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mony.50 What would happen then, if a man refused to be tried by
jury, the only method of trial left? In view of the above principle this
created a grave problem since it would be too great a break in tradition,
"to sentence a man who had been allowed no chance of proving his
innocence by any of the world-old sacral processes."' Therefore, be-
ginning in 1219, prisoners were sent to the "peine fort et dure," where
they were at first confined and starved and later tortured until they
would plead.52
SELF-INCRIMINATION
When William conquered England, he found that bishops sat as
judges in the popular courts while in France they merely sat in eccle-
siastical courts with jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters. Therefore,
he enacted that bishops should only have jurisdiction over ecclesiasti-
cal matters as in France, which resulted in a system of double judica-
ture.53 His purpose was no doubt to strengthen his government and
enlarge the royal jurisdiction. As time passed, these two forces came
more and more into conflict over their respective jurisdictions.54
Earlier it was seen that Pope Innocent III in 1215 instituted a man-
ner of investigation whereby the accused and others were examined
under oath when circumstances warranted. This inquisitional system
bolstered by the discovery that Roman law had also allowed such
investigation was in widespread use in continental ecclesiastical pro-
cedure. When Henry III married a French woman, this inquisitional
system was introduced into England's ecclesiastical law by two
French priests who came to England. The popular courts, it is noted,
always began with some manner of accusation whether it was appeal,
presentment or information. This new method, "the inquisitio," began
"ex officio mero" without any manner of accusation and often with-
out the suspicion necessary for its use as required by the decretals of
Pope Innocent Ill.
50 Holdsworth, ibid., at Vol. IX, p. 179.
51 Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. 11, p. 650.
52 There was no forfeiture to the Crown if a man did not plead which may have
been an incentive to many prisoners. "Peine fort et dure" was part of the law until
1772. Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. I, pp. 326, 327; Stephens, op. cit. supra
note 30, Vol. 1, pp. 297-301; Pike, op. cit. supra note 29, Vol. 1, pp. 210, 211.
53 Pollock& Maitland, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, pp. 88, 449,450.
54 Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. VIII, pp. 278-293 (3rd ed. Bost., 1940); Stphens, Practice
of Interrogating Persons Accused of Crime. Papers Read Before the Juridical Society,
pp. 460, 461 (1857).
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This innovation in procedure met with some disapproval early but
since the great controversy centered around jurisdiction of Church
and state, it was for some time neglected. The controversy arose again
when Henry VIII designated himself head of the Church of England.
The court of the Star Chamber was established, with broad sweeping
jurisdiction following ecclesiastical rules of procedure. This meant
that the Star Chamber could call in a man without first accusing him
and question him at length. This is the same procedure which the
Church had used to check the veracity of rumors centuries before in
a logical, rational way. A reaction grew up in England against ques-
tioning a man under oath without having some manner of accusation
first. The fact that a man could be called in arbitrarily by the govern-
ment and questioned and later even tortured did not sit well with the
English people. Traditionally, no man could be questioned until he
had been accused and it was this questioning without an accusation
that irked the people. They did not mind being interrogated because
that was normal procedure in the common law and ecclesiastical
courts. Historically, the accused had always been bound to exculpate
himself. In the earlier days of direct vengeance, he had to defend him-
self. By ordeals he had to prove his innocence or guilt by submitting
to them himself. Compurgation involved his own oath and testimony
of innocence. Surely, the burden was always directly on the accused,
a burden which he did not protest. Indeed, many cases throughout
early history show that the accused was interrogated in the common
law courts without protest. Among these cases, the famous Throck-
morton case in 1554," the Duke of Norfolk's case in 157156 and
Udall's case in 159057 are remarkable in that all were men of intelli-
gence and learning and yet, made no objection to being interrogated
in the common law courts. Therefore, it is readily seen that the inter-
rogation of prisoners was practised up until the end of the 17th cen-
tury in common law courts.5 8 However, in the ecclesiastical courts and
those following ecclesiastical procedure, the problem of jurisdiction
and the "ex officio" oath were becoming more pronounced so that
55 Discussed in: Stephens, ibid., at p. 461; Stephens, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, pp.
325-329.
56 Discussed in Stephens, ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 330, 331.
57 Discussed in Stephens, op. cit. supra note 54, pp. 462, 463. This case was decided
in the same year as Cullier v. Cullier which raises the maxim, "nemo tenetur prodere
seipsum."
58 Porter, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 2, p. 18 (1949).
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decisions starting with Cullier v. Cullier59 began to appear invoking
the maxims, "nemo tenetur prodere" or "accusare seipsum" or "nemo
debet esse testis in propris causa." The objection was that the ecclesi-
astical courts had put the oath improperly to the accused because of
lack of jurisdiction and the lack of a formal accusation.
The Star Chamber, using ecclesiastical procedure and with broad
jurisdiction, began using torture and other harsh methods ° which
arousing public criticism culminated in the famous case of Colonel
Tilburne0' in 1637. The reaction again seemed to be against the "ex
officio" oath, torture and the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts. The
result was the abolition of the Star Chamber and the abolition of the
use of the "ex officio" oath in ecclesiastical courts in matters penal.
However, though Tilburne's objection was to the lack of a formal
accusation, this distinction came to be ignored and it was claimed flat-
ly that no man is bound to incriminate himself on any 'charge, no
matter how properly instituted or in any court. This claim was con-
ceded by the common law courts and by the end of Charles II's reign
under the restoration there was no doubt as to this principle in any
court.
INCOMPETENCY OF THE ACCUSED
After the Restoration, the pendulum swung the other way. The
accused was not allowed to testify even if he wanted to. This rule
first appeared in civil cases during the 1500's, making parties to a case
incompetent. It seemed to be an outgrowth of the old trial of con-
purgation which later became known as wager of law, being used
mainly in detinue and debt. In wager of law a man's oath was needed
but in trial by jury, a distinctly different trial, there was no need for
anything so solemn as a party's oath. Trial by jury was one method of
proof with all the religious implications while the testimony of the
accused under oath was another. Therefore, in the evolution of jury
trial when witnesses began being introduced and sworn under oath,
the party to a case was incapable of becoming a witness because he
was being tried by a jury and to place him under oath would be to
invoke another method of proof which would be contradictory and
unnecessary."'
59 Discussed in: Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. VIII, p. 287; Stephens, op. cit.
supra note 54, pp. 457, 467.
60 Williams, Proof of Guilt, pp. 37-39 (Hamlyn Lecture Series, London, 1957).
61 Discussed in: Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. VIII, pp. 291, 292; Stephens,
op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, pp. 343-345.
02 Porter, op. cit. supra note 58, p. 18; Wigmore, ibid., at Vol. II, p. 681.
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However, the accused had always been allowed to plead in person
because he was not allowed counsel in treason cases until 1695 and
in felonies until 1836. Therefore, the accused was forced to defend
himself and the custom arose of allowing him to tell his story to the
jury in the form of an unsworn statement. The right of the accused
to make an unsworn statement, which still exists in England today,
had nothing to do with the incompetency of the accused since he was
not sworn, was not considered a witness and, though there is disagree-
ment, did not give evidence in theory of law.63
At early common law, the accused was not allowed witnesses since
the jurors had knowledge of their own. However, as witnesses began
being used in civil cases, the accused was allowed witnesses who testi-
fied without taking an oath. Then he was given compulsory process
for them and finally by statutes in 1695 and 1701, the accused was
allowed to have his witnesses sworn in cases of treason and felony.
The result of course placed the accused in the same position as a
party in a civil case and thus the civil rule was adopted whereby the
accused was disqualified to testify.(4
At this time the historical distinction between trial by jury and
trial by oath seems largely to have been forgotten. Courts began
stating that the reason parties were disqualified from testifying was
because of their interest in the case. Total exclusion from the stand
was a proper safeguard against a false decision whenever the persons
offered were of a class especially likely to speak falsely. Since the
accused as an interested party was likely to speak falsely, he was to-
tally excluded from testifying. As was stated:
The law will not receive the evidence of any person, even under the sanction
of an oath, who has an interest in giving the proposed evidence, and conse-
quently whose interest conflicts with his duty. This rule of exclusion, considered
in its principle, requires little explanation. It is founded on the known infirmities
of human nature, which is too weak to be generally restrained by religious or
oral obligations, when tempted and solicited in a contrary direction by temporal
interests. 65
It was not until Bentham's time that the policy of this rule was
questioned. He pointed out that if the discovery of truth be, as it
ought to be, considered the one object at which all courts of law
should steadily aim, the exclusion of the evidence of the very persons
63 Porter, ibid., at p. 18; Vigrnore, ibid., at Vol. II, p. 684; Pike, op. cit. supra note
29, Vol. II, p. 206.
64 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. IX, p. 196.
65 Starkie, Evidence, p. 83 (Phila., 1869).
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who could tell most about the transaction under investigation was
certainly not conducive to this end. 6  He argued that the danger of
parties testifying falsely was not a certainty and that the danger of
deception was small because the judge and jury were aware of the
parties' interest and because the party would have to be subjected to
that great test of truth, the cross-examination. He colored his argu-
ments with various examples of injustice67 resulting from a party's
incompetency and with brilliant logic68 exposed the fallacies in reason-
ing which had made witnesses and parties to a suit incompetent.
Bentham's theory that interest should affect credibility and not com-
petency spread to criminal procedure and began a movement which
caused the passage of some 28 statutes in and after 1872 enabling the
accused to testify.6 The culmination of this movement was the pas-
sage of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 which will be discussed.
CONFESSIONS
During the early English history it is clear that there was no doc-
trine of excluding confessions.7° Confessions were thought of as a
plea of guilty and therefore dispensed with the necessity of evidence
66 "Be the dispute what it may, see everything that is to be seen; hear everybody
who is likely to know anything about the matter: hear everybody, but most attentively
of all, and first of all, those who are likely to know most about it-the parties." Rationale
of Judicial Evidence. Quoted in Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. II, p. 694.
67 For example in an action on a tailor's bill, the tailor could not give evidence that
he had supplied the garments; but if he could find a witness who would swear that he
chanced to be present when the defendant obligingly walked into the plaintiff's shop
and said to him, "Oh! Mr. Tailor, I had these breeches from you last winter, and I
owe you £ 5 for them," this was good evidence of "an admission" by the defendant of
the goods having been sold and delivered to him, and also of an "account stated" be-
tween the parties, and the defendant in his turn could not contradict by his own denial
evidence, however false it may be, which was opposed to his own interest. The Law
Times, Vol. 99, p. 104.
68 "Every Defendant is 'per etat,' by his station in the cause, a liar: a man who, if
suffered to speak, would be sure to speak false, and equally sure to be believed. Every
defendant is a liar. But every human being may, at the pleasure of every other, be con-
verted into a liar, and, in that character, has capacity of giving admissible testimony
annihilated." Rationale of Judicial Evidence. Quoted in WVigmore, op. cit. supra note
54, Vol. II, p. 694.
69 These statutes are listed in Best, Evidence, pp. 535, 536 (Bost. 1908).
70 A confession is a species of admissions defined as an acknowledgment in express
words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of
some essential part of it. Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. III, p. 238. Confessions
can be divided into two classes, namely, judicial and extrajudicial. Judicial confessions
are made before a magistrate, or in court, in the due course of legal proceedings. In
other words, it is a plea of guilty. Extra-judicial confessions are made by the party
elsewhere than before a magistrate or in court. Taylor, Evidence, Vol. I, p. 545; Roscoe,
Evidence, p. 38, (London, 1956).
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or a trial and were followed by immediate conviction. 1 After the
restoration of 1660, as criminal procedure took form and rules of
evidence began to be laid down, it was noted by the courts that some
extra-judicial confessions were untrustworthy as an affirmation of
guilt and so they began to exclude some from evidence. In 1783, the
exclusionary rule was laid down as follows:
Confessions are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a con-
sideration whether they are or are not entitled to credit. A free and voluntary
confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow
from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore, it is admitted as proof of the
crime to which it refers; but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery
of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is
to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to
it; and therefore it is rejected.7 2
By the beginning of the 19th century, the whole attitude of the
judges had changed. There was a general suspicion of all confessions,
a prejudice against them as such, and an inclination to repudiate them
upon the slightest pretext. There are several reasons for this policy on
the part of the 19th century judges:
1. Most offenders of the time were of the lower classes and thus subordinate
and submissive in a half-stupid manner to those in authority. False confes-
sions were easy to procure from these people;
2. There was no right of appeal so judges had to consult one another over
difficult and doubtful problems. Since most judges did not want to trouble
fellow associates or cause delay, they each tried to eliminate doubtful evi-
dence. Confessions were often excluded because under certain circumstances,
they were doubtful evidence;
3. The accused was not allowed to testify or to be represented by counsel.
It seemed quite unfair to the judges to hold what a man said under doubtful
circumstances against him and then refuse to allow him to speak out in
open court.73
When the courts did exclude confessions they usually gave as the
fundamental and underlying principle for the exclusion the fact that
under certain conditions a confession was testimonially untrustwor-
thy.7 4 Thus, though it was generally accepted that all untrustworthy
71 The confession was technically a plea of guilty which the accused pleaded before
the court and which the court could refuse to record if it felt the plea stemmed from
fear, menace or duress. Thus, there was no question as to its admissibility as evidence
and therefore it was thought of as a "conviction." Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54,
Vol. III, pp. 232-236.
7 2K. v. Warickshall, I Leach Cr. C. 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
73 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. III, pp. 351-356.
7 4 K. v. Warickshall, I Leach Cr.C. 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783); Scott's Case, 1
D. & B. 58 (1856); R. v. Mansfield, 14 Cox. Cr. Cas. 639 (1881).
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confessions should be excluded, the courts were faced with the prob-
lem of deciding which confessions were untrustworthy. 75 Since single
judges were sitting in different circuits and even in different genera-
tions, it was quite natural that different tests would be employed by
different judges in deciding which confessions were untrustworthy.
One test put as the reason for distrusting a confession was the fact that
a person is placed in such a situation that an untrue confession of guilt
irrespective of its truth or falsity has become the more desirable of
two alternatives between which the person is obliged to choose.7 1
Another test used is, was the confession induced by a threat or prom-
ise, by a fear or hope. 7 Finally a test was employed whereby it was
asked if the confession was "voluntary." The term "voluntary" was
used as a test for trustworthiness and not in connection with compul-
sory self-incrimination. It was considered supplementary to, and
usually mentioned in reference to promises or threats.78
Regardless of the test employed to determine if a confession was
untrustworthy, the person who was attempting to obtain the confes-
sion, had to have the power, that is, the authority, to induce the con-
fession. Then, considering the inducement itself, it had to be sufficient
75 Since confessions were excluded because they were untrustworthy, the courts
hcld that confessions were not to be excluded because of any breach of confidence or
good faith. A confession was not excluded because of any illegality in the method of
obtaining it. From the historical development of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, it is seen that the exclusion of confessions and the doctrine of self-incrimination
are two distinct principles. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the accused
from making any disclosure which is compulsory regardless of the truth or falsity of
the disclosure. Where this privilege is violated, the principle behind it prevents the use
of such evidence without resort to the principles used for the exclusion of confessions.
The confession rule excludes confessions which are untrustworthy thus aiming to
exclude false confessions. The privilege rule only covers statements made in legal pro-
ceedings. The confession rule excludes statements made out of court as well. The con-
fession rule goes beyond the privilege rule and can exclude statements made without
compulsion. If the privilege has been waived or not claimed, the confession rule can
still act to exclude. The privilege rule applies to witnesses in all proceedings. The con-
fession rule is concerned only with the party defendants in criminal cases.
76 "The object of the rule relating to the exclusion of confessions is to exclude all
confessions which may have been procured by the prisoner being led to suppose that
it will be better for him to admit himself to be guilty of an offense which he really
never committed." R. v. Court, 7 C. & P. 486 (1836).
77 "If hope has been excited or threats or intimidation held out, it shall not be rc-
ceived." R. v. Gibney, Jebb C. C. 15 (1822).
78 "A simple test ... Is it proved affirmatively that the confession was free and
voluntary; that is, was it preceded by any inducement to make a statement held out
by a person in authority." R. v. Thompson, [1893] 2 Q.B. 17. The use of the word
"voluntary" has caused some confusion of the confession rule with the privilege of
self-incrimination. See Bram v. United States 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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to bring about a false confession. A threat of physical violence was the
clearest case of an inducement that would exclude a confession. A
person threatened with a whip, gallows or rack will prefer to confess,
even falsely, to avoid the disagreeable consequences. A promise of
pardon has been held sufficient to induce a false confession so that the
confession was excluded. 79 Promises of favorable legal action such as
cessation of prosecution or release from arrest have also been held to
be sufficient inducements to render a confession untrustworthy.8
Since confessions are not excluded on grounds of public faith or of
private pledge of secrecy, 81 it follows that the use of a trick or fraud
does not exclude a confession induced by the means of it unless the
trick or fraud would act to produce a false confession.8 2
In considering the various inducements sufficient to bring about a
false confession, the question arose as to whether the mere fact of
arrest alone, or presence before a magistrate, or examination under
oath was in itself a sufficient inducement to render a confession un-
trustworthy. During the 19th century, due to the reaction against the
reception of confessions into evidence, many judges excluded con-
fessions on these grounds alone without any threats, promises or assur-
ances. These exclusions were based on the principle that the confession
was not "voluntary." However, in taking the term "voluntary," they
did not consider it with reference to threats or promises, but made it
into a final and absolute test. In other words, was the situation such
that the person had to speak, felt obliged to speak, or was it a matter
of pure choice with him to speak or not? There was no concern for
the truth or falsity of the confession but only, was it "voluntary"?
Thus, the principle underlying the exclusion of confessions, namely,
79 Inducements involving lighter punishments, milder treatment or reward of money
have not been held sufficient inducements to make a confession untrustworthy and
hence excludable. Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54 at Vol. III, pp. 271-274.
80 R. v. Simpson, 1 Mood. 410 (1834); Boughton's Case, 6 Cr. App. 8 (1910). Various
assurances such as, "What you say will be used for you," or "used against you," were
at one time grounds for exclusion in England. These rulings were overturned by
R. v. Baldry, 2 Den. C. C. 430 (1852). "You had better confess" has also been held to
be a sufficient inducement to vitiate a confession. R. v. Coley, 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 536
(1868). The influence of a religious or moral nature has also been held to be sufficient
inducement to render a confession untrustworthy. R. v. Radford, 1 Mood. 197 (1823).
81 "It is a mistaken notion that the evidence of confessions and facts which have
been obtained from prisoners by promises or threats is to be rejected from a regard
to public faith; no such rule ever prevailed. The idea is novel in theory, and would be
as dangerous in practice as it is repugnant to the general principles of criminal law."
K. v. Warickshall, 1 Leach Cr. C. 263,168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
82 R. v. Derrington, 2 C. & P. 418 (1826).
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that the confession is untrustworthy because it may be false was ig-
nored and involuntary confessions were excluded even though they
might have been true. This in effect looks like an extension of the
privilege against self-incrimination which had become confused with
the entirely separate doctrine of exclusion of confessions."5 In the lat-
ter part of the 19th century this test was somewhat altered, namely,
was the confession obtained by asking questions of a person while in
custody?14 The test of "voluntariness" was also extended to another
form which argued that when persons are suspected wrongly of a
crime, officially charged and questioned, especially when circum-
stances are strongly inculpatory, they are apt to make the first ex-
planation that occurs to them and thus try to assert their innocence
by inventing false stories." This test aims to exclude statements of
innocence and not confessions as such and thus cannot be used to ex-
clude confessions. The application of these various tests at different
stages of criminal procedure will be considered subsequently.
AMERICAN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Tile early colonists had the benefit of the great 17th century Eng-
lish struggle for the privilege against self-incrimination. They, as
83R. v. Baldry, 2 Den. C. C. 441 (1852); R. v. Johnston, 15 Fr. C. L. 60 (1864). This
test has been criticized because it overlooks the fundamental theory behind the ex-
clusion of confessions, that is, the risk that they are untrue. It has also been criticized
because the privilege of self-incrimination allows a person to testify if he chooses and
such testimony will be received. Exclusion by the mere fact of arrest or interrogation
contradicts the rule. It is finally argued that there is no compulsion in mere custody or
examination which makes a statement involuntary and hence excludable.
84 "When a prisoner is in custody, the police have no right to ask him questions.
Reading a statement over, and then saying to him, 'What have you to say?' is cross-
examining the prisoner, and therefore I shut it out. A prisoner's mouth is closed after he
is once given in charge, and he ought not to be asked anything." R. v. Gavin, 15 Cox.
Cr. Cas. 656 (1885); R. v. Johnston, 15 Fr. C.L. 66 (1864).
85 "The danger to be guarded against is not, in the far greatest number of cases, that
an innocent man will fabricate a statement of his own guilt, although instances of this
have occurred, too well attested to be doubted. The danger is that an innocent person,
suddenly arrested, and questioned by one having the power to detain or set free, will
(when subjected to interrogatories, which may be administered in the mildest or may
be administered in the harshest way, and to persons of the strongest and boldest or
of the most feeble and nervous natures) make statements not consistent with the
truth, in order to escape from the pressure of the moment." R. v. Johnston, 15 Fr. C.L.
60, 121 (1864). This test was repudiated by the English courts in 1856 though cham-
pioned by the Irish judges above. Its true origin is the American case, Hendrickson v.
People, 10 N.Y. 13, 33 (1854) by Judge Selden. The rule is therefore known as "Selden's
principle of mental agitation."
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British subjects, could claim flatly that no man is bound to incriminate
himself."' Since the privilege was long recognized in the colonies, its
denial was not one of the abuses which led to the American Revolu-
tion. It was not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence which
lists twenty-nine grievances against the British Crown. Neither the
Declaration of Rights by the Stamp Act Congress in 1765 nor that
of the Continental Congress in 1776 included the privilege in enumer-
ating fundamental rights. However, before 1789, the privilege had
been inserted in the constitutions or bills of right of seven American
states.87 Nine states, enough to put the United States Constitution in
operation, ratified it without a suggestion of incorporating this privi-
lege.8 In 1789, whatever the reason, the privilege came to be included
in the Bill of Rights and is known more popularly today as "the Fifth
Amendment." '89 Some people argue that the reason for the American
insistence to have this privilege incorporated in the Bill of Rights was
the French dissatisfaciton and agitation with the inquisitional feature
of the Ordonnance of 1670."° It is also suggested that
[t]he real reason for the American insistence that the privilege against self-
incrimination be made a constitutional privilege may possibly be traced to the
proceedings of the prerogative courts of Governor and Council, which con-
stituted the Supreme colonial courts, and the proceedings instituted to enforce
the laws of trade in the colonies.91
Today, the Federal Constitution and the constitutions of the various
states recognize and sanction the privilege against self-incrimination.92
The protection under all these clauses extends to all manner of pro-
ceedings in which testimony is to be taken, whether litigious or not,
86 Massachusetts recognized and employed the ecclesiastical rule by which the in-
quisitional oath was allowed until 1685 when they adopted the privilege against self-
incrimination. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 108 (1908).
87 The seven states were: Virginia (June 1776); Pennsylvania (Sept. 1776); Maryland
(Nov. 1776); North Carolina (Dec. 1776); Vermont (July 1777); Massachusetts (Mar.
1780); and New Hampshire (1784).
88 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908). The other four states, Virginia,
New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island included the privilege among long lists
of suggested privileges to be incorporated. It is interesting to note that New York and
Rhode Island had not incorporated the privilege into their state constitutions and did
not do so for many years.
89 The privilege in England was a matter of judicial decision only. It was not men-
tioned in the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights or the Petition of Right.
90 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. VIII, p. 302.
91 Wigmore, ibid., at Vol. VIII, p. 304, quoting Mr. R. Carter Pittman.
92 Iowa and New Jersey are the only states which do not include the privilege in
their Constitutions.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
and whether "ex parte" or otherwise. It applies in all kinds of courts,
in all methods of interrogation before a court, in investigations by a
grand jury, in investigations by a legislature or a body having legisla-
tive functions and in investigations by administrative officials. The
Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution only applies in federal
proceedings and cannot be invoked in state proceedings. The Four-
teenth Amendment preserving the "privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States" against impairment by state law does not
include the privilege against self-incrimination. The guarantee of "due
process of law" in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the
privilege. Therefore, in state proceedings the privilege against self-
incrimination is a matter of the state constitution or state policy.
93
The privilege is merely an option of refusal, not a prohibition of
inquiry and thus it follows that the privilege must be claimed. In the
case of an ordinary witness, the question is usually put to him and
then he can exercise his privilege. In the case of the accused, the privi-
lege exempts him from all answers whatsoever because no relevant fact
could be inquired about that would not tend to criminate him. Thus,
the prosecution does not have the right to call the accused to be sworn
in a trial. 4 It is seen then, that the privilege against self-incrimination
includes two distinct principles. First, a witness can claim the privilege
by refusing to answer a question though he may be called and must
take the stand. This is not the same rule as the historical principle un-
der discussion. Historically, it was a privilege of the accused. He not
only did not have to answer any questions but there was no right to
ask them. Today, the accused still has this right because he cannot be
called to the stand by the prosecution. 5
The privilege may be waived. This waiver may be by contract for
93 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
94 Wigmore argues that the prosecution should be allowed to call the accused to be
sworn because it is otherwise not known beforehand whether the accused would
exercise his privilege. The present rule may be due to several factors:
(1) Since the accused was not allowed to testify until the statutory changes be-
tween 1860 and 1900, to call him would have been useless and thus, the negative
practice becomes fixed;
(2) If the accused does testify today, the prosecution upon cross-examination can
put the same questions to him;
(3) The statites usually state that the accused is a qualified witness "at his own
request" but "not otherwise."
Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. VIII, pp. 392, 393.
96 Williams, op. cit. supra note 60, pp. 35, 36.
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[U]nless the contract is one which by its circumstances has come within the
doctrine of duress or oppression, and is thus voidable on general principles of
contract, there is no reason in its present aspect why it should not be binding.
This has been the doctrine since the origin of the privilege.96
The privilege may also be waived by volunteering testimony from the
stand. In the case of the accused, the waiver occurs if he voluntarily
takes the stand because, as seen, his privilege protects him from being
asked a single question. A witness is compelled to take the stand in
the first instance and his opportunity for choice does not come until
the incriminating question is asked. The accused has his choice from
the outset. From this basic proposition there follow various solutions
as to the extent of waiver in the event the accused does take the stand.
INCOMPETENCY OF THE ACCUSED
The early American colonies also inherited the English rule in
regard to the testimony of parties in a civil case and the accused in a
criminal case. Both were disqualified because of interest. Since the
policy of this rule was not questioned until Bentham's time, it was not
until 1864 that Maine, the first state to do so, declared the accused
competent to testify by statute. Massachusetts followed suit in 1866,
then Connecticut in 1867, New York and New Hampshire in 1869
and New Jersey in 1871. England did not make the accused competent
until 1898. Today, in the federal courts and in all state courts except
Georgia, the accused is a competent witness. Progress was generally
slower in the Southern states and was often accompanied by a proviso
that the accused should testify, if at all, first in the order of the wit-
nesses on his own side.
Since competency was first granted to the accused in America, the
consequences of such legislation were discussed, argued and weighed
at an earlier period than in England which did not grant such com-
petency until 1898. Bentham's reasoning which clearly demonstrated
that interest should not affect competency but only credibility was ac-
cepted by the majority of jurists. Their arguments went beyond this.
For example, in one case it was stated:
[I1n the great body of cases, no wise practitioner would permit his client,
whether he believed him guilty or innocent, to testify when upon trial on a
criminal charge. The very fact that he testifies as if with a halter about his
neck, that he is under such inducement to make a fair story for himself, his
character and his liberty if not his fortune and his life being at stake, is enough
to usually deprive his testimony of all weight in his favour, whether it be true
96 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. VIII, p. 435.
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or false. This is the case even when his manner upon the stand is unexceptional,
while his critical condition often creates such apprehension and excitement that
his manner is open to great criticism, and if he does make a mis-step after
voluntarily assuming the responsibility of testifying, it will naturally be con-
strued strongly against him. In short, his testimony is far more likely to injure
him seriously than to help him a little. It is true that a clear intellect and
perfect self-possession may enable an unscrupulous rogue to run the gauntlet
of a cross-examination and make something out of this privilege; and the same
qualities will be still more likely to help an innocent man to some advantage
from it; but the true application of the statute [qualifying him] is only to those
rare cases, when a word from the prisoner, and him only, will manifestly
dispose of what otherwise seems conclusive against him.97
In another case it was argued:
[T]he policy of such a statute has been considerably discussed by law writers
and others, and to our minds, the strongest objection that has been urged
against it, is, that it places a party charged with crime in an embarrassing posi-
tion; that, even when innocent, a party upon trial upon a charge for some grave
offence may not be in a fit state of mind to testify advantageously to the truth
even, and yet if he should decline to go upon the stand as a witness, the jury
would, from this fact, inevitably draw an inference unfavorable to him, and
thus he would be compelled, against the humane spirit of the common law,
to furnish evidence against himself, negatively at least, by his silence, or take
the risk, under the excitement incident to his position, of doing worse, by
going upon the stand and giving positive testimony.9 8
In pointing out that the accused can do himself no good by taking
the stand it has been stated:
[W]here evidence other than the prisoner's, is called for the defence, it will
be found that it is either positive or explanatory. If the jury do not believe
this testimony, it is almost unnecessary to argue that they will not believe the
story of the prisoner. His statements cannot do more as a rule than corroborate
the witnesses already called on his behalf, and if these witnesses are not believed,
97 State v. Cameron, 40 Utah 555, 565 (1868). "He will be examined under the em-
barrassments incident to his position, depriving him of his self-possession, and ne-
cessarily greatly interfering with his capacity to do himself and the truth justice, if
he is really desirous to speak the truth. These embarrassments will more seriously
affect the innocent than the guilty and hardened in crime. " Ruloff v. The People, 45
N.Y. 213, 221, 222 (1871). In presenting these and other arguments E. F. B. Johnston
put forth this general rule: "never put the accused in the box." [1931] 4 D.L.R. 1, 3.
9s People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 528 (1869). "They in reality force him to take the
stand to protect himself from the inference of guilt which is almost sure to be drawn
.against him if he fail to do so, and the case call for an explanation on his part. He may
be never so innocent, yet his omission to testify must always be at the risk of con-
demnation on the presumption of guilt founded on his silence when the law gives him
an opportunity to speak .... It may be asked, in reply, whether it is in the power of
courts or legislatures to prevent the accused's failure to testify from prejudicing him
jn the minds of the jury. It is a fact in the case which the jury have derived from the
infallible evidence of their own senses, and which must needs force itself on their
minds." Win. A. Maury in 14 Am. L. Rev. 753,763 (1880).
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very little, if any, weight will be given to the corroboration. If they do believe
his witnesses, there is an end to the case.99
From these arguments it can be seen that the great worry was not
that the accused would perjure himself and be believed by the court
and jury because of his interest in the case, but because the result of
making him competent would be unfair to him. These arguments may
be summarized as follows: (1) The testimony of the accused is of
little value to him since his credibility is affected by his position. (2)
The option given to the accused to remain silent or give evidence is an
illusory election and not equal. (3) If the accused does take the stand,
he waives his privilege against self-incrimination and can be cross-
examined even as to prior unproved crimes in some states and to vary-
ing degrees in others.100 (4) If the accused is innocent and takes the
stand, he can easily give a bad impression under clever cross-examina-
tion and so lose his case.' (5) If the accused exercises his privilege
against self-incrimination and refuses to testify, an inference will nat-
urally arise in the jury's mind which legislation or judge cannot erase.
If the prosecutor or judge is allowed to comment on such fact, the
situation is immeasurably worse. (6) It changes the presumption of
innocence to a presumption of guilt.0 2 (7) It violates the privilege
against self-incrimination." °3
The result of this opposition acted to slow down the general accept-
99 E. F. B. Johnston in [1931] 4 D.L.R. 1, 5.
100 "[A]nd, if he does, what becomes of the constitutional provision that no man
shall be compelled to furnish evidence against himself? Can he decline to answer on
the ground that his answer might tend to criminate him? Has he not thrown over-
board all his defensive armor? Is he not to be stretched on the rack of cross-examina-
tion? Will not all his secrets be wrung out of him by the torture of question after
question?" 1 Am. L. Rev. 466 (1866).
101 Wm. A. Maury points out that Bentham placed great reliance on the Throck-
morton case in regard to the testimony of the accused. He then quotes from Mr. Jardine
who stated in regard to the Throckmorton case that "a man of less firmness of nerve,
though entirely innocent, would, under such circumstances have been utterly unable
to defend himself." He also quotes from Mr. Stephen: "None but those who constantly
see it can appreciate the gross stupidity of prisoners, or the state of abject helplessness
to which terror and the apparatus of courts of justice reduce them." 14 Am. L. Rev.
759,760 (1880).
102 This argument is presented in 103 Law Times p. 297 (1897).
103 This argument is used by XVm. A. Maury in holding all such legislation invalid as
being contrary to the privilege against self-incrimination. Also see Ruloff v. The Peo-
ple, 45 N.Y. 221, 222 (1871) where it is stated: "The individual is morally coerced, al-
though not actually compelled to be a witness against himself. The Constitution, which
protects a party accused of crime from being a witness against himself, will be prac-
tically abrogated."
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ance of the movement to grant competency to the accused. However,
to give the accused a chance to tell his story in exculpation, the prac-
tice grew up and was introduced by statute of allowing the accused to
tell his story, not under oath and not as a witness, but in the guise of
an address or argument on the testimony and the whole case. This
practice, similar to English "unsworn statements," was in keeping
with Bentham's theories regarding interest and yet avoided the evils of
the above arguments. This practice soon disappeared in most jursidic-
tions so that today the accused may only testify under oath if he so
desires.
CONFESSIONS
The reasoning of the English courts has influenced the American
decisions in the field of confessions to a great degree. The American
courts have accepted as the fundamental and underlying principle for
the exclusion of confessions, the fact that under certain circumstances,
a confession is testimonially untrustworthy. 10 4 The various English
tests for untrustworthiness have been accepted by different American
courts at different times. Some courts have employed the test whereby
a confession is excluded when a person has been placed in such a situa-
tion that an untrue confession of guilt has become the more desirable
of two alternatives between which the person was obliged to
choose. 105 Other courts have used the test whereby a confession is ex-
cluded if it was induced by a threat or promise, or a fear or hope.10 6
Still other courts have used the "voluntary" test in conjunction with
the "threats or promises" test.' °
104 "Testimonial worthlessness is the underlying and fundamental principle on
which confession evidence is, under certain circumstances, rejected." Wilson v. State,
19 Ga. App. 759, 92 S.E. 309 (1917): "The rules are based on 'the general hypothesis
that the truth of statements made under the circumstances referred to is too often
questionable. The only object sought in the entire matter is truth." Parker v. State, 91
Tex. Cr. 68, 238 S.W. 943 (1922). Confessions are not excluded on principles of breach
of faith, illegality or the self-incrimination privilege.
105 "The real question is whether there has been any threat or promise of such a
nature that the prisoner would be likely to tell an untruth from fear of the threat or
hope of profit from the promise." United States v. Stone, 8 Fed. 232, 241, 256 (1881):
"The controlling inquiry is whether there had been any threat of such a nature that
from fear of it the prisoner was likely to have told an untruth." Beckham v. State, 100
Okla. 15, 17, 14 So. 859, 860 (1894).
106 "Any inducement of profit, benefit or melioration held out; any threat of vio-
lence, injury, increased rigor of confinement; or any other menace which can inspire
alarm, dread, or the slightest fear, is enough to exclude the confession as not volun-
tarily made." Bonner v. State, 55 Ala. 242, 245 (1876).
107 "No confession of guilt shall be heard in evidence unless made voluntarily; for
if made under the influence of either hope or fear, there is no test for its truthfulness."
State v. Whitfield, 70 N.C. 356 (1874).
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In several American jurisdictions, the legislature has defined the
type of inducement that will act to exclude a confession. These
statutes usually do no more than accept one of the common law
rules. °8 Threats of physical violence have excluded confessions. 1 9
Promises of pardon have vitiated confessions."" Promises of other
favorable legal action such as cessation of prosecution, release from
arrest or abstention from arrest have also acted to exclude confes-
sions."' In considering the mere fact of arrest alone or presence before
a magistrate or examination under oath as being sufficient inducements
in themselves to render a confession untrustworthy, some courts have
adopted the test of "voluntariness" as the sole, absolute and final test. 12
Because of the use of words like "voluntary" and "involuntary" by
courts and other authorities in excluding confessions upon the prin-
ciple of untrustworthiness, and because of the fact that confessions
may also be excluded by reason of the fact that the privilege of self-
incrimination has been violated (which is an entirely different doc-
trine) and because confessions may also be excluded because the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated,
there has been a great deal of confusion in the field of the law con-
cerning confessions.
THE PRESENT FRENCH SYSTEM
THE CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE OF 1808
The Code d'Instruction Criminelle adopted in 1808 was a compro-
mise between the pre-revolutionary ideas expressed in the Ordon-
nance Criminelle of 1670 and the system inaugurated by the Constit-
uent Assembly of 1791 which had been largely borrowed from Eng-
lish law. In the proceedings prior to trial, the system of the Ordon-
nance of 1670 was to a large extent preserved including a secret in-
vestigation by the judge and the refusal of counsel to the accused. At
108 Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Washington have such statutes. Wigmore, op. cit. supra
note 54, Vol. III, pp. 262, 263.
109 See cases cited Wigmore, ibid., at Vol. III, pp. 268, 269.
110 Conley v. State, 12 Mo. 470 1849); People v. Reilly, 224 N.Y. 90, 120 N.E. 113
(1918); State v. Carr, 37 Utah 191 (1864).
111 See cases cited, Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. III, pp. 274, 275.
112 "The principle is that no statement made upon oath in a judicial investigation of
a crime can ever be used against the party making it, in a prosecution of himself for
the same crime; because the fact that he is under oath of itself operates, as a compulsion
upon him to tell the truth and the whole truth, and his statement, therefore, cannot be
regarded as free and voluntary." Jackson v. State, 59 Miss. 312 (1879).
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the trial, the accusatorial system prevailed with public proceedings,
oral evidence and the defendant's right to counsel.' 13
In January, 1958, a new Code went into effect in France which has
created some changes in the preliminary investigation of crime which
will be considered here. Presently, another section of this Code is being
prepared which will deal with the trial itself.
THE FRENCH COURT STRUCTURE AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME
For administrative purposes, France is divided into 89 departements
and territoire. The departements and territoire are grouped into 27
judicial districts (ressorts) and divided into 356 judicial areas called
arrondissements. These arrondissements are further divided into 3,028
cantons."' The lowest trial court is the cantonal court in which a jus-
tice of the peace (juge de paix) sits alone. For criminal cases, this court
is known as the Tribunal de Simple Police."" In each arrondissement
there is a court known as the Tribunal de Premiere Instance with
original and appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. For the trial of
criminal cases, this court is known as the Tribunal Correctionnel. An
odd number of judges, not less than 3 must sit in each case."' There is
no permanent criminal court in the d6partements but for the trial of
"crimes" a court known as the Cour d'Assises is set up every 3 months
and oftener if necessary. This court consists of a president and two
associate judges (assesseurs) who sit with a jury of seven laymen. This
is the only court in France, civil or criminal, which has a jury. 11 7 In
each ressort there is a Cour d'Appel which usually contains two or
more sections (chambres). This court generally handles criminal ap-
peals from the Tribunal Correctionnel. In each Cour d'Appel, three
judges are assigned to a section (chambre) known as the Chambre des
mises en accusation. It is their duty to decide after the preliminary in-
vestigation by the juge d'instruction whether or not the accused
should be held for trial.118 The highest court in France is the Cour de
113 Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France, pp. 387, 388, 88 U. of
Penn. Law Rev. 386, 692, 915 (1940); Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 372.
114 Keedy, ibid., at pp. 392,393.
115 Keedy, ibid., at p. 393; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 385.
110 It is a fundamental principle of the French judicial system that at least 3 judges
must sit in order to constitute a court. The lone exception to this is the juge de paix.
Keedy, ibid., at pp. 393, 394; Ploscowe, ibid., at pp. 385, 386.
117 Vouin, The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal Procedure, pp. 159-161;
5 Int. & Coop. L. Q. 157 (1956); Keedy, ibid., at p. 395.
118 Keedy, ibid., at pp. 395-397; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 384.
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Cassation. It has appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases
for the entire country and colonies.
The general term used to describe members of the judicial profes-
sion is magistrature. Each member is known as a magistrat and is ap-
pointed by the President of the Republic upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice (Garde des Sceaux) who is the head of the judicial
system. Members of the prosecuting department are also known as
magistrats because they are regarded as being non-partisan and judi-
cial. They are called "standing magistrate" (magistrature debout) be-
cause they stand when addressing the court in contrast to the "sitting
magistrats" (magistrature assise) who act as judges. These members of
the magistrature who represent the interests of the government in
court are known as the ministe're public."' The head of the ministere
public is likewise the Minister of Justice. The members of the ministcre
public attached to any court are known collectively as the parquet.
The chief of the parquet attached to each Cour d'Appel is called the
procurer general and prosecutions are conducted in his name both in
the Cour d'Appel and the Cour d'Assise as a representative of the
ministere public. In addition to this he also supervises the application
of penal law throughout the whole district of the Cour d'Appel1
20
The parquet of the Tribunal de Premiere Instance or Tribunal Cor-
rectionnel is in the hands of the procureur de la R6publique. He prose-
cutes all cases for the minist~re public and has various administrative
duties. 121 At the level of the Tribunal de Simple Police, the function
of the minstere public is usually carried out by the police commission-
er (connissaire de police) of the place where the tribunal is.r21
Offenses are divided according to their gravity into crimes, dilits
and contraventions. The importance of this division lies in their man-
ner of trial. Crimes are tried in the Cour d'Assise composed of 3 judges
and a jury. Delits are triable in the Tribunal Correctionnel by 3 judges
without a jury. Contraventions are tried by a single justice of the peace
(juge de paix) in the Tribunal de Simple Police without a jury.'12 3
119 The minist~re public enforces public action and demands that the law be applied.
It is represented at each court, all decisions are given in its presence and it insures the
execution of the decision. Code de Procedure Penale, Arts. 31-33 (1957) Bulletin L6gis-
latif Da~loz (hereinafter cited as C.P.); Vouin, op. cit. supra note 136, pp. 8, 9; Keedy,
ibid., at pp. 402-404.
120 C. P., Arts. 34-38; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 405, 406.
121 C. P., Arts. 39-44; Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117, pp. 8-11; Keedy, ibid., at p. 406.
122 C. P., Arts. 45-48; Keedy, ibid., at p. 406.
123 The classification of offenses is complicated due to statutory listings of what class-
ification particular offenses are. However, it may be generally stated that "crimes" can
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In order to simplify its study, French criminal procedure may be
divided into three stages. The first stage is the preliminary investiga-
tion wherein the offence is verified, the circumstances under which it
occurred are determined and evidence is gathered. In the second stage
all the evidence is weighed in order to decide whether or not the
accused should be held for trial. The third stage is the trial itself.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Police judiciaire.-The investigation of offences preliminary to trial
is carried on by a group known as the police judiciare and by the juge
d'instruction who, until the new code, was considered a member of the
police judiciaire. The police judiciaire is operated under the direction
of the procureur de la R~publique and is under the supervision of the
procureur gen6ral in each Cour d'Appel district.124 The police judi-
ciaire is, with certain exceptions, in charge of investigating violations
of penal law, gathering evidence and finding suspected parties until
investigation is begun. When the investigation is begun, it performs
tasks assigned to it by investigating officials.Y
Before the new code, if the procureur did not have enough informa-
tion in order to make a decision he used to institute an investigation
known as the enquete officieuse. He used to delegate this investigation
to the police judiciaire who would then employ all the methods which
the Code provided for the juge d'instruction in conducting his exami-
nation. The problem was that the Code did not provide for the use of
such procedure by the police judiciaire and thus there was much dis-
be compared to the Anglo-American concept of a felony. Delits can be compared
to the more serious Anglo-American misdemeanors and "contraventions" to the less
serious misdemeanors. It is pointed out that many offenses are brought before the Tri-
bunal Correctionnel which are within the jurisdiction of the Cour d'Assise. This is
accomplished by leaving out certain of the aggravating factors so that the offense has
become a delit and subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal Correctionnel. This
is done often for purposes of expediency and because it is less expensive since there is nojury trial. There is a better chance for conviction since the dossier is prepared by the
procureur de la R~publique and it is upon this that the court usually makes its decision.
For these reasons, the Tribunal Correctionnel has become the busiest criminal court in
France.
124 In the new code, the procureurs are not listed as members of the police judiciaire.
The police judiciaire is composed of: Officers, such as mayors and their assistants, offi-
cers and sergeants of the police force and police commissioners; agents, who are officials
of the active police department and members of the municipal police; officials and
agents to whom 'the law attributes certain judicial duties such as engineers, district chiefs
and technical agents of water supply and forests, as well as rural constables. C. P., Arts.
12-29.
125 C. P., Art. 14.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
cussion as to the legality of such action. Besides searches and seizures,
the suspect was frequently "invited" to appear for questioning before
the police judiciaire. During interrogations, the suspect was not in-
formed of the nature of the charge against him, nor was he permitted
to have counsel present because the Code did not apply to this in-
formal type of interrogation. There was also evidence of "third-
degree" methods being used to extract confessions. The enquete offi-
cieuse was justified on the following grounds: (1) It was necessary so
that the procureur should know how to dispose of the case. (2) It
saved time and expense. (3) If there were no enquete officieuse, it
would be necessary to have more juges d'instruction. (4) It gave an
innocent person a chance to exculpate himself without a formal inves-
tigation by the juge d'instruction. (5) The local police would arrive
more quickly at the truth than a juge d'instruction with a formal in-
vestigation.
The enquite officieuse was criticized because it placed arbitrary
power in the hands of subordinate officials. It also was contended that
the suspect should have the right to hear the charge and have counsel.
It was also argued that the juge d'instruction often accepted the results
of the enquete officieuse without making an investigation of his own.
Also, there was no provision for it in the Code. 26
Today, under the new Code, enquete officieuse has been given stat-
utory sanction. The police judiciaire on instructions from the pro-
cureur or acting by virtue of their office may carry out preliminary
inquiries. Searches and seizures can only be made with express agree-
ment of the person at whose house this takes place. If it is necessary to
hold a person more than 24 hours, he must be taken before the pro-
cureur de la RWpublique who can authorize a further 24 hour period.
During this period of detention, the suspect may be interrogated,
though the length and details of the interrogation must be noted by
the officer of the police judiciaire in a written report. A medical
examination of the suspect can be ordered by the procureur de la R6-
publique or by the suspect if he demands it after 24 hours. 2 7 It is pro-
vided that the procureur general can instruct the police judiciaire to
gather any information which he thinks will help him to administer
justice.12 The procureur de la Ripublique also has the power to direct
126 Keedy, op. cit. supra note 113, pp. 920-924.
127 C. P., Arts. 75-78.
128 C. P., Art. 38.
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their investigations.'29 The juge d'instruction as well, may delegate his
duties to the police judiciaire so that they have all the powers of the
juge d'instruction when acting within the limits of that investigation.
They are not allowed however, when acting in this capacity, to inter-
rogate or confront the accused. If it is necessary to detain a suspect,
they must bring him before the juge d'instruction within 24 hours. 3 °
In the case of a "flagrant"' ' crime or d6lit, the police judiciaire
must go to the scene of the offence and make any investigations which
would be useful. 3 2 They have the power to make searches and
seizures with little limitation. 3 They can also take evidence under
oath from people who they feel might be able to help. They may also
detain people in the interests of the inquiry for not more than 24 hours,
which period can be extended upon written authority from the
procureur de la R6publique or the juge d'instruction. Any interroga-
tions during this period must be noted as to length and details. The
suspect has the right to demand a medical examination after 24
hours.'3 4 The police judiciaire hand over the case to the procureur de
Ia R6publique upon his arrival. If the offence is a "flagrant" crime, the
procureur de la Ripublique may examine the suspect at once. If the
suspect brings counsel he cannot be questioned except in the presence
of that counsel. If the offence is a "flagrant" d6lit, the procureur may
place the suspect in custody after interrogation.'3 5 If the juge d'in-
struction is present, the procureur de la Ripublique and the officers of
the police judiciaire hand the case over to him and he proceeds with
the investigation.'3 6
Thus, the police judiciaire can make investigations and interrogate
the suspect upon delegation or instructions from the procureur
general, the procureur de la R6publique, the juge d'instruction, the
prefet, or by virtue of their own office. They also have additional
powers in the case of a "flagrant" crime or d6lit.
Juge d'instruction.-The juge d'instruction is chosen from the titu-
lar judges and nominated by a decree of the President of the Republic
129 C. P., Art. 41. A prefet (Administrative head of a departement) can, in urgent
cases, start an investigation by the police judiciaire. C. P., Art. 30.
130 C. P., Arts. 81, 151-154.
131 A "flagrant" crime or delit is one which is either in the very act of being perpe-
trated or which has just been perpetrated. It is "flagrant" when the suspected person
is being pursued by public hue and cry or is found in possession of objects, or shows
signs or indications which lead one to think that that person has just committed a crime
or delit. C. P., Art. 53.
132 C. P., Art. 54. 134 C. P., Arts. 60-64. 136 C. P., Art. 72.
'33 C. P., Arts. 56-59. 135 C, P.. Arts. 68-71.
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on introduction by the Council. 13 Like the procureur de la Republique
he functions within an arrondissement. Before the new Code, he was
considered an officer of the police judiciaire. In theory this was a
result of earlier law when the juge d'instruction collected evidence
against the accused as a major part of his duties which placed him in
the realm of the police judiciaire. Secondarily, he had decided along
with a council of three or more judges (chambre du conseil) whether
the accused should be brought to trial. This council (chambre du
conseil) was done away with in 1856 and all its duties were conferred
on the juge d'instruction. Thus, he became more of a judge than an
officer of the police judiciaire but he was still considered a member of
the police judiciaire until the enactment of the new Code. 138
It is the duty of the juge d'instruction to conduct an investigation1 39
known as the preliminary examination (instruction priparatoire). The
juge may make such an investigation in three cases only: when di-
rected by the procureur;140 when the person injured by a crime or
ddlit complains to the juge and constitutes himself a partie civile;141
when the offense is considered a "flagrant" delit, in which case the
juge on his own initiative may conduct an investigation. 142
It must be emphasized that the purpose of this investigation is to
determine whether there is enough evidence to hold the suspect for
trial. The juge is no longer a member of the police judiciaire but a
member of the "sitting magistracy" (magistrature assise) and thus pur-
sues his examination impartially in the sole interest of justice. He has
the right, more, a strict duty to find out the facts for himself in order
to discover the real truth. 43 The juge d'instruction in making this in-
vestigation is authorized by law to perform many and varied func-
tions. First, he makes use of all the information and evidence that may
137 C. P., Art. 50. 138 Keedy, op. cit. supra note 113, pp. 408, 409.
139 An investigation usually begins with one of the following: A complaint (plainte)
by the injured person; a denonciation which is an accusation by another person other
than the injured party; a written report of an officer of the police judiciaire who learned
of the offense in the course of his duties; by the procureur upon his own motion where
he has acquired personal knowledge of an offense. Keedy, ibid., at p. 412.
140 C. P., Art. 80.
141 The partie civile is the injured party. By filing a complaint (plainte) with the
juge he sets in motion a criminal prosecution and civil action for damages. It is an inter-
esting characteristic of French law that criminal and civil actions may be tried together.
The procureur can only instruct the juge not to investigate in this case if the facts
have no penal character. C. P., Arts. 85-91; Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117, pp. 11, 12.
142 C. P., Arts. 51, 72. In this case, he carries out all the duties of the police judiciaire
in the case of a flagrant crime or delit.
143 Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117, pp. 13, 14.
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have been gathered by the police judiciaire in their duties which have
just been discussed. Besides this he may (1) visit the scene of the
crime (transport) and make searches (perquisitions) and seizures
(saisies) ;144 (2) issue orders (mandats) to bring the suspect before
him and then to detain him; 145 (3) keep the accused detained (deten-
tion preventive) or grant him a conditional release (liberte provi-
soire);146 (4) interrogate the suspect (interrogatoire);147 (5) summon
and hear witnesses; 148 (6) reconstruct the crime (reconstitution) ;149
(7) appoint experts to conduct special investigations (expertises); 150
(8) delegate certain of his functions to other officials (delegation)."5
The most ancient feature of this investigation is the interrogation
(interrogatoire) of the suspect. It is also the most characteristic and
probably the most important part of the investigation since it may lead
to a confession and because the juge cannot order the committal for
trial until he has heard the suspect. The theoretical purpose of the
interrogatoire is the ascertainment of truth.
[I]t is necessary to consider it [the interrogatoire] as being at the same
time a means of defense and a means of investigation; its object is to hear the
explanations of the suspect for the purpose of verifying them, to record his
denials or his admissions, to search for the truth of the facts in his convincing
or contradictory statements. 5 2
The interrogatoire is conducted secretly in either the cabinet of the
juge or in the jail. The number of the interrogatoires is left entirely to
the discretion of the juge. All that occurs during the proceedings is
noted though the suspect is not under oath. 53 The suspect cannot be
questioned by anyone except the juge.'54
144 C. P., Arts. 92-100; Keedy, op. cit. supra note 113, pp. 693-697.
145 C. P., Arts. 122-136; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 697-701. These mandats also provide for
the immediate interrogation of the suspect within 24 or 48 hours or he will be freed.
146C. P., Arts. 137-150; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 701-705; Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117,
pp. 19-21. This provisional measure has been severely criticized.
147 C. P., Arts. 81, 114-121, 125, 133; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 705-712.
148C. P., Arts. 101-113; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 712-716.
149 Keedy, ibid., at p. 722. 1-50 C. P., Arts. 156-169; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 716-722.
151 C. P., Arts. 81, 151-155; Keedy, ibid., at pp. 723-727; Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117,
pp. 14, 15.
152 Faustin 'Helie as quoted by Keedy, ibid., at p. 706.
153 The Ordonnance of 1670 required that the accused be sworn. This was abolished
in 1789. Keedy, ibid., at p. 706.
154 The Code specifically states that even though the juge delegates his duties to the
police judiciaire, they still do not have the power to interrogate the suspect. C. P.,
Art. 152.
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The Code provides for at least two appearances of the suspect be-
fore the juge d'instruction. At his first appearance, the juge will verify
the identity of the suspect, tell him expressly each charge against him
and warn him that he is free not to make a declaration. If the suspect
wishes to make a declaration the juge takes it at once. If the juge is of
the opinion that the accused should be examined, he must inform the
suspect of his right to counsel. If the suspect wishes, he will have one
officially chosen for him.'55 The juge may carry out an immediate in-
terrogation if the matter is urgent,"5 6 but other than this, the first
appearance is regarded as a preliminary proceeding in order to inform
the suspect of his rights and give him an opportunity to explain away
the charge. Thus, as a general rule, the juge may not question the sus-
pect at his first appearance.
At least two days before the interrogation, counsel for the suspect
is summoned by a registered letter. The proceedings must also be
placed at the disposition of the counsel for the suspect at least 24 hours
before each interrogation. 1 7 The procureur may also be present at the
interrogatoire."I During the interrogatoire, the procureur and coun-
sel for the suspect can only ask questions after receiving the permis-
sion of the juge. 59 Counsel for the suspect listens to the interrogatoire
and makes notes. His role is to keep a check on the juge. If the suspect
refuses to answer, the juge is provided with no means of compulsion.
If the suspect persists, mention of this must be made in the proces-
verbal and if the suspect is brought to trial, the court may draw an un-
favourable inference from the fact of such refusal.
160
As soon as the juge d'instruction considers the investigation com-
pleted he sends the dossier to the procureur de la Ripublique, who
must return his order within 3 days. If the juge feels the facts do not
155 C. P., Art. 114. 1 5 0C. P., Art. 115.
157 Counsel for the suspect may also communicate freely with the suspect even though
he be in custody. C. P., Arts. 116, 118.
1,8 C. P., Art. 119. Prior to the new code, there was no legal sanction for the presence
of the procureur.
159 C. P., Art. 120. Under the Code of 1808, the suspect was not informed of the charge
against him. He was denied the right to have counsel present during the interrogation
and was frequently not allowed to communicate with anyone. The juge too often acted
as a prosecutor and attempted to procure confessions. In 1897, all this was abolished.
Keedy, op. cit. supra note 113, pp. 707, 708.
160 The Code states that the juge must warn the suspect at his first appearance that he
is free not to make a declaration. C. P., Art. 114. This is generally interpreted to apply
only to the first appearance and not to the interrogatoire. Keedy, ibid., at pp. 710, 711.
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constitute a crime, delit or contravention, he declares a non-suit by
decree. If he thinks the facts constitute a contravention, he decrees
that the case be remitted to the Tribunal de Simple Police. If he thinks
the facts constitute a delit, he decrees that the case be remitted to the
Tribunal Correctionnel. If he thinks the facts constitute a crime, he
decrees that the dossier and statement of evidence be sent by the
procureur de la Rdpublique to the procureur giniral at the Cour
d'Appel so that the Chambre d'Accusation can decide whether the sus-
pect should be held for trial.""
Thus, if the offence charged is a crime, there has probably been an
investigation by the police judiciaire under the procureur de la Re-
publique and an independent examination by the juge d'instruction.
The suspect has probably been interrogated by the police judiciaire
and by the juge d'instruction. The result of these investigations is all
contained in one dossier which is now sent up to the Chambre d'Accu-
sation which will decide if the suspect should be tried in the Cour
d'Assise.
THE CHAMBRE D'ACCUSATION
Each Cour d'Appel contains at least one Chambre d'Accusation. It
is composed of a full-time president and two counsellors who meet at
least once a week.162 The procureur g6ndral institutes proceedings
when he receives the dossier and juge's decree from the procureur de
la Rp-ublique and also informs each party by registered letter when
the case is to be heard. The hearing is carried out in the Chambre
du Conseil. Written arguments may be submitted by counsel for the
parties if they request to do so. The procureur gdneral and counsels
for the parties are allowed to make brief observations under the new
Code. The chanbre may also order parties to appear in person or have
evidence brought before it.l63
When the hearing is finished, the Chambre d'Accusation will discuss
161 C. P., Arts. 175-184. The procureur, suspect and partie civile all have the right
to appeal the juge's decree to the Chambre d'Accusation. C. P., Arts. 185-187.
162 C. P., Arts. 191-193. France introduced a grand jury in 1791 which differed from
the English version. In 1808 it was abolished because the French did not fully under-
stand its operation. To take its place, they instituted the Chambre du Conseil which was
abolished in 1856. Today, the Chanzbre d'Accusation fulfills their duties. Ploscowe,
op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 381-384. Also see Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117, pp. 23-25;
Keedy, op. cit. supra note 113, pp. 931-933.
163 C. P., Arts. 194-199. Under the old Code the proceedings were secret. The partie
civile or the suspect were not allowed to be present. The chambre did not hear any
witnesses but based its findings entirely on the dossier and the arguments of the pro-
cureur general as well as those submitted by the suspect. Keedy, ibid., at pp. 932, 933.
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the case in secrecy. The procureur general, the parties or their counsel
or the clerk cannot be present.' It can order any further investigation
it thinks necessary. It can also, with the agreement of the ministere
public, free the suspect. If it feels the facts constitute a de'lit or contra-
vention it refers the case to the proper tribunal. If it thinks the facts
constitute a crime, the chambre declares the case is to be referred to
the Cour d'Assise.'6 5 At this point the accused has probably been in-
vestigated and interrogated by the police judiciaire, the juge d'instruc-
tion and maybe even by the Chambre d'Accusation.
THE TRIAL
When the Chambre d'Accusation has committed the accused to trial
at the Cour d'Assise, the procureur gen6ral draws up a bill of indict-
ment (acte d'accusation) which is a resume of the charges and effects,
the service of this bill and the judgment of committal. He gives notice
of the list of the witnesses to be called by the prosecution and finally
transfers the accused and his dossier to the Cour d'Assise.
166
Before the trial begins, the accused makes his formal appearance and
seven qualified jurors are chosen by lot from the jury list for the ses-
sion .' 7 The accused can challenge up to 4 jurors, the prosecution only
3. The president then asks the accused his identity, receives tile oath
of the jurors, orders the reading of the judgment of committal and the
bill of indictment and then orders the witnesses to leave the court-
room.'
6 8
164 C. P., Art. 200.
165 C. P., Arts. 201, 202, 212-217. The Cbambre d'Accusation also hears appeals from
the decrees of the juge d'instruction and exercises a general supervision over all the pro-
ceedings of the preliminary investigation. C. P., Arts. 219-230.
166 Vouin, op. cit. supra note 117, pp. 164, 165.
167 The Code of 1808 provided that all questions of fact as to the guilt of the accused
lay with 12 jurors by majority vote. The court handled all questions of law. Mistrust
crept into this relationship and juries began returning verdicts of "not guilty" rather
than allow the court to impose an excessively severe sentence. In 1824, as a concession,
a law was passed allowing the court to find "extenuating circumstances" for mitigation
but the juries still persisted in their systematic acquittals. In 1832, as another concession,
a law was passed allowing the jury to find mitigating circumstances. Finally, after a
century of difficulty, it was decided in 1932 that the jury, after deliberating alone on
the question of guilt should join with the judges to decide on the sentence. In 1941,
the jurors were reduced from 12 to 6 and it was decided that the court and jury should
deliberate together on first, the question of guilt, and then the sentence all in one de-
liberation. In 1945, juries were increased to 7 people so that today a majority out of
10 people, 3 judges and 7 jurors, decide the innocence or guilt and sentence of the
accused. Vouin, ibid., at pp. 162, 163; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 389-391.
168 Vouin, ibid., at pp. 166, 167.
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The trial begins after the withdrawal of the witnesses with the
examination of the accused (l'examen de l'accuse) though such pro-
cedure is not prescribed by the Code. 69 This interrogation is often a
long monologue by the president dealing with the past history of the
accused including past offences. This is justified upon the theory that
both conviction and sentence must be taken into consideration in one
deliberation. The accused does not have to reply to the president's in-
terrogation though this may be held against him.170
Following the interrogation of the accused the witnesses are inter-
rogated (l'interrogatoire des temoins). In France, witnesses testify
"spontaneously," that is to say, without being questioned. After this
"spontaneous" testimony they may be questioned by the president, or
the parties through the president as intermediary. Then various steps
follow such as expert evidence, production of exhibits, or a visit to the
locus in quo. The prosecution then makes his plea for conviction
(la requisitoire). After this, if there is a partie civile, his counsel speaks,
followed by a representative of the ministere public and finally coun-
sel for the accused. The prosecution may reply but the accused is al-
ways given the final word.171 At this point the president used to sum
up the case for the jury, calling their attention to the most important
evidence produced and reminding them of their functions. Because it
was felt that such summing up was often unfavorable to the accused,
it was abolished in 1881.
The hearing concluded, the president draws up and reads the ques-
tions which are going to be put to the court for resolution. Each of
the questions are drawn up so that they can be answered "yes" or
"no." The court and jury then retire into a room to deliberate which
they cannot leave until they have reached a majority verdict. First,
they deliberate on guilt and then on penalty without interruption.
169 Under the "ancien regime" the president had always been able to interrogate the
accused. Before 1881, there were signs of a tendency among many judges to confine the
interrogatory to more reasonable limits or even to abandon it entirely. Then a law
was passed prohibiting the summing up of the judge at the close of the trial (le resume).
Deprived of the opportunity which the summing up affords him of expressing his opin-
ion, the judges revived the interrogatory so that what he formerly said in the resume,
he now says in the interrogatory. Other reasons suggested for this interrogation are:
the president's duty to expose the case to the jury; the president's discretionary power
to use whatever measures he deems necessary to bring out the truth; some feel this is
just a hang-over from the inquisitional procedure. Such procedure is prescribed by the
Code for the Tribunal Correctionnel and the Tribunal de Simple Police. Vouin, ibid.,
at pp. 167-169; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 388, 389.
170 Vouin, ibid., at p. 168; Ploscowe, ibid., at pp. 388, 389.
171 Vouin, ibid., at pp. 168, 169.
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The judgment is then read in open court without expressing the
grounds of the decision." 2
The French system of evidence appears quite shocking to the
Anglo-American jurist.
All evidence which is reasonably probative, whatever it may be, is admissible
in criminal proceedings because for us there is one supreme proof which over-
shadows all the others and alone decides the issue: this is what we term the
"profound personal conviction" (intime conviction) of the judge.'7 3
Like the judge, the duty of the juror is defined in his oath as follows:
You swear and promise before God and men . . . to decide in accordance
with the charges and the grounds of defence following your conscience and
your personal conviction (intime conviction), and with the impartiality and
firmness which befits a free and honest man. 174
The importance of this principle of evidence lies in the fact that
everything can be considered as evidence, up to the demeanor of the
accused at the trial.'7 5 The testimony of the accused in a system such
as this naturally plays a major part. Every interrogation that he takes
part in, from the police judiciaire, the procureur de la Ripublique, the
juge d'instruction or the Chambre d'Accusation is noted together with
other evidence in the dossier which is considered by the Cour d'Assise
where the accused is again interrogated. What the accused has said
during these interrogations will do much to shape the "personal con-
viction" of judge and jury.
THE PRESENT ENGLISH SYSTEM
ENGLISH CRIMINAL COURTS
In Norman times, the king's court was merely one of tile many
courts but as has been seen, it gradually encroached upon the jurisdic-
tion of other courts until it had jurisdiction of virtually all criminal
matters. This increase in judicial activity led to institutional changes
for since the king and his court could no longer travel around to
various counties and hear criminal cases, he and his court stayed in
Westminster while his representatives travelled around and tried cases
172 Vouin, ibid., at pp. 169, 170; Ploscowe, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 390.
173 Vouin, ibid., at p. 15.
174 Vouin, ibid., at p. 170.
175 "Nothing is silent, nothing is useless at the hearing: the countenance, the com-
posure or agitation, the variations and changes of expression, the various impressions
form a collection of signs which, to a greater or lesser extent, lift the veil enveloping
the truth." As quoted by Vouin, ibid., at p. 171.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
in his name.' 6 These itinerant justices visited counties three or four
times a year with commissions from the king to try and hear cases.
This became known as the Assize Court.177
However, since these justices of Assize had to hear civil cases as
well as criminal cases, they soon found that they were wasting valu-
able time on petty cases while not being able to handle all the serious
criminal cases, which were increasing in number. Therefore, statutes
were passed providing that worthy men should be appointed to keep
the peace and hear and determine felonies at sessions four times a year.
These men, known as justices of the peace, were appointed for coun-
ties and assembled four times a year to form the court known as Quar-
ter Sessions. They were allowed to try felonies but more difficult
cases were reserved for the judge at Assize. In the 15th and 16th cen-
turies, due to the volume of criminal cases, these justices were given
the power to hear and determine petty offences in a summary fashion.
They were also instructed to hold preliminary inquiries into allega-
tions of crime that might lead to trial at Assize or Quarter Sessions. 178
Today, the system is much the same. Petty offenses are now tried
summarily by justices sitting in a regular court house and following a
regular procedure. The name Magistrates' Court is given to this
court.179 These justices or magistrates also make preliminary inquiry
176 The king's court at Westminster soon split into judicial institutions and groups
of advisors and officials known as the King's Council. The judicial institutions became
known as: The Court of Common Pleas and handled disputes between subject and sub-ject; Court of the King's Bench which handled cases where the King was particularly
concerned; Court of Exchequer which handled revenue cases. The King's Council soon
divided into the House of Lords and the House of Commons. See Plucknett, op. cit.
supra note 29, pp. 83-106, 139-156.
177 Jackson, Machinery of Justice in England, pp. 4, 5 (2nd Ed. Cambridge, 1956).
One commission was that of "Oyer and Terminer," giving authority to try all prisoners
committed to a particular Assize. The other is that of "General Gaol Delivery," giving
authority to try all prisoners who are in gaol or who have been released on bail, what-
ever may have been the Assize at which the bills against them were preferred. The
same commissions are used today. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, pp. 453, 454 (16th
Ed. Cambridge, 1956).
178 A petty offense was dealt with summarily, there being virtually no rules of pro-
cedure. In a more serious case, the justices would hear evidence for the prosecution
in order to determine whether a prima facie case had been made out against the accused.
If so, the accused would be committed for trial at the next Assize or Quarter Sessions.
A grand jury of 23 men of substantial position was summoned who were presented
with a formal accusation, called an indictment, against the accused. The grand jury
heard the evidence of the prosecution and deliberating in secret, voted a true bill or a
no true bill. If they found a true bill, then the accused stood indicted and trial proper
would proceed before a trial jury. Jackson, ibid., at pp. 83, 84.
179They used to be called Petty Sessions and consisted of two or more lay justices
or one paid magistrate. In the metropolis, these same courts were often called "police
courts" due to the prominence of police in the proceedings. The justices of the Peace
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into indictable offenses and ascertain judicially whether the prosecu-
tion has produced evidence on which the accused ought to be sent for
trial at Assize or Quarter Sessions.18 0 Other courts of criminal jurisdic-
tion are the House of Lords, 1" the Court of Criminal Appeal' 8 2 and
the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice.'8 3
ENGLISH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Anglo-American criminal procedure is commonly called "accusa-
torial" in contrast to the "inquisitorial" system of the continent. Un-
der the accusatorial system, someone, usually called the prosecutor,
Act of 1949 changed their names to Magistrates' Courts. Though the terms magistrate
and justice are synonymous, the distinction is sometimes made that a magistrate is paid
while a justice is not. Jackson, ibid., at pp. 84, 85, 86.
180 Statutes have divided criminal offenses into: (1) Indictable offenses that must be
tried on indictment before a jury (almost all serious crimes are in this category); (2)
Indictable offenses that can be tried either on indictment or in Magistrates' Courts;
(3) Offenses that are both indictable and summary; (4) Summary offenses in which
the accused can demand trial on indictment; (5) Summary offenses triable only in sum-
mary courts. Jackson, ibid., at pp. 86, 87. The Assize courts can try any indictable
offense whatever and are the most important of the criminal courts of first instance.
The Quarter Sessions can try all indictable offenses with certain exceptions. In London,
the function of the Assizes is discharged by the Central Criminal Court commonly
known as the "Old Bailey." Kenny, op. cit. supra note 177; Jackson, ibid., at pp. 89,
90, 91.
181 The House of Lords has a two-fold jurisdiction as a court of appeal and as a court
of first instance. There may be an appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal on any
point of law which the Attorney General certifies to be of such exceptional public im-
portance that it is desirable to have the highest decision. Trial by peers was abolished
in 1948. Kenny, ibid., at pp. 449, 450; Jackson, ibid., at pp. 98, 105, 106.
182 The common law provided no court of appeal in criminal cases, so that judges
used to hold informal meetings to discuss questions of difficulty. This practice was
superseded by the establishment of a formal tribunal, the "Court for Crown Cases Re-
served" with power to determine points of law that arose upon the trial of any prisoner
at either the Assizes or Quarter Sessions. By the Judicature Acts, this jurisdiction was
transferred to the High Court of Justice. Finally in 1907, a more comprehensive prin-
ciple was established by the Criminal Appeal Act which created a general court of
criminal appeal over the law and fact. Kenny, ibid., at pp. 451, 452. Jackson, ibid., at
pp. 103-105.
183 This tribunal exercises the jurisdiction of the old King's Bench which passed to
the High Court by the Judicature Acts and there assigned to the Queen's Bench Di-
vision. It has original jurisdiction in 3 classes of offenses: (1) Any misdemeanor when
an information has been filed by the King's Attorney-General; (2) Any indictable
crime that has been committed in the county of London and the county of Middlesex;
(3) Any indictable crime, an indictment which has been found in some other court and
has since been removed by order into the Queen's Bench for trial. It can also review
the proceedings of Quarter Sessions or of any still lower tribunal. Kenny, ibid., at 452,
453. Jackson, ibid., at pp. 95-97. The Coroner's Court has a history of some seven
hundred years and was originally designed to collect fines for the king in criminal
cases. Its function is to hold inquests in violent or unnatural deaths. It is a fact finding
body incapable of trying any issue but if the verdict at the inquest is one of homicide
by a named person, then that person is committed for trial and it is equivalent to an
indictment. Kenny, ibid., at p. 456; Jackson, ibid., at pp. 98-100.
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formulates a charge and presents it against the accused who meets the
charge before a fair and impartial tribunal. 8 4 In England all prosecu-
tions are nominally at the suit of the Crown though in most cases, any
member of the public may prosecute. Thus, though there is a Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions who prosecutes the more serious cases,'8 5
the majority of cases are prosecuted by "private persons.' 81 6 The
majority of these private prosecutions are "police prosecutions," insti-
tuted by police officials, who from their own knowledge, or from
complaints, decide that a charge should be made.' 87
In both summary and indictable offenses, the presence of the de-
fendant is secured before the justices either by a summons, 8 a war-
rant'89 or an arrest.19 If the case is one that can be handled summarily,
184 In the "inquisitorial system," the judge himself investigates a complaint and then
upon finding out the facts for himself, decides what ought to be done according to
law. See Williams, op. cit. supra note 60, pp. 27, 28; Jackson, ibid., at pp. 60-62, 106.
185 The Director of Public Prosecutions is an official appointed by the Home Secre-
tary from barristers or solicitors of 10 years standing. His greatest importance lies in
the fact that he is the co-ordinating and controlling element throughout all prosecu-
tions. He has considerable power and influence. His main functions are to: give advice
on prosecution; to be kept informed on most offenses and prosecutions; to prosecute in
all cases punishable by death and in cases referred to him by government departments
or in any case which appears to him to be of importance or difficulty or which for any
other reason requires his intervention. Only a small proportion of actual prosecutions
are undertaken by the Director and then the actual steps are taken by members of his
staff or by a solicitor appointed by him. Jackson, ibid., at pp. 114-116.
186 The term "private persons" actually means practically any prosecution other
than by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Thus, the term includes a prosecution by
any citizen as well as a prosecution by a police officer acting under orders from his
chief which is called "police prosecution." Government departments or local authori-
ties also prosecute though usually by their own legal departments. These private prose-
cutors must usually hire their own solicitors unless the case falls under the jurisdiction
of the Director of Public Prosecutions. If the case is to be tried at Quarter Sessions or
Assize, a barrister must also be hired. Jackson, ibid., at pp. 108-110, 117.
187 The police usually conduct their own prosecutions in Magistrates' Courts while
for trials at Quarter Sessions or Assize they hire solicitors and barristers. Jackson, ibid.,
at pp. 110-113.
188 A summons is merely a formal written notification to the defendant that he is to
attend court on a given day. Jackson, ibid., at p. 118.
189 Between the 14th and 17th centuries, summonses and warrants developed and
took the place formerly occupied by the "hue and cry." Since Justices of the Peace
were assigned to keep the peace, they were also empowered to arrest a suspected per-
son. Rather than do it himself, the Justice authorized the constable to arrest the suspect
and make a search if necessary by virtue of a warrant. This right was after sone dis-
pute, finally recognized by statute in 1848. Stephens, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, pp.
189-192. Thus, today it is a special authorization for arrest. Kenny, op. cit. supra note
177, p. 472.
190 Arrest can be made by constables and private persons without a warrant under
certain circumstances. Kenny, ibid., at pp. 473-476. The person is entitled to know
upon what charge or suspicion he is seized. Failure to do so gives rise to an action of
false imprisonment. Kenny, ibid., at p. 476.
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the Magistrates' Court will proceed to deal with the matter. The sub-
stance of the charge is stated to the defendant who is then asked if he
admits its truth. If he denies its truth, the trial proceeds. The prose-
cutor opens his case by a speech and then calls his witnesses. The de-
fendant may then similarly open his case and his witnesses are similarly
heard. Neither side has the right to make a second speech. The deci-
sion of the justices is then given.''
If the offense charged is one that must be tried upon indictment, the
justices do not try the case but hold a preliminary inquiry. 9 2 The
magistrate sits as a judge with no interest in the case prior to the
examination.9 The testimony is open,9 4 accusatory and confronta-
tive. The accused has the right to counsel and cross-examination. The
presence of the accused is absolutely essential. The prosecutor begins
by opening his case with any necessary explanation and then calls his
witnesses who give their evidence exactly as they would at trial. 195
This finished, if the justices feel that a prima facie case has been made
out against the accused, the charge must be read to him and explained
in ordinary language. He must then be asked if he has anything to say
in answer to the charge, and told that he need not say anything but
that if he does say anything it will be taken down in writing and may
be used in evidence at the trial. The justices also ask the accused if he
wishes to be sworn and give evidence and if he wishes to call witnesses.
If he does so wish, the justices must proceed to take such evidence.
The accused may either remain silent or leave it to his counsel to make
a statement or make one himself. If the accused does make a state-
ment, it is taken down in writing and afterwards read over to him and
signed by one of the examining justices. The prisoner's witnesses, if
191 Kenny, ibid., at p. 460; Jackson, op. cit. supra note 177, pp. 119, 120.
192 The preliminary hearing is one of the modern developments of criminal pro-
cedure. Early law did not contemplate any preliminary inquiry into the guilt or inno-
cence of a defendant but he was tried immediately following an accusation, The in-
quest of the coroner having some characteristics of a preliminary investigation, prob-
ably influenced the passage of a series of statutes in the 16th century giving Justices of
the Peace the power to hold preliminary investigations. The Magistrate was not acting
judicially but inquisitionally interrogating the prisoner in secret without counsel for
the purpose of aiding the prosecution. Stephens, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, pp. 216-
229.
193 This change from the older system when he acted more like a prosecutor is no
doubt due to the establishment of a modern professional police force in the 19th cen-
tury thus allowing them to "get up" the case and leaving the judge a neutral arbiter.
194 Kenny indicates that despite statutory language preliminary examinations may
not be "open" in practice. Kenny, op. cit. supra note 177, p. 477.
195 The clerk takes down their testimony which is signed by each witness and is
known as a deposition.
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any, are examined and their evidence is taken down in writing and
signed by the witness and the justices." 6
The justices must then decide if there is a prima facie case against
the accused so as to commit him for trial at the Quarter Sessions or
Assize. In cases other than treason, the justices can decide to keep a
committed person in prison or release him upon a recognizance, usual-
ly with sureties, that he will surrender himself into custody to take his
trial when designated. 9 The depositions and a copy of any statement
the accused may have made are then transferred to the clerk of the
Quarter Sessions or Assize Court as the case may be. The clerk of the
trial court usually draws up the indictment and then signs it. Since
the abolition of the grand jury this is all that is necessary and the
prisoner stands indicted. 198 The accused must then appear in person at
the bar of the court to be arraigned by hearing the indictment read
and to plead to it. He may plead guilty, stand mute, take some legal
objection to the indictment or plead to it.'99 If the accused pleads "not
196 If represented by counsel, this advocate is heard either before or after the evi-
dence of the accused. If the accused himself gives evidence then the advocate with
consent of the justice may be heard before and after such evidence in which case the
prosecution is entitled to reply. Otherwise, the prosecution can make no second speech.
Kenny, op. cit. supra note 177, pp. 476-479; Jackson, op. cit. supra note 177, pp. 120, 121.
197 The right to bail is almost as old as the law of England itself because in the early
days there would otherwise have to be imprisonment until the sheriff made his tour,
which could be years. Thus, it was a matter of the greatest importance to receive a
provisional release from custody. Stephens, Vol. I, pp. 233-243. Today, in very few
serious offenses such as murder, bail is not granted, but otherwise it is discretionary.
The Bill of Rights also forbids excessive bail which amount is up to the judgment of
the justice himself. Jackson, ibid., at p. 121; Kenny, ibid., at pp. 480-482.
198 Up until 1933, a bill of indictment had to be presented before a grand jury of
from twelve to twenty-three persons. If the grand jury found a true bill, the bill be-
came an indictment and was presented to the petty Jury. The origins are seen in the
old Frankish inquests and the Assize of Clarendon of 1166. Their duty was merely to
decide whether there was a prima facie case for presentation to a petty jury. They
heard the evidence of the prosecution in secret and saw neither the defendant nor his
witnesses. In 1933, the grand jury was abolished for reasons of economy. Kenny, ibid.,
at pp. 487,488; Jackson, ibid., at p. 122.
It must also be remembered that an accused person can be brought to trial by other
means than through the process of commitment by a justice. An information, that is, a
written complaint made on behalf of the crown by one of its officers and filed in the
Queen's Bench Division dispenses with an examination before a Justice of the Peace. It
can only be used in misdemeanors. There can also be an indictment by a coroner's in-
quisition in the case of homicide which dispenses with a preliminary examination.
Kenny, ibid., at p. 486. Today any person can prefer a bill of indictment charging an
indictable offense provided that the accused has been committed for trial or that the
bill is preferred by direction or with consent of a judge of the High Court. This bill
becomes an indictment when signed by the proper clerk.
199 Kenny, ibid., at pp. 496-501.
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guilty," the next stage in the proceedings is trial by jury, the history
of which has already been discussed.
A panel list of qualified jurors is returned by the sheriff in each
county at every Assize from which the clerk calls 12 names whom the
accused may challenge.200 The jury is then sworn and in cases of
felony or treason, the indictment is read to them, which is known as
"charging" the jury.2°1
The prosecution then "opens" the case by addressing the jury in
order to direct their minds to the main issues in dispute, telling them
what evidence he plans to introduce and explaining its bearing on the
case. He then calls his witnesses who are examined in chief, cross-
examined and re-examined, successively.20 2 This done,0 3 the counsel
for the defense "opens" his case and then his witnesses are examined,
cross-examined and re-examined. Counsel for the defense then makes
a second speech summing up the defense to which the prosecution
makes a speech in reply. The testimony of the accused will be con-
sidered in the following sections.
Following the full statements of the cases for each side, it becomes
the duty of the judge to sum up the case to the jury. He directs the
jury as to any points of law that are involved in the case and also
addresses them as to the relevancy and value of the evidence. 0 4 After
the summing-up, the jury retires to consider its verdict which must be
unanimous.
200 The qualifications for jurors are: 1) over 21 years of age; 2) must be the owner, in
fee or forlife, of lands or tenements worth 10 pounds a year or by long leaseholds
worth 20 pounds a year or else the occupier of a house rated at 20 pounds a year. Chal-
lenges are rare in England probably because there is not so great a fear of prejudice
as in America where the divergence between people is much greater. Kenny, ibid., at
pp. 503, 504.
201 Kenny, ibid., at p. 504.
202 The crown counsel is a minister of justice whose function is to assist the jury in
arriving at the truth. "It is not his duty to obtain a conviction by all means." "The
Crown has no interest in procuring a conviction. Its only interest is that the right
person should be convicted, that the truth should be known, and that justice should be
done." Kenny, ibid., at p. 505, quoting Sir. J. Holker and Lord Hewart.
203 Defense counsel may ask that the case be withdrawn from the jury because the
prosecution has not established a prima facie case. As a general rule, the prosecution
must close their case before the defense begins and stand or fall by the evidence they
have given. However, if some new matter arises, "which no human ingenuity can
foresee" the judge may himself call a witness. He may also do so when the case for
the defense is closed. Kenny, ibid., at pp. 505, 506.
204 The Court of Criminal Appeal sets an enforceable standard that the summing-up
be adequate and accurate. The judge may also ask the jury to answer definite questions
of fact which they are entitled to refuse and if they prefer, return a general verdict.
Kenny, ibid., at p. 507.
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THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898205
The provisions of this Act can be more easily understood in the
light of the foregoing historical development of English criminal pro-
cedure. Early criminal procedure, through a system of proofs such as
ordeals, compurgation or trial by battle, placed the burden of proof
directly on the accused to exculpate himself. Since these proofs were
permeated with the religious element, any other method of trial would
probably have seemed as revolting to an accused person as these
methods of proof seem to us today. When these methods of proof
were gradually done away with, there was little public reaction be-
cause society had accepted the fact that they were barbaric and out-
moded. Likewise, society accepted the introduction of trial by jury or
"trial by the countryside" because it was familiar with this manner of
procedure. There was no reaction against the interrogation of the
accused during this trial because there was no reason why the accused
should not be interrogated. It was quite logical to question the ac-
cused since he should know more about his innocnece or guilt that
anyone else and besides, a society used to ordeals, trial by battle and
compurgation could see nothing wrong with merely questioning an
accused person.
However, when ecclesiastical courts and then later, the Star Cham-
ber began to question people without first accusing them by one of the
time honored methods to which the public was accustomed, there
was a reaction. The English people did not like this arbitrary question-
ing of any person by the courts or government. For centuries a per-
son had always been accused by one of the formal methods of accusa-
tion before he went to trial where he was interrogated freely. This
was all right, but to call a person in and question him without accusa-
tion seemed abhorrent to the English people. The reaction against this
interrogation continued for centuries. With each year it became a
broader and more traditional principle than the year before until final-
ly, at the end of the 17th century, it was claimed flatly that, "no man
is bound to incriminate himself."
Historically it is presumed that civil parties to a suit were first held
incompetent to testify as witnesses because this would be invoking
another manner of trial into trial by jury which would be completely
unnecessary. However, after some centuries, courts theorized that a
party to a suit was incompetent because of his interest in the case and
205 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36 (1898).
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that therefore he was sure to lie and sure to be believed by the court
and jury. This rule was subsequently adopted by the criminal courts.
Originally, this rule and the principle behind it were not questioned.
Society felt that there was nothing unfair in this rule and especially so
in criminal cases, for there the accused was allowed to tell his story in
the form of an unsworn statement. When Bentham attacked this rule
and the principle behind it, he set off a chain of public reaction which
led to the abolition of the rule in civil procedure. This was an age of
reform in England and fairness to the accused was uppermost in the
English mind. Thus, because of Bentham's arguments and the argu-
ments of many of his followers, because of the fact that many Ameri-
can states had already made the accused a competent witness, but most
of all, because this was an age of reform, the movement began in
England to make the accused a competent witness.
In the face of this great public demand, the legislature realized that
if it did make the accused a competent witness, other problems would
arise. The first problem was the privilege against self-incrimination.
If they made the accused competent and compellable, the privilege
would be violated. If the accused was competent and exercised his
privilege by not taking the stand an adverse inference would be
formed by the jury. Thus, an adverse inference would be formed by
the exercise of a traditional English right. Would the possibility of
such an inference create a moral coercion on the accused to testify?
If the accused did testify, did he waive his privilege? If so, to what
extent did he waive his privilege? If the accused was made a competent
witness should he also have the right to make an unsworn statement?
Further, another problem was created by the dual capacity 'the
accused would represent in testifying. On one hand, he would be a
witness whose credibility could be attacked by evidence of his bad
character. As the accused, however, the prosecution does not have the
right to introduce evidence of his bad character on the grounds that
such evidence would be prejudicial unless the accused has put his
character in issue by introducing evidence of his good character.
These were some of the problems facing the English legislature which
they attempted to solve by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 which
(in so far as pertinent) provides:
I. Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or husband, as the case
may be, of the person so charged, shall be a competent witness for the
defence at every stage of the proceedings, whether the person so charged
is charged solely or jointly with any other person. Provided as follows:
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a) A person so charged shall not be called as a witness in pursuance of
this Act except upon his own application:
b) The failure of any person charged with an offence, or of the wife or
husband, as the case may be, of the person so charged, to give evidence
shall not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution:
c) The wife or husband of the person charged shall not, save as in this
Act mentioned, be called as a witness in pursuance of this Act except
upon the application of the person so charged:
d) Nothing in this Act shall make a husband compellable to disclose any
communication to him by his wife during the marriage, or a wife com-
pellable to disclose any communication made to her by her husband dur-
ing the marriage:
e) A person charged and being a witness in pursuance of this Act may be
asked any question in cross-examination notwithstanding that it would
tend to criminate him as to the offence charged:
f) A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall
not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question
tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been
charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged,
or is of bad character unless-
(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other
offence is admissable evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence
wherewith he is then charged; or
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses
for the prosecution with a view to establishing his own good char-
acter, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or
conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the
character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the
same offence:
g) Every person called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall, unless
otherwise ordered by the court, give his evidence from the witness box
or other place from which the other witnesses give their evidence:
b) Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of section eighteen of the
Indictable Offences Act, 1848, or any right of the person charged to
make a statement without being sworn.
2. Where the only witness to the facts of the case called by the defence is the
person charged, he shall be called as a witness immedately after the close
of the evidence for the prosecution.
3. In cases where the right of reply depends upon the question whether evi-
dence has been called for the defence, the fact that the person charged has
been called as a witness shall not of itself confer on the prosecution the
right of reply.
The act first of all provides that the accused is a competent witness.
Further, he is a competent witness at "every stage of the proceedings."
This has been interpreted to mean that the accused may give evidence
under oath before a magistrate both in summary and indictable
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offenses,20 6 in extradition proceedings,1 7 at the trial itself and after
verdict in mitigation of punishment. 8 It has also been held that by
virtue of this statute, a judge must inform the accused of his right to
give evidence or make a statement.20 9 However, in recognizing the
privilege against self-incrimination, the legislature provided that the
accused can only be called upon his own application so that he is not
compellable.2 10
If the accused does choose to testify, he does so under sanction of
oath and is therefore punishable for perjury."' By choosing to testify,
the legislature also provided that the accused thereby waived his
privilege against self-incrimination to the extent specified in the Act.
Thus, upon cross-examination the accused may be asked any question
even though it would incriminate him as to the offense charged. 212 If
the accused refuses to answer upon cross-examination because it may
incriminate him as to the offence charged, he may be punished for
contempt, and whatever evidence he has given will not be received. 13
However, if the accused does choose to testify, he cannot be asked
and if asked, does not have to answer any question that will show he
has committed or has been convicted of any other offense or is of bad
character. 14 In Charnock v. Merchant,215 a conviction was quashed
200R. v. Bird, 19 Cox Cr. Cas. 180 (1898). The accused refused to give evidence at
his trial but a statement he made during his preliminary hearing before a magistrate
after caution was admitted. The privilege against self-incrimination was not involved
since he had waived it by voluntarily giving testimony.
207 R. v. Kams, as quoted in Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, Vol. II, p. 864; Phipson,
Evidence, p. 473 (London, 1956).
208 R. v. Wheeler, [1917] 1 K.B. 283.
209 "There is no doubt that the satisfactory course is that a prisoner's attention
should be pointedly directed to his or her right to give evidence or make a statement."
R. v. Yeldham, 128, L.T.R. 28, 30 (1923); R. v. Village, 20 Cr. App. Rep. 150 (1927);
R. v. Malvoici, 73 J.P. 392 (1809).
210 Since the Act provides that the accused can only be called for the defense, it was
held that he could not testify before the grand jury in an early case. Q. v. Rhodes,
[1898] 1 Q.B. 77. The wife or husband of the accused, as the case may be, is also com-
petent but not compellable except upon application of the accused.
211 R. v. Wookey, 63 J.P. 409 (1899). 212 Sec.1 (e).
213R. v. Senior, 34 L.J. 100 (1899); R. v. Minihane, 16 Cr. App. Rep. 38 (1921). Also
see R. v. Paul, [1920] 2 K.B. 183, where a co-defendant pleaded guilty and was then
cross-examined so as to incriminate his co-defendant. The theory of the court was the
fact that he was called as a witness for the defense and thus subject to cross-examination.
214 Sec. 1 (f).
215 [1900] 1 Q.B. 474. "Whether a question put to a person charged with a crime and
called as a witness tends to show, within the meaning of § 1, clause (f), of the Criminal
Evidence Act, 1898, that he has committed or been convicted of or charged with any
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because the accused had been asked upon cross-examination, over ob-
jection, if he had been previously convicted of a similar offense. Thus,
as a general rule, the legislature provided that the accused only waives
the privilege of self-incrimination to the extent of the particular
offense charged. However, there are exceptions to this general rule.
If proof of another offense will prove that the accused is guilty of the
particular offense with which he is charged, it will be admitted into
evidence under the theory of relevancy.216
In handling the question of the character of the accused, the legis-
lature laid down the general rule that evidence of his bad character
cannot be introduced upon cross-examination because such evidence
would be prejudicial. As exceptions to this general rule, it was pro-
vided that if the accused gives evidence of his good character or asks
questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish-
ing his own good character, the prosecution may attack his character
upon cross-examination by asking about past offenses or his bad char-
acter upon the theory that the accused has put his character in issue.217
Also, if the accused makes imputations as to the character of the
prosecutor or witnesses for the prosecution, he is again subject to
questions involving past offenses and bad character upon cross-exami-
nation.218 Finally, if he has given evidence against another person
charged with the same offense, he can be cross-examined as to past
offenses or character.219 Some of these rules have been severely criti-
offense other than that with which he is charged cannot be decided by looking merely
at the single question. Each question must be judged by the light of others asked
before and after." R. v. Ellis, [1910] 2 K.B. 746. Also see R. v. Haslam, 12 Cr. App.
Rep. 10 (1916) where a conviction was quashed because the prisoner had been placed
in the dilemma of having to admit he had been in prison or commit perjury.
216 Sec. 1 (f), (i). This is merely a reassertion of the common law rule as stated ini
Makin v. Att. Gen. for N.S.W., [1894] A.C. 57, 65. "The mere fact that evidence ad-
duced tends to show the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if
it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be relevant if it bears on the ques-
tion whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were
designed or accidental, or to rebut a defense which would be otherwise open to the
accused." Also see, R. v. Bell, [1911] A.C. 47.
217 Sec. 1, (f), (ii). R. v. Winfield, 27 Cr. App. Rep. 139 (1939); Stirland v. Director
of Public Prosecutions, 30 Cr. App. Rep. 40 (1949).
218 Sec. 1 (f), (ii). R. v. Hudson, [1912] 2 K.B. 464; R. v. Morrison, 6 Cr. App. Rep.
159 (1911);R.v. Wilson, 11 Cr. App. Rep. 251 (1915).
219 Sec. 1 (f), (iii). R. v. Hadwen, [1902] I K.B. 882; R. v. Seigley, 6 Cr. App. Rep.
106 (1911). To avoid complications due to the refined study of case law, the rules as to
cross-examination to credit of the accused have been simply stated as follows:
1. The accused in the witness-box may not be asked any question "tending to show
that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offense other
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cized because of their unfairness to the accused. The prosecution may
attack all his witnesses and counsel but if he makes any imputation as
to the bad character of the prosecutor or his witnesses, he risks letting
in his whole past record.
UNSWORN STATEMENTS
Before the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, the accused had the right
to make an unsworn statement. By Sec. I (h), this right was preserved
in simple, straightforward, unexplanatory language. Since there was
very little parliamentary debate on this provision and since the com-
mentaries likewise gave it perfunctory treatment, some problems have
arisen as to its application. 220 The most important problem is, why was
the right to make an unsworn statement preserved? The legislature, in
passing this Act, was attempting to establish a system whereby the
accused would be able to give evidence under oath without interfer-
ing with his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to object
to the introduction by the prosecution of any evidence of his bad
character unless he had put his character in issue. How then, does the
right to make an unsworn statement fit into this scheme?
Superficially, it would seem that once the accused was allowed to
than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character" unless one or the
other of the three conditions set out in paragraph (f) of Section 1 of the Act of
1898 is fulfilled.
2. He may, however, be cross-examined as to any of the evidence he has given in chief,
including statements as to his good record, with a view to testing his veracity or
accuracy, or to showing that he is not to be believed on his oath.
3. An accused who "puts his character in issue" must be regarded as putting the whole
of his past record in issue. He cannot assert his good conduct in certain respects with-
out exposing himself to inquiry as to the rest of his record so far as this tends to
disprove a claim for good character.
4. An accused is not to be regarded as depriving himself of the protection of the sec-
tion, because proper conduct of his defense necessitates the making of injurious re-
flections on the prosecutor or his witnesses; Turner, 30 Cr. App. Rep. 9; [1944] K.B.
463.
5. It is no disproof of good character that a man has been suspected, or accused, of a
previous crime. Such questions as "Were you suspected?" or "Were you accused?"
are inadmissible because they are irrelevant to the issue of character, and can only be
asked if the accused has sworn expressly to the contrary (see rule 2 above).
6. The fact that a question put to the accused is irrelevant is in itself no reason for
quashing the conviction, though it should have been disallowed by the Judge. If the
question is not only irrelevant but is unfair to the accused as being likely to distract
the jury from considering the real issues, and so lead to "a miscarriage of justice"
(Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, § 4 (1)), it should be disallowed and if not disallowed,
is a ground on which an appeal against conviction may be based." Stirland v. Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions, 30 Cr. App. Rep. 40, 54, 55, (1944).
220 See Cowen & Carter, Legal Essays, p. 205 (Oxford, 1956).
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testify and give evidence under oath, the need for and reason for
allowing unsworn statements has disappeared. Such was the position
of a British judge in 1902 until his attention was called to the statutory
reservation whereupon he allowed the unsworn statement to be
made.22'1 Canada gave the accused the right to testify under oath with-
out any express reservation in regard to the right of the accused to
make an unsworn statement. There, the right to make an unsworn
statement has been held to be abrogated by the Act which gave the
accused the right to testify under oath. 222 However, in England be-
cause of Sec. 1 (h) the right still survives and as such, presents many
questions. Are such statements evidence? Can the accused make an
unsworn statement and still call evidence? What time in the trial
should such statements be made? Is an accused person represented by
counsel entitled to make such a statement? Finally, it may be asked,
what is an unsworn statement and why was the right to make one pre-
served by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898? The most important of
the above questions and the one upon which the other questions turn,
concerns the probative value of the unsworn statements. Are they, or
are they not, evidence?
In the 16th century the accused and counsel for the Crown grap-
pled in furious verbal argument. The accused, in effect, gave unsworn
evidence on his behalf and was examined on that evidence ".22  So long
as the prisoner was not allowed counsel or witnesses he had to speak
for himself. However, when the accused could call witnesses, they
were at first not sworn and yet their evidence was considered. At the
same time, the civil rule making parties incompetent was being
221 "Now that the prisoner is entitled to give evidence on his own behalf under the
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, is not his right to make a statement gone." R. v. Pope, 18
T.L.R. 717, 718 (1902).
222 It is "extremely probable" that had it not been for the saving clause in the Imperial
Evidence Act 1898, it would have been there held that the privilege of making an un-
sworn statement was abrogated by that Act. The privilege was granted to prisoners be-
cause they were debarred from giving evidence on oath and for that reason alone.
When the law was changed and the right accorded to them to tell their story on oath
as any other witness the reason for making the unsworn statement was removed. R. v.
Krafchenko, 17 D.L.R. 244, 250 (1914). Also see Kerr v. The Queen, [1953] N.Z.L.R.
75, 78.
223 Stephens, op. cit. supra note 30, Vol. I, p. 326; "his statements covered without
distinction whatever he had to say of law, of evidence, and of argument. In effect, he
furnished evidence, i.e. material which affected the jury's belief; but he was not sworn,
he had no standing as a witness, and in theory of the law he therefore gave no evidence."
Vigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. II, p. 684. "A prisoner's statements were not evi-
dence because he could not be sworn." Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. IX, p.
195.
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adopted by criminal courts. The double effect of these two factors is
represented by a case in 1681 wherein the judge said to the accused:
Make you your observations upon the proof, that is proper for you to do;
and urge it as well as you can, and to the best purpose you can: But to tell
us long stories of passages between you and others that are not a whit proved,
that is not usual, nor pertinent.
In the same case, another judge said:
It is your part to sum up the evidence on your own side, and to answer that
which is proved upon you, if you can .... But to tell stories to amuse the
jury.., and to run out into rambling discourses to no purpose, that is not to be
allowed, nor ever was in any court of justice.2 24
This clearly indicates that what the accused said was not evidence.
Since he was allowed witnesses, they proved his case along with other
evidence. Why then was he allowed to speak? Simply because the
prosecutor for the Crown was allowed to comment on the evidence
and argue before the jury thus giving him an unfair advantage over
the accused who had no counsel. In the interest of justice, the accused
was allowed to comment or argue on the evidence. This viewpoint
occurred again and again.225
When counsel was allowed to the accused, some judges logically
held that when counsel had spoken, the accused could not because
then counsel would argue or comment on the evidence and there was
no need for the accused to make a statement.2 26 Other judges, however,
224 Colledge's Trial, 8 S.T. 550, 681 (1681).
225 Coleman's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 1, p. 65 (1678), where the following dialogue
took place:
COLEMAN: "I came home the last day of August."
JUD.E: "Have you any witnesess to prove that?"
COLEMAN: "I cannot say I have a witness."
J UDGE: "Then you say nothing."
This case was discussed in Cowen & Carter, op. cit. supra note 220, p. 210. Other ex-
amples are R. v. Rider, 8 C. & P. 539, 540 (1838), where it was said: "If the prisoner
were allowed to make a statement, and stated as a fact anything which could not be
proved by evidence, the jury should dismiss that statement from their minds; but if
what the prisoner states is merely a comment on what is already in evidence, his counsel
can do that much better than he can." Also of interest is the common law decision of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts where it was stated that: "[tihe statement
or address of a defendant in the circumstances here disclosed is not evidence. It is
merely a statement or address to be considered by the jury for what it is worth in the
light of all the conditions under which it is given. No finding can be founded by the
jury on the strength of such a statement, but every finding essential to the verdict must
rest upon the evidence and testimony presented in the usual way and under customary
safeguards as to competency and credibility." Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9,
151 N.E. 74, 77 (1922).
226 "Prisoner, your counsel has spoken for you. I cannot hear you both." R. v.
Boucher, 8 C. & P. 141 (1837); R. v. Burrows, 2 M. & Rob. 124 (1838); R. v. Rider,
8 C. & P. 539 (1838).
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were prepared to make concessions in favor of a prisoner and allowed
him to make unsworn statements even though defended by counsel.227
This became the regular practice. Cases also began to appear where
the accused not only commented on the evidence but alleged new
facts as well. 221 Why were these concessions made? First, many judges
thought it unfair that the accused was not able to testify under oath
and therefore not able to tell his story. It was also seen that it was im-
possible for a prisoner to address the jury without bringing in new
matter and so many judges allowed it in.22' Theoretically and histori-
cally, the proper purpose of the prisoner's address was comment and
argument on the evidence. It was only laxity on the part of many
judges due to the injustice of shutting the mouth of the accused that
statements of new facts were allowed. This did not change the charac-
ter of the prisoner's statements. They were not and are not evidence
but only to be considered as an address or argument on the testimony
and the whole case. 20
The confusion arose because in cases like R. v. Sbimmin it was
stated:
True his statement was not made on oath, and that he was not liable to be
cross-examined by the prosecuting counsel, and what he said was therefore
not entitled to the same weight as sworn testimony. Still it was entitled to such
consideration as the jury might think it deserved. 23'
Thus, today in the absence of a clear cut modem English decision,
there are authorities who hold that unsworn statements are evidence
and authorities who say they are not. In considering the problem,
reference must be had to some New Zealand and Australian decisions.
The New Zealand Supreme Court has stated:
The statement thus permitted to be made must have some place in the body
of material on which the jury are asked to decide whether the accused is guilty
or not guilty-else why allow it all? In cases where a statement is made the
usual practice is for the presiding judge to point out to the jury that the state-
227 R. v. Malings, 8 C. & P. 242 (1838); R. v. Dyer, 1 Cox Cr. Cas. 113 (1844). "I would
never prevent a prisoner from making a statement though he has counsel"; R. v. Shim-
min, 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 122 (1882).
228R. v. Malings, 8 C. & P. 242 (1838); R. v. Walkling, 8 C. & P. 243 (1838), wherein
Baron Gurney expressing doubts as to this practice stated, "I think that it ought not
to be drawn into a precedent."
229 See 26 Austr. L.J. 166, 167 (1952); also see Best, op. cit. supra note 69, Par. 635.
230 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. 1I, p. 702.
231 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 122, 124 (1882). Also see R. v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 142 (1837) where
it was stated that an unsworn statement, "is to have such weight with the jury as, all
circumstances considered it is entitled to."
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ment is not legal evidence because it has not been made under oath or subjected
to the test of cross-examination, but that, having regard to the other materials
before them, they may give it such weight as in the circumstances they con-
sider it deserves.232
On the other hand, the Court of Criminal Appeal of Queensland
after an elaborate survey of the authorities made this statement in
R. v. McKenna:
[A]n unsworn statement by an accused person is not evidence. It should be
accorded persuasive rather than probative force. The practice has grown up
of allowing a prisoner to make statements of fact, but those statements are not
evidence of the facts stated. Such statements of fact have come to be regarded
as something less than evidence but something more than mere argument.2 ': 1
One other viewpoint to be considered is that one proposed by the
Supreme Court of New South Wales in R. v. Riley, which stated:
As a general rule, no material can be placed before a Court to establish a
fact unless it is verified by oath. The Legislature may, however, if it chooses,
depart from this general rule to any extent that it considers desirable .... The
Legislature of New South Wales has thought fit to provide that an unsworn
statement may be made by an accused person before the jury who are trying
them. In our opinion, this must be regarded as "proof" in the sense of material
to which the jury are entitled to give such weight as they think it deserves,
for the purpose of determining whether the accused person has a lawful excuse
within the meaning of the section. There is nothing in the section which states
expressly or impliedly that proof may be given only by sworn statements.2"4
The fallacy of this reasoning lies in the fact that the Legislature
have preserved the right to make an unsworn statement in Sec. 1 (11).
This has in no way affected the status of an unsworn statement as
232 Perry v. Pledger, [1920] N.Z.L.R. 21, 25. In Victoria, Australia, where the accused
is statutorily allowed to make unsworn statements as to facts, this statement was made
upon appeal to the High Court of Australia: "[T]he jury should take the prisoner's
statement as prima facie a possible version of the facts and consider it with the sworn
evidence, giving it such weight as it appears to be entitled to in comparison with the
facts clearly established by evidence." Peacock v. R., 13 Commonw. L.R. 619 (1911).
Also see Mack v. Murray, 5 V.L.R. 416 (1879).
283 44 St. R. Qd. 299, 307 (1951). The trial judge who had given the instruction stating
that an unsworn statement was not evidence was Mansfield, S.P.J. Also see R. v. Morri-
son, 10 L.R.N.S.W. 197 (1889) where an unsworn statement was held not to be evi-
dence. It was stated that an unsworn statement should be regarded "in the same light
as the speech of counsel. As a counsel can suggest upon the evidence what perhaps is
the real state of facts, different from those deposed to by the wimesses for the Crown,
so it is competent for a prisoner to make suggestions as to the real facts being different
to those deposed to by the witnesses." Very curiously, R. v. Chantler, 12 L.R.N.S.W.
116 (1891), affirms the Morrison decision and then states that the prosecution may call
evidence to rebut such a statement which seems incongruous if such statements are not
evidence.
234 40 S.R.N.S.W. 111, 116 (1940).
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evidence or not. Therefore, if unsworn statements were not evidence
before the Act, they still are not evidence.
It is argued by Professor C. K. Allen 3 5 that unsworn statements are
evidence. He cites R. v. Maybrick wherein Mrs. Maybrick, the ac-
cused, in making an unsworn statement blundered and thus "put the
rope around her neck." He states that this was "evidence of the high-
est importance, though to the great disadvantage of the prisoner."
Just because it was evidence against the accused, however, does not
mean that unsworn statements are evidence for the accused. 30 Mrs.
Maybrick's statement was an admission and hence an exception to
the hearsay rule and thus evidence.
Professors Cowen and Carter 237 also argue that unsworn statements
are evidence. Their chief argument is based upon the reasoning of the
court in R. v. Riley, which has been exposed as fallacious. They
further argue, "if the reason is that it is unsworn and untested, our
statute law expressly recognizes that statements of fact may be evi-
dence, although not given under oath. ' 23 8 Because an unsworn state-
ment is not under sanction of oath and does not undergo the test of
cross-examination, it would certainly not meet many definitions of
evidence. 239 However, that is not pertinent because as has been shown,
the whole theoretical and historical purpose of the unsworn statement
has been to allow the accused a chance to argue his case in a "state-
ment" to the jury. Certainly, during periods of laxity, the courts
allowed the accused to introduce new facts into his "statement" which
were not in evidence. These facts were not and are not evidence as
some courts have mistakenly held in the most difficult problem of
23a- 69 Law Quarterly Review, p. 22 (1953).
230 See Note R. v. Shinunin, 15 Cox. Cr. Cas. 122, 124 (1882) wherein a quotation
from R. v. Haines is cited: "The prisoner's statement is evidence against him but not
for him."
237 Cowen and Carter, op. cit. supra note 220, p. 205.
238 Cowen and Carter, ibid., at p. 216. They then cite the Children and Young Persons'
Act, (1933) which provides for the admission of unsworn evidence of children upon
the entirely different theory that children would not understand the sanction of an oath.
Also such evidence is subject to collaboration which distinguishes it again from an un-
sworn statement.
239 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. II, p. 684, rejects unsworn statements as evi-
dence because they are neither sworn nor subject to cross-examination. So does Holds-
worth, op. cit. supra note 32, Vol. IX, p. 195. Cowen and Carter, ibid., at p. 216, define
evidence as "that which may be placed before the Court in order that it may decide
the issues of fact." Thus, they feel that unsworn statements are evidence. To become
involved in the semantical problem of evidence would only serve to further confuse the
issue.
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trying to instruct the jury on how to regard these statements. They
were and are the argument of the accused to the court and jury on
his whole case. This answers the question posed in Perry v. Pledger,
-"else why allow it at all?" The legislature in 1898 gave the accused
the right to give evidence under oath. It preserved the right of making
an unsworn statement so that every accused would have the right to
argue his case to the jury.
Before the Act, there was some divergence as to when the accused
should make his unsworn statement. Some courts held that he should
address the jury before the speech by his counsel while others held
that he should do so after the speech by his counsel. In R. v. Sheriff,24°
it was held that a prisoner's unsworn statement must be made before
the counsel for the prosecution sums up the case and before his own
counsel addresses the court. It is suggested that this is the proper ruling
and the one to be followed.24'
That the accused may make an unswom statement despite the em-
ployment of counsel, seems to be quite settled.242 However, in 1885 in
R. v. Millbouse,243 it was held that the accused could not make an
unsworn statement if he had called witnesses. The court stated:
If it were allowed, the result would be that, after counsel had made a defence
and called witnesses to facts, that then the prisoner, who was not liable to be
cross-examined, could supplement what had been said by his counsel and wit-
nesses, and supply facts by means of a statement made without the sanction
of an oath, which it would be impossible to test by the ordinary means of
cross-examination. 2
44
However, in the famous case of R. v. Maybrick,215 it appears that
the accused, Mrs. Maybrick, was allowed to make an unsworn state-
ment and call evidence. Other than this, there has been no clear de-
cision in England.
This problem has been considered by the courts in Australia and
240 20 Cox. Cr. Cas. 334 (1903).
241 Archbold, Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases, pp. 192, 193 (London,
1955). The New South Wales Crimes Act, Sec. 405 (1900) provides that the accused
may make a statement at the close of the case for the prosecution and before calling of
any of the wimesses for the defense.
242 R. v. Doherty, 16 Cox Cr. Cas. 306 (1887); R. v. Sheriff, 20 Cox Cr. Cas. 334 (1903);
R. v. Pope, 18 T.L.R. 717 (1902). The New South Wales Act and the Victorian Evi-
dence Act both allow the accused to make an unsworn statement though he is repre-
sented by counsel.
243 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 622 (1885). 244 Ibid., at 623.
245 Discussed in Cowen and Carter, op. cit. supra note 220, p. 208; Phipson, op. cit.
supra note 207, p. 51. Kerr v. the Queen, [1953] N.Z.L.R. 75.
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New Zealand. Three decisions in Queensland followed the reasoning
of Lord Coleridge in R. v. Millhouse and disallowed the unsworn
statement because they felt it would give an unfair advantage to the
accused.2 '4  Then in R. v. Harrold24 and R. v. Mckenna, supra,
Mansfield, S.'P.J. allowed the accused to call evidence and also make
an unswom statement. No comment was made upon this point when
R. v. Mckenna went to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The important
point to remember is that R. v. Mckenna is also the case that held that
unswom statements are not evidence. In the New Zealand case, Kerr v.
The Queen,248 the court discussed the Millbouse decision, the Queens-
land decisions and then considering the argument of Lord Coleridge in
Millhouse stated:
It appears to us, however, that there is really no logical basis for refusing to
allow an unsworn statement simply because evidence is called for the defence:
and, indeed, the difficulty pointed out by Lord Coleridge can at least partly be
met by requiring the prisoner to make his statement before evidence is called for
the defence.
On the other hand, we cannot but feel that the interests of justice demand
that the prisoner should have both rights concurrently. If an accused can prove
through witnesses certain facts confirmatory or corroborative of the facts, or
some of them, which he asserts in his statement, or can prove through witnesses
facts to which his statement does not extend, it is difficult to conceive that he is
not entitled in the interests of justice to establish those particular facts by the
sworn testimony of others. It may be, of course, that his statement will extend
to assertions of fact beyond the facts purported to be established by the testi-
mony of his witnesses, but at least it seems to me he is entitled to reinforce his
assertion as to as many facts as possible by the testimony of witnesses.
We think it necessary, however, to say that, in our opinion, the practice that
should be adopted in cases in which a prisoner desires both to call witnesses and
to make an unsworn statement is that the statement should be made before any
evidence is called for the defence.2 49
This then overcomes the argument of the Millhouse case and leaves
the way open for English courts to allow the accused to call witnesses
and make an unsworn statement. But is the reasoning in Millbouse and
this court sound? Reference must. be made to the decisions of Mans-
field in the Mckenna and Harrold cases. If unsworn statements are not
evidence but merely argument on the case to the jury, then it cer-
tainly follows that the accused may call evidence. Nothing could be
240R. v. Sturdy, [1946] Q.W.N. 41; R. v. Daniel, [1946] Q.W.N. 42; R. v. Toms,
[1947] Q.W.N. 66.
247 [1948] QW.N. 36. 248 [1953] N.Z.L.R. 75.
249 Ibid., at 78. Emphasis was also placed on the fact that Stephen, J. had allowed
Mrs. Maybrick to make a statement and call evidence in R. v. Maybrick.
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more logical. The time when the accused should make his statement,
if it is argument to the jury, is after he has produced his evidence
because this is what he must argue on. Therefore, if this theory is
accepted, the reasoning of Kerr v. The Queen is incorrect.
It may be asked, what if the accused introduces new facts to which
no reply is allowed to the prosecutor? The answer is simply that the
trial judge and prosecutor should not allow him to introduce new
facts. New facts were only permitted to be introduced into unsworn
statements during the 19th century when the accused was incompe-
tent and judges were lenient because of this. The Criminal Evidence
Act, 1898, rectified this situation so that the accused may introduce
all the new facts he wants by testifying under oath. Therefore, un-
sworn statements should be relegated to their former position as argu-
ment on the case. This places the address by the accused in the same
category as counsel's address which makes the following resolution
by English judges in 1881 pertinent:
In the opinion of the Judges it is contrary to the administration and practice
of the criminal law as hitherto allowed that counsel for prisoners should state to
the jury, as alleged existing facts, matters which they have been told on the au-
thority of the prisoner but which they do not propose to prove in evidence.
2 50
Therefore, if counsel in his address cannot allege facts which are
not proved by evidence, the same rule should apply to the accused in
making an unsworn statement.
It may be argued that the legislature intended that the accused
should be allowed to give evidence under oath and also by an unsworn
statement. This line of reasoning is supported by one case decided in
1882 when new facts were allowed to be introduced into unsworn
statements through the leniency of judges because the accused was
incompetent and judges had difficulty in instructing juries on how to
regard these facts. Other arguments in favor of this theory have been
shown to be incorrect. The great difficulties this theory will cause in
regard to unsworn statements have been evidenced by the Australian
and New Zealand cases. Such a theory is theoretically and historically
unsound, and it should not be believed for one moment that the legis-
lature intended to further confuse the problem by allowing the ac-
cused to give evidence under oath and also by an unsworn statement.
It is far better to presume that the legislature gave the accused the
right to present evidence, which includes new facts, under oath and
250 Quoted in R. v. Krafchenko, 170 D.L.R. 244, 248 (1914).
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by Sec. 1 (h), preserved the right of the accused to argue his case to
the jury. Such reasoning simplifies the purpose of the Criminal Evi-
dence Act, 1898, and solves many of the problems that now surround
the unsworn statement.
THE SILENCE OF THE ACCUSED
Silence at trial-comment by the judge.-One of the problems facing
the legislature in drafting the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, was the
effect of the privilege of self-incrimination. Clearly, they could not
make the accused compellable because this would be a direct violation.
But what if the accused exercised his privilege and did not choose to
testify? Would not an adverse inference arise from the exercise of a
traditional English right? Could the feared effect of such an inference
act to coerce the accused into testifying? Recognizing the impossibil-
ity of stopping such an inference from arising in the jury per se, the
legislature took steps to prevent the act of the accused in exercising
his privilege against self-incrimination and choosing to remain silent
from going beyond this and becoming ammunition in the hands of
the prosecutor. Sec. 1 (b) provides:
The failure of any person charged with an offence, or of the wife or husband,
as the case may be, of the person so charged, to give evidence shall not be made
the subject of any comment by the prosecution.
Though the Act specifically prohibits comment by the prosecution
on the silence of the accused, it makes no mention of the judge's right
to comment on this fact. This introduces a new problem. For a long
time it had been a general rule that whenever a litigant in a civil case
was peculiarly able to offer evidence which would elucidate the facts
and failed to do so, an inference would arise that the production of
such evidence was unfavorable to his cause and the judge would com-
ment on this fact in many cases. As Lord Mansfield put it:
• It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the
proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced and in the power
of the other to have contradicted. 251
Further, the silence, speech or other conduct of the accused outside
of the courtroom had long been admissible as evidence at his trial upon
the theory that such conduct indicates the state of mind of the accused
which is evidence.2 12 Besides this, English judges had always been
251 Blatch v. Archer, 1 Cowp. 64, 65, 98 Eng. Rep. 969, 970 (1774). Also see Armory
v. Delanierie, 1 Strange 505 (1722); R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & Aid. 122 (1820).
252 This theory is further developed subsequently in the American section on Silence
of the Accused.
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allowed to comment on the evidence and the manner in which the
case was conducted. Therefore, it is logical to presume that the legis-
lature purposely limited the prohibition to the prosecutor so as not to
interfere with the above rules of evidence in regard to comment by
the judge. When the question arose in late 1898, this was the answer
presented in R. v. Rhodes,25 where the court stated:
There is nothing in the Act that takes away or even purports to take away
the right of the Court to comment on the evidence in the case and the manner
in which the case has been conducted. The nature and degree of such comment
must rest entirely in the discretion of the judge who tries the case; and it is
impossible to lay down any rule as to the cases in which he ought or ought not
to comment on the failure of the prisoner to give evidence, or as to what those
comments should be. There are some cases in which it would be unwise to make
any such comment at all; there are others in which it would be absolutely neces-
sary in the interests of justice that such comments should be made. That is a
question entirely for the discretion of the judge; and it is only necessary now
to say that that discretion is in no way affected by the provisions of the Criminal
Evidence Act, 1898.254
In 1904, this statement was made in R. v. Corrie & Watson:
I agree that no inference ought to be drawn in support of a weak case on the
ground that the defendants were not called to give evidence; but where trans-
actions are proved which are capable of an innocent explanation, and if the
defendants could have given it, and there is prima facie evidence that the person
is carrying on an illegal business, I do not think it improper for the jury to draw
a conclusion from the fact that the defendants were not called. 255
In R. v. Bernard, this statement was made:
It is right that juries should know, and, if necessary, be told, to draw their
own conclusions from the absence of explanations by the prisoner. Here he
failed to give any explanation of the circumstances in which he signed letters
containing false statements .... There was abundant evidence of his guilt, and
the jury were justified, in the absence of explanation by him, in convicting
him.256
Further guidance is found in the opinions of certain cases in the
Privy Council.257 The most important of these cases is Waugh v. The
253 [1899] 1 Q.B. 77. 254 [1899] 1 Q.B. 77, 83, 84.
255 Lord Alverstone, L.C.J. 68 J.P. 294, 297 (1904). Grantham J. said: "The jury have
no right to convict a man merely because he does not go into the witness-box, but if
prima facie evidence of an offense has been given and the man does not go into the box,
the jury may draw their own conclusion."
2561 Cr. App. Rep. 218, 219 (1908).
257 In Kops v. The Queen, [1894] A.C. 650, 653, this statement was made: "The
learned judges did not lay down-it was not within the scope of the case necessary to
lay down-any general rule as to such comments. There may no doubt be cases in which
it would not be expedient, or calculated to further the ends of justice, which undoubt-
edly regards the interests of the prisoner as much as the interests of the Crown, to call
attention to the fact that the prisoner has not tendered himself as a witness, it being
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King,258 a murder case on appeal from the Court of Appeal, Jamaica,
where the law in regard to comment is exactly the same as the law of
England. One of the grounds of the appeal was the fact that the judge
had, in his summing-up, referred no less than nine times to the fact
that the accused had not testified. There it was stated:
It is true that it is a matter of fact for the judge's discretion whether he shall
comment on the fact that a prisoner has not given evidence; but the very fact
that th6 prosecution are not permitted to comment on that fact shows how
careful a judge should be in making such comment.
Then after referring to the facts it was stated:
In such a state of the evidence the judge's repeated comments on the appellant's
failure to give evidence may well have led the jury to think that no innocent
man could have taken such a course. The question whether a prisoner is to be
called as a witness in such circumstances and on a murder charge is always one
of the greatest anxiety for the prisoner's legal advisers, but in the present case
their Lordships think that the prisoner's counsel was fully justified in not calling
the prisoner, and that the judge, if he made any comment at all, ought at least
to have pointed out to the jury that the prisoner was not bound to give evidence
and that it was for the prosecution to make out the case beyond reasonable
doubt.259
In R. v. Jackson,26° an appeal from a conviction for receiving stolen
property, the Waugb case was distinguished as being a murder charge:
In that case there was a conviction of murder, and I do not want in the least
to appear to be whittling down what their Lordships in the Judicial Committee
said on this matter, but, of course, each case on such a point as this must depend
on its own facts .... It has to be remembered, among other things, in this case
that the charge against the appellant was receiving stolen property, and if ever
there is a case in which a prisoner might be expected to give evidence offering
an explanation with regard to the offence of which he is alleged to be guilty,
that is the case. We cannot say that because the judge commented strongly
on the appellant's absence from the box that the comment was in any way
unfair. Of course, a prisoner is always entitled to say: "I am going to stand here
and say nothing. The evidence against me is so unsatisfactory that it does not
call for any answer": but nowadays, whatever may have been the position very
soon after the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, came into operation-and I regret
to say that I have been in the profession long enough to remember the state of
affairs when counsel had very great difficulty in deciding whether to call his
client or not-everybody now knows that absence from the witness-box requires
a very considerable amount of explanation; I need not put it higher than that.
In view of the evidence in this case, if the appellant had any explanation to give,
one cannot doubt that he would have given it.261
open to him either to tender himself, or not, as he pleases. But on the other hand there
are cases in which it appears to their Lordships that such comments may be both legiti-
mate and necessary."
25 8 [1950] A.C. 203. 260 37 Cr. App. Rep. 43 (1953).
259 [1950] A.C. 203, 211, 212. 26,1 37 Cr. App. Rep. 43, 50, 51 (1953).
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Recently in R. v. Adams,2 2 Devlin, J., in his summing-up made the
point that it was a natural reaction to ask why the accused had not
gone into the witness-box and say: "If he is an innocent man ... he
can tell us more about this than anyone else can. Why has he not gone
into the witness-box unless he thinks that questions may be put to him
that he could not satisfactorily answer?" He further said that the jury
might have found defense counsel's reasons for the accused not giving
evidence convincing, or they might not, but it did not matter. The
accused had the right not to go into the witness-box. It would be
utterly wrong if they were to regard his silence as contributing in any
way to proof of guilt. It did not and could not.
Theoretically, the true interpretation of Sec. 1 (b) has been pointed
out. Comment by the prosecution is prohibited because in his hands
it would become not only an inference but a weapon with which he
could place the accused in a frightening dilemma. It would act as a
coercion on the accused to take the stand for fear of being convicted
because he has exercised his privilege against self-incrimination, a tra-
ditional English right. It must therefore be presumed that the judge
should not be able to use the silence of the accused as such a weapon.
It must be remembered by the trial judge that the privilege against
self-incrimination stands as a guardian over any comment he might
make on the silence of the accused. Therefore, no comment should be
made merely because the accused is silent. The silence of the accused
must be such that would naturally raise an inference of guilt because
it is peculiarly in his power to elucidate or explain the prima facie case
against him. Therefore, it is suggested that the strong language of Lord
Goddard in R. v. Jackson, should be regarded with caution and that
the trend towards a broad discretion on the part of the judge in com-
menting on the silence of the accused at trial should be checked in
keeping with the reasoning of Devlin, J. in the Adams case.
Silence before examining magistrate-comment at trial.-Since the
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, makes the accused a competent witness
at "every stage of the proceedings," he is a competent witness when
appearing before the examining magistrates. It is provided by statute,
that the magistrate shall caution the accused and tell him that he need
not say anything unless he wishes to do so.163 Further, the accused is
262 Unreported. Quoted from the Law Times, Vol. 224, p. 170 (Sept. 1957).
263 The right and opportunity of the accused to make a statement before the exam-
ining magistrate after caution is found in the Magistrates' Courts Rules, r. 5 (4) 1952,
Archbold, op. cit. supra note 241, p. 402.
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protected by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, which prohibits com-
ment by the prosecution if he exercises his privilege of self-incrimina-
tion as recognized by the Act. However, because the accused is com-
petent when appearing before the magistrates, the question arose as
to whether the trial judge might comment on the fact that the accused
did not make a statement or give evidence after the caution by the
magistrate. Again it is clearly seen that mere silence should not be the
subject of comment because of the privilege against self-incrimination
and also the Magistrates' Rules which provide that the accused need
not say anything unless he wishes. Since the appearance of the accused
before the magistrate is not his trial, should his failure at this time to
introduce evidence which would elucidate or explain the facts against
him result in an adverse inference which the judge might comment
upon at the trial? Should his silence be admissible into evidence as
indicating his state of mind or as it is sometimes known, the "con-
sciousness of guilt" rule? In his summing-up should the judge be
allowed to mention this fact at all by way of comment on the evidence
or the handling of the case?
The first indication that a judge might refer to this silence in any
respect was seen in R. v. Humphries, where it was stated:
The recent Criminal Evidence Act was passed for the benefit of prisoners, and
if the defence was an honest one it should be given at the earliest possible stage,
and justices should impress that on all prisoners.26 4
This argument was used by counsel for the Crown in R. v. Nay-
lot 265 as justification for the summing-up of the recorder at Quarter
Sessions. In this case, after caution, 6 the accused had answered, "I
don't wish to say anything except that I am innocent." The fact that
the accused had not disclosed his defense at this time was sought to
be used as evidence against him in corroboration of an alleged accom-
plice who had pleaded guilty and given evidence for the prosecution.
In other words an attempt was made to treat his silence as incrimi-
nating evidence. The recorder, in his summing-up, had referred to the
caution and the response of the accused as follows:
Imagine a purely innocent man accused of housebreaking and having these
words put to him-"Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge?"
26467 J.P. 396 (1903).
265 [1933] 1 K.B. 685; 23 Cr. App. Rep. 177 (1932).
2 66 The words of caution used were: "Do you wish to say anything in answer to the
charge? You are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but whatever
you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence at the trial."
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Surely, if he is innocent, one would think he would give some explanation of
where he was and what he was doing at the particular time, and would make
his defence then and there .... Of course, what lurks in the background of this
sort of hanging back and not disclosing his defence is that he gives the prosecu-
tion and the police no time to inquire into any statement he may make, so that
it might be possible to show that these statements are not true. That is the real
reason why many men do not make statements when they are first called upon
-to do S0. 267
In holding this a misdirection and quashing the conviction, the
Court of Criminal Appeal said:
When one looks at the words of the caution in s.12 sub-s.2, of the Criminal
Justice Act, 1925, which must be taken to have been framed deliberately, it is
obvious that they were intended to convey to the prisoner the information that
he is not obliged to say anything unless he desires to do so. We do not think that
the words of the caution can properly be construed in the sense that the prisoner
remains silent after being cautioned at his peril and may find his silence made
a strong point against him at his trial. In our view, the words mean what they
say, and a prisoner is entitled to reply to the caution that he does not wish to
say anything. The matter becomes even stronger when one reflects that what
was done here was done on the advice of a solicitor. It would be strange if a
point could properly be made against a prisoner because, acting on the advice
of his solicitor and following the very words of the Act of Parliament, he says
that he does not desire to say anything at that stage.268
However, this case was distinguished in R. v. Littleboy 269 where
the Court of Criminal Appeal held that no general proposition in re-
gard to comment had been laid down in the Naylor case. The trial
judge, in the course of his summing-up, referred to the defense of
alibi and then observed that it was unfortunate that the prisoner did not
say then and there-that is to say, when charged and when asked by
the magistrates before being committed for trial if he desired to give
evidence on his own behalf or to call witnesses. He then said:
If he says it then and there, it gives the police, or those who are conducting
the prosecution an opportunity of making their own inquiries to test the truth
of the statement that he was at Wroxham on that afternoon, at the material time,
on June 29. By adopting the course of saying "I reserve my defence" of course,
he deprives the prosecution of any opportunity of testing the statement.
270
267 [1933] 1 K.B. 685, 686; 23 Cr. App. Rep. 177, 180 (1932).
268 [1933] 1 K.B. 685, 687; 23 Cr. App. Rep. 177, 180, 181 (1932). In R. v. Smith, 25 Cr.
App. Rep. 119 (1933), a reference was made in the summing-up that the two defendants
had made no statement before the magistrate. This was held to be a misdirection since
each had given his answer to the police, each had been represented in court and was
entitled to say nothing.
269 [1934] 2 K.B. 408. This decision and R. v. Naylor were both by Lord Hewart, C. J.
270 [1934] 2 K.B. 408, 411.
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In other words, the fact that a statement was not made before the
magistrates was not treated as evidence against the accused, which was
the case in Naylor, but rather was used by way of observation on the
defense of alibi which was set up at the trial. The court thus distin-
guished this case from Naylor and stated:
It is one thing to make an observation with regard to the force of an alibi, and
to say that it is unfortunate that the defence was not set up at an earlier date
so as to afford the opportunity of its being tested; it is another thing to employ
that non-disclosure as evidence against an accused person and as corroborating
the evidence of an accomplice. 271
The court stated that it was not trying to lay down any general
propositions since this would not be useful but held that the observa-
tions of the trial judge were not a misdirection. They then said:
No doubt observations upon the failure to disclose a defence at some date
earlier than the trial have to be made with care and fairness to the accused person
in all circumstances in the case, but we do not assent to the general proposition
that in no circumstances may comment be made on the failure to disclose the
defence in the police court. The observations of the Court in Rex v. Naylor
were never intended to go that length.272
From these cases it can be seen that the silence of the accused before
an examining magistrate cannot be construed as evidence against him
because of his failure to deny, elucidate or explain incriminating facts
or under the "consciousness of guilt" doctrine. This is due in part to
the privilege of self-incrimination and the Criminal Evidence Act,
1898, but more so, from the reasoning of the Naylor case, to the fact
that the Magistrates' Rules provide that the accused does not have to
reply to a caution unless he so desires. However, the Act, the privilege
271 Ibid., at 413.
2Ibid., at 414. A defense of alibi has always been regarded as one of which an early
disclosure is desirable. "Before the magistrates the appellant had set up no defense, and
in this class of case it was most important that the defense should be raised at the earliest
opportunity." R. v. Winkworth, I Cr. App. Rep. 129, 130 (1908); "He had, at the police
court, a full opportunity of saying where he was. It is very unfortunate that he kept
back this alibi until the trial." In R. v. Parker [1933] 1 K.B. 850, there were 3 defendants,
two of whom gave evidence and disclosed their defenses. The third reserved his defense.
The trial judge, in summing-up had said: "Now you will remember that this alibi, un-
like those of the other two, was never disclosed when he was at the police court, and
when he was there asked if he would give evidence or call any witnesses, he contented
himself by saying that he would reserve them until the trial, and so in that way the
police had no opportunity of making any inquiries into the truth of the evidence given
by those witnesses."
The Court held that this was not a misdirection and distinguished this case from
R. v. Naylor by indicating that here there were 3 separate defendants and that the judge
was bound in the interests of the two defendants who had declared their defenses to
make this known to the jury.
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and the Magistrates' Rules have no effect on the right of the judge to
comment on the evidence and the handling of the case and so he may
make observations on the silence of the accused indirectly when di-
recting the jury on how to weigh an alibi which the accused could
have invoked earlier. Thus, theoretically the judge is not commenting
on the silence of the accused but merely commenting on the weight
of his alibi as evidence.
Silence before the police-comment at trial.-The Judges' Rules pro-
vide that the police should caution the accused if he has, or is going to
charge him with an offense and also warn him that he need not say
anything unless he so desires.273 The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898,
does not extend to these proceedings and so the accused is not compe-
tent nor entitled to its protection. He does have the protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination and also of the Judges' Rules. Can
the silence of the accused after caution by the police act as evidence
under the "consciousness of guilt" doctrine so that the judge may
comment on this fact? Can the judge comment on the failure of the
accused to deny, elucidate or explain incriminating evidence at this
point? May he make any comment at all about this fact in his sum-
ming-up?
In R. v. Leckey,274 the accused had replied to a police caution dur-
ing an interview by saying: "I have nothing to say until I have seen
someone, a solicitor." The trial judge in summing-up, commented ad-
versely on three occasions in regard to the silence of the accused and
suggested that the jury might infer the guilt of the accused from this
silence. The Court of Criminal Appeal stated:
In our view, that amounted to a misdirection, and it is proper ground on
which this conviction should be quashed. If it were not so, a caution might
obviously be a trap instead of the means for finding out the truth in the inter-
csts of justice. An innocent person might well, either from excessive caution
or for some other reason, decline to say anything when charged and cautioned,
and, if that could be held out to a jury as ground on which they might find
him guilty, he might obviously be in great peril. 275
In R. v. Tune,276 the accused, on being interviewed by the police
after caution with regard to 3 charges, made a statement in which he
admitted that he had been shown various documents by the police, but
gave no explanation and at the end said: "I can fully explain the whole
273 See Archbold, op. cit. supra note 241, p. 414.
274 [1944] 1 K.B. 80. 275 Ibid., at 86.
276 29 Cr. App. Rep. 162 (1944).
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question, but would prefer to have advice before doing so in writing."
The judge referred to that statement in his summing-up and made the
following comment: "Members of the jury, could not that have been
said without legal advice?"
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that this was not a misdirection
because it did not invite the jury to form an adverse conclusion from
the fact that the accused did not give an explanation. They felt that it
was merely a comment that what the accused was saying, if it was
true, was something that did not require any legal advice.
In R. v. Gerrard, the accused being found in possession of a lorry
laden with bottles of spirits, was asked by the police officer, after
caution, how he came to be in possession of the lorry and the contents.
The accused replied: "What I have to say I will say to the court."
Later, upon trial for housebreaking, the judge in summing-up said:
It may be a little odd to you-I do not know-that he should say: "I reserve
my statement for the court," when in fact, he has not been charged with any-
thing or told he is going to come before a court.277
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that this was not a misdirection
and stated:
It can only be a misdirection if it was an invitation to the jury to form an
adverse opinion against the applicant because he did not then give an explanation,
but, in our opinion, it cannot possibly be construed as anything of the sort. It
was a perfectly harmless, reasonable and true observation to make.
They then put forth this warning about Leckey's case:
All we say about Leckey's case, which was a decision of this court, is that
it may be described as forming the high water mark of those cases in which
convictions have been quashed because of a statement made by the presiding
judge about an observation made by the accused man when he was arrested, and
we are not disposed to extend the decision in that case beyond the facts of that
case or some similar case, if it should come before us.2 78
From these decisions it can be seen that the silence of the accused
after caution by the police cannot act as evidence under the "con-
sciousness of guilt" doctrine or under the theory that the accused did
not elucidate or explain incriminating facts which it was in his power
to do, thus justifying an adverse inference which acts as an admission.
The reason is clearly the Judges' Rules which provide that the accused
should be cautioned that he need not say anything unless he so desires.
This recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination in the
Judges' Rules and the Magistrates' Rules has thus offset these two
277 1 All. E. R. 205 (1948). 278 1 All E. R. 205, 206 (1948).
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former rules of evidence in regard to the silence of the accused before
the magistrate or the police. However, the courts have held that the
judge may make an observation on the silence of the accused in his
summing-up as long as it is "harmless" and "reasonable" and does not
invite the jury to "form an adverse opinion." In regard to how far
judges may carry these observations, it may be well to bear in mind
the concluding remark by the court in R. v. Tune:
It is probably better, where a person has been charged with a criminal offence
after having been cautioned and has either made no answer at all, or has made
some observations, which in itself is not in the nature of an explanation of the
charge, that the presiding judge should say nothing about it beyond telling the
jury exactly what was said or not said on that occasion, because many observa-
tions of different sorts by learned judges have from time to time been made the
subject of appeals to this court. If nothing is said by way of comment by the
presiding judge, no point can be raised. 279
CONFESSIONS
Judicial confessions.-If in open court, the accused freely and volun-
tarily confesses that he is guilty of the offense charged in the indict-
ment, it acts as a plea of guilty and if the court accepts the plea,
further proof or trial is unnecessary. However, once the accused has
been given in charge to the jury, the verdict of the jury is taken, even
though the accused confesses during the course of the proceedings.280
The court is usually reluctant to accept and record a confession of
guilt on indictments for grave crimes and will generally advise the
prisoner to retract it and plead not guilty.281
If the accused confesses before a magistrate upon preliminary in-
quiry it is treated as an admission which may be used in evidence at the
trial of the accused. 82 The taking of such confessions is governed by
27929 Cr. App. Rep. 162, 165 (1944).
280R. v. Hencock, 23 Cr. App. Rep. 16 (1931).
281 Archbold, op. cit. supra note 241, p. 420.
282 At common law when the accused appears before the magistrate he was not ex-
amined under oath because he was incompetent. Thus, if it happened that he was
examined under oath, any confession resulting therefrom was excluded from evidence.
The proceedings of such examination were regulated for some years by the statute
1 & 2 P. & M. c. 13, § 4 (1554), which provided that justices of the peace should examine
the accused before committing him or allowing him to bail. If the accused confessed
during these proceedings such confession was readily admitted into evidence under the
common law and under the statute. In 1917, R. v. Wilson, 171 Eng. Rep. 353, put forth
the proposition that an examination by a magistrate imposes an obligation to speak so
that a confession would not be voluntary and hence excludable. This doctrine was re-
vived in 1850 when in R. v. Pettit, 4 Cox. Cr. Cas. 164, 165, it was stated that "magistrates
have no right to put questions to a prisoner with reference to any matters having a
bearing on the charge upon which he is brought before them." This view has received
little sanction.
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the Magistrates' Courts Rules which provide that after the evidence of
the prosecution has been heard and the charge read and explained to
the accused, the court shall say to the accused in these words or words
to this effect:
You will have an opportunity to give evidence on oath before us and to call
witnesses. But first I'm going to ask you whether you wish to say anything in
answer to the charge. You need not say anything unless you wish to do so, and
you have nothing to hope from any promise, and nothing to fear from any
threat, that may have been held out to induce you to make any admission or
confession of guilt, Anything you say will be taken down and may be given in
evidence at your trial. Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? 2s
Whatever the accused says in answer to the charge is put in writing,
read over by him and signed by one of the examining justices and also
by the accused if he so wishes. Any statement made by the accused in
accordance with the rules may, whether signed by the accused or not,
be given in evidence on his trial without further proof. 2 4
The important thing to be remembered in confessions before a
magistrate is the theory of their admissibility. First, the confession may
be admissible into evidence by virtue of the statute if proper caution is
given. The confession may not be admissible under the statute if
proper caution was not given but it may be admissible under the com-
mon law if the confession is deemed "trustworthy" by one of the tests
previously discussed. Finally, if the confession is in response to ques-
tions by the magistrate the problem arises as to whether it is admissible
tinder the statute or under common law or neither. If, after caution,
such a confession would be admissible under the statute has not been
authoritatively decided. At common law, a confession after question-
ing by a judge, was admissible except for some individual rulings
which held that the putting of questions was improper in that it in-
volves a compulsion and that therefore, the confession was not "volun-
tary. "285 This view has received little sanction. If the accused chooses
to testify under oath, anything he says will be put in evidence because
by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, he is a competent witness before
the magistrates.
283 Magistrates' Courts Rules r. 5 (4) (1952) as set out in Archbold, op. cit. supra
note 241, p. 402.
284 Archbold, ibid., at pp. 403, 404. In R. v. Sansome, 4 Cox Cr. Cas. 203, 207 (1850)
it was pointed out that a confession not receivable under the 1849 statute for lack of a
caution could still be received under the common law because it met the test for trust-
worthiness. It also seems that no further proof of a caution having been given is re-
quired than the fact of it appearing to have been so given on the face of the prisoner's
statement. Also see Lambe's Case, 2 Leach Cr. L. 625 (3rd Ed., 1791).
2 8 5 R. v. Wilson, 171 Eng. Rep. 353 (1817); R. v. Pettit, 4 Cox Cr. Cas. 164 (1850).
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Since judicial confessions take place in court before impartial
judges, there is usually very little trouble involved in receiving them.
The main problems occur with extra-judicial confessions.
Extra-judicial confessions.-An extra-judicial confession is made
where the accused makes a confession of his guilt to any person other
than a judge or magistrate seised of the charge against him. The funda-
mental theory underlying their admissibility is, as has been noted, their
trustworthiness. To this end, various tests have been employed
throughout English history.286 Archbold states: "The only questions
to be considered in deciding whether a confession is or is not admis-
sible are: (1) Was any promise of favor, or any menace or undue
terror made use of, to induce the prisoner to confess? (2) If so, was
the prisoner induced by such promise or menace, etc., to make the
confession sought to be given in evidence? If the answer to both these
questions be in the affirmative, the confession will be inadmissible."!" 7
To exclude a confession, it must be made to someone in authority,
that is, someone engaged in the arrest, detention, examination or prose-
cution of the accused. 88 The inducement itself in order to exclude a
confession must relate to the charge. The inducement must reasonably
imply that the accused's position in regard to the charge will become
better or worse depending on whether he confesses or not. This in-
ducement does not have to be express but may be implied from the
conduct of the person in authority or the circumstances of the case.
This inducement does not have to be made directly to the accused for
the confession will be excluded if it can be reasonably presumed that
it came to his knowledge and induced the confession.2 89 The great
majority of extra-judicial confessions are those made to the police.
If the accused confesses while detained or arrested by the police, the
question arises whether to exclude this confession from evidence be-
286 These tests, discussed previously, were: Was the person placed in such a position
that an untrue confession of guilt irrespective of its truth or falsity has become the
more desirable of two alternatives between which the person is obliged to choose; Was
the confession induced by a threat or promise, a fear or hope; Was the confession "vol-
untary" in conjunction with the "threats and promises" test; Was the confession "volun-
tary" as an absolute test.
.87 Archbold, op. cit. supra note 241, p. 413; Phipson, op. cit. supra note 207, p. 266;
Taylor, op. cit. supra note 70, Vol. I, p. 548. Most English authorities and cases use the
"voluntary" test coupled with the "threats or promises" test.
288 Phipson, ibid., at p. 267; Taylor, ibid., at Vol. I, p. 551; Archbold, ibid., at pp. 409,
410.
289 For various examples of inducements see: Phipson, ibid., at pp. 268-270; Taylor,
ibid., at Vol. I, pp. 554-557; Archbold, ibid., at pp. 411-413. The burden of proof is on
the prosecution to show the confession is trustworthy. Phipson, ibid., at p. 266.
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cause it is untrustworthy. For a long time, the mere fact of arrest even
when combined with interrogation did not act to exclude a confes-
sion.29° This result was quite in keeping with the tests employed at this
time to determine the untrustworthiness of a confession since no
threats or promises were employed and there was no alternative of a
false confession to choose from. No caution to the prisoner was re-
quired at this time either.
In the middle of the 19th century when confessions were excluded
on trivial and irrational grounds, the test of "voluntariness" as an abso-
lute and final test was well accepted. Therefore, if the accused con-
fessed while in custody in answer to questions put to him, the confes-
sion was excluded because it was not "voluntary."291
Wigmore points out that the effect of these rulings plus the statute
requiring the magistrate to caution the accused resulted in a change of
police tradition. He attributes this to the dominance of a tendency in
English law to apply to the situation "the dictates of that sporting in-
stinct which has done so much in other parts of English law to estab-
lish principles of fair and considerate treatment of the accused. ' 29'2 In
1912, the judges in England at the request of the Home Secretary
drew up four rules as guides for police officers in respect to communi-
cation with prisoners or persons suspected of crime.293 These rules did
not have the force of law but were merely administrative directions
which police authorities were to enforce upon their subordinates as
tending to the fair administration of justice. In R. v. Voisin294 it was
held that statements obtained from prisoners contrary to the spirit of
these rules, could be rejected as evidence by the judge presiding at the
trial.
290 Lambe's Case, 2 Leach Cr. C. 3rd ed., p. 625 (1791); R. v. Wild, I Mood. C. C. 452
(1835).
291 The first decisions following this line of reasoning were a series of Irish cases
quoted in Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. III, p. 292. Another factor involved
was the passage of the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, Art. 18 which provided for two cau-
tions to be given to a prisoner when being examined by a magistrate. This concern for
the prisoner when appearing before a magistrate had a great influence on the conduct
of police investigations. The attitude is well illustrated in the following passage: "When
a prisoner is in custody, the police have no right to ask him questions. Reading a state-
ment over, and then saying to him, 'What have you to say?' is cross-examining the
prisoner, and therefore I shut it out. A prisoner's mouth is closed after he is once given
in charge, and he ought not to be asked anything." R. v. Gavin, 15 Cox Cr. Cas. 656, 657
(1885).
292 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 54, Vol. 111, p. 293.
293 The rules are set out in R. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531, 539.
294 Ibid.
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Today, the judges' rules provide as follows:
1. When a police officer is endeavoring to discover the author of a crime, there
is no objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to any person
or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks that useful infor-
mation can be obtained.
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge a person with a
crime, he should first caution such person before asking him any questions,
or any further questions, as the case may be.
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being
first administered.
4. If the prisoner wishes to volunteer any statement, the usual caution should
be administered. It is desirable that the last two words of such caution should
be omitted, and that the caution should end with the words "be given in evi-
dence."
5. The caution to be administered to a prisoner, when he is formally charged,
should therefore be in the following words: "Do you wish to say anything in
answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish
to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be
given in evidence." Care should be taken to avoid any suggestion that his
answer can only be used in evidence against him, as this may prevent an
innocent person making a statement which might assist to clear him of the
charge.
6. A statement made by a prisoner before there is time to caution him is not
rendered inadmissible in evidence merely by reason of no caution having
been given, but in such a case he should be cautioned as soon as possible.
7. A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be cross-examined, and
no questions should be put to him about it except for the purpose of removing
ambiguity in what he has actually said. For instance, if he has mentioned an
hour without saying whether it was morning or evening, or has given a day
of the week and day of the month which do not agree, or has not made it
clear to what individual or what place he intended to refer in some part of
his statement, he may be questioned sufficiently to clear up the point.
8. When two or more persons are charged with the same offence and statements
are taken separately from the persons charged, the police should not read
these statements to the other persons charged, but each of such persons should
be furnished by the police with a copy of such statements and nothing should
be said or done by the police to invite a reply. If the person charged desires
to make a statement in reply, the usual caution should be administered.
9. Any statement made in accordance with the above rules should, whenever
possible, be taken down in writing and signed by the person making it after
it has been read to him and he has been invited to make any corrections he
may wish.295
In as much as these are not rules of law, but only rules for guidance
of the police, the fact that a prisoner's statement is made by him in
295 Archbold, op. cit. supra note 241, pp. 414, 415. Also see Moriarty, Police Pro-
cedure, pp. 86, 87 (1957); Moriarty, Police Law, pp. 65-68 (1955). Bunn, Police Pro-
cedure, pp. 31-35 (1957), includes the supplementary rules which provide that: The
accused should write the statement out himself if possible; the police officer should
also note the times of taking the statement in his notebook; once a person has been in-
vited to make a statement and declined, no further invitation should be given him unless
new material is found.
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reply to a question by the police after he has been taken into custody
and without a caution does not of itself render the statement inadmis-
sible into evidence.2 96 However, "in its discretion the court can always
refuse to admit it if the court thinks there has been a breach of the
rules. '29 7 As to the exercise of this discretion by a trial judge it has
been said in R. v. Bass:
There can be no doubt, having regard to that evidence, that the appellant was
in custody; that he was questioned without being cautioned, and thus that there
was a breach of rule 3 of the Judges' Rules. If the Deputy-Chairman had held-
as we think he should have done-that the statement was taken in contravention
of the Judges' Rules, it would have been open to him in his discretion to refuse
to admit it. On this matter he did not exercise any discretion because, erroneously
as we think, he considered the Rules had not been contravened. 298
Therefore, in considering confessions made to the police, the judge
must determine if the Judges' Rules have been violated. If they have
been violated and he does not so state, he has violated his discretion if
he lets in the confession and a conviction will be quashed. If he holds
they have been violated, he may in his discretion either allow the con-
fession in or exclude it from evidence. He may exclude the confession
by virtue of the fact that it does not meet the test for trustworthiness
or he may exclude it because the Judges' Rules have been contravened.
If he allows the confession into evidence, the fact that the Judges'
Rules have been violated will not justify a quashing of the conviction
because he has exercised his discretion. But, the Criminal Appeal Court
may still quash the conviction because the confession was not free and
voluntary and was induced by a promise of favor, or by menaces or
undue terror and therefore, untrustworthy.
Thus, from a theory of evidence that untrustworthy confessions
should be excluded from evidence and from a period of reform in
English criminal history when fairness to the accused was of the ut-
most importance there has evolved a method of police control and
police measures which ensures to the accused a high degree of protec-
tion when charged by the police. The trend in England as witnessed
by the above cases, is to increase that protection indirectly by forcing
the police to comply more strictly with the Judges' Rules.
2 9 6R. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 KB. 531; R. v. Wattam, 36 Cr. App. Rep. 72 (1952); See
Archbold, ibid., pp. 416, 417.
297 R. v. May, 36 Cr. App. Rep. 91, 93 (1952).
29837 Cr. App. Rep. 51, 56 (1953).
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SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Anglo-American observers tend to look upon many features of
French criminal procedure with mixed reactions of skepticism, distaste
and astonishment. Though the basic differences lie in the philosophy
and historical development of the Anglo-American and French sys-
tems which have installed a strong sense of traditionalism in the peoples
of each country to their own principles, the following features of
French criminal procedure have appeared particularly incredible to
jurists of the United Kingdom and America:
1. To jurists whose systems have evolved principles of evidence which require
volumes to expound and which confuse even the most ardent of scholars,
the French system of evidence which basically is concerned with the "per-
sonal conviction" of judge and jury cannot be regarded as essentially scien-
tific;
2. The interrogation of the accused by every manner of official from the moment
he has become a suspect until the moment of his trial is no doubt one of the
most villainous practices of French criminal procedure to many Anglo-
American jurists;
3. The enqu~te officieuse by the police judiciaire appears to be a legislative
sanction of "third degree" tactics;
4. The fact that the juge d'instructions makes his own investigation and conducts
his own interrogations of the accused in the counterpart of the Anglo-Ameri-
can preliminary hearing seems unfair to impartially-minded jurists of the
United Kingdom and America;
5. The impartial mind of the Anglo-American is further horrified to find that
the whole past of the accused including crimes and bad character is recited
publicly before the jury at his trial;
6. The great Anglo-American "test of truth," the cross-examination, appears to
be totally ignored by the French;
7. The French jury which is composed of three judges and seven laymen who
deliberate together on the guilt or innocence of the accused appears oppres-
sive and dictatorial to many Anglo-Americans;
8. The use of the dossier at the trial has also been subject to much criticism.
Even more incredible is the fact that French jurists often look upon
Anglo-American criminal procedure with the same skepticism, distaste
and astonishment. For example, we think it right and fair that the
preliminary inquiry into crime should be conducted by the police act-
ing ex parte and in principle without the participation of the suspect.
The French think this grossly improper since they feel that no investi-
gation should be made without the knowledge of the suspect and his
right to put forward his own view of the situation at the very begin-
ning. It is hardly necessary to state that most French jurists think that
the privilege against self-incrimination is a ridiculous, irrational and
sentimental principle of law.
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Among the most unusual things that Americans find in regard to
English criminal procedure are the following:
1. The traditional pomp and ceremony surrounding Assize time in an English
town;
2. The wearing of wigs and gowns and the formal atmosphere which permeates
the trial itself;
3. The fact that there is no public prosecutor in the strict sense of the word as
Americans understand it;
4. That there is no grand jury;
5. That the judge is, as he is often called, "God in a courtroom," wielding an
enormous amount of influence over counsel, witnesses and jury.
The British on the other hand feel that our trials are uncivilized and
that if a man is to be convicted, he should at least feel that it was done
in a formal atmosphere of justice complete with pomp and ceremony.
They feel that the use of grand juries is obsolete and a waste of time
and more important, of money. They further feel that their judges
who are appointed should wield a certain amount of influence in con-
trast to American judges who are, for the most part, politically elected
or appointed and thus, in many instances, unqualified.
POLICE BRUTALITY AND CONFESSIONS
The varying philosophies of England, France and America in re-
gard to their criminal procedures are most clearly seen in the regula-
tions of police brutality and the "third degree" tactics. In France the
police judiciaire are under the direction of the procureur de la Ripu-
blique and the procureur geniral in each Cour d'Appel district. These
men, known as magistrats are regarded as being non-partisan and judi-
cial and are subject to the authority of the Minister of Justice. Further,
the Chambre d'Accusation also exercises a general supervision over
the police judiciaire. Thus, though the police judiciaire are empowered
to make investigations or interrogate suspects by virtue of their own
office or upon delegation from the procureur general, the procureur
de la Ripublique, the juge d'instruction or the prifet, they are still
subject to the theoretical control of non-partisan judicial government
officials who have the power to stop any abusive police tactics.
Though this system would appear to be theoretically sound, it has
not worked that way in practice. It is a well-known fact that the
police judiciaire often behave brutally and oppressively. That such
practice exists when in theory it should not, is directly related to the
philosophy of the French people and their attempts to balance the re-
quirements of society against the liberty of the individual in their
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search for truth. The history of criminal procedure in France has
created a sense of traditionalism in the people which looks upon the
interrogation of the accused as the rational and logical way to obtain
truth in contrast to the traditionalism of Anglo-Americans. A philos-
ophy such as this cannot look upon "third degree" tactics or even
brutality by the police with as much horror as a people whose philos-
ophy of criminal procedure has evolved through such principles as
''no man is bound to incriminate himself."
The modem police force in England was inaugurated over one hun-
dred years ago when Sir Robert Peel, the then Home Secretary, was
able in 1829 to establish the Metropolitan Police Force by Act of Par-
liament. Later Acts directed that justices in Quarter Sessions establish
a sufficient police force for each county. Borough police forces were
also established which together with the county police were under the
control of appointed Crown Inspectors of Constabulary who reported
directly to the Home Secretary.
Today, there are four types of police forces in England:
1. The County Police or Constabulary forces which are each controlled by its
Chief Constable who has the general government of his force subject to the
authority of the Standing Joint Committee composed half of representatives
of the justices assembled in Quarter Sessions and half of representatives of
the County Council;
2. The Borough Police which forces are each managed by a committee of the
Borough Council, known as the Watch Committee;
3. The Metropolitan Police Force which is under the direct control of the
Home Secretary;
4. The City of London Police which has the Common Council of the City as
its police authority.
It is clear that these forces are separate and yet there is a spirit of
free and cordial cooperation which links them together. Besides the
direct control over each force there are also the Judges' Rules which,
as has been noted, act as an indirect compulsion on the police since a
judge in his discretion may reject any evidence obtained in violation
of the Rules. A further influence upon the police is the philosophy of
the English people who will not stand for arbitrary, brutal power in
the hands of the police and who consequently demand fair and con-
siderate treatment for the accused. It is this "sporting instinct" of the
English people which distinguishes them most clearly from the French
who will in one breath express fear of the police judiciaire and faith in
their tactics.
In America, state police are usually composed of municipal, county
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and state police forces who work independently from each other and
from the public prosecutors. The authority governing these police
forces is usually political, lacking in experience and subject to constant
change. These are among the basic factors to be considered when de-
liberating over problems of the "third degree" and police brutality,
but will not be taken up here.
The use of "third degree" tactics in America can be better under-
stood if it is remembered that the police risk their lives daily in carry-
ing out their duties towards society. How many policemen and their
families are burdened by this heavy thought throughout every day of
their lives? While most of the people in the United States work in
comparatively morally pleasant occupations, many policemen spend
every working day dealing with criminals of every kind in the most
dismal surroundings. In an environment of this nature, it is nearly im-
possible to prevent these men from forming a calloused and cynical
attitude towards criminals and consequently, towards many people
accused of crime.
Take a policeman who knows that he may someday lose his life in
the performance of his duty towards society, let him deal with crimi-
nals every day for a number of years, allow him a certain amount of
unrestricted power over an accused person and a place where he can
exercise that power untrammeled, and you have a situation which is
inherently ripe for "third degree" tactics. All that is lacking are the
proper circumstances. For example, if the police have captured one
member of a criminal gang, they may be tempted to employ "third
degree" methods to find out who the other members of the gang are.
Or, if the police suspect strongly that a hardened criminal is guilty of
a crime but have no evidence other than circumstantial to prove it,
they again may strive for the confession, since this is the only way they
feel they can convict this man. This same situation existed in France
in the 13th century and torture was employed for the same reasons.
There can be no doubt that crime today is highly organized while
courts and society have more and more handcuffed the police in their
interrogation of suspects. Any gangland lawyer will take good advan-
tage of all opportunities and, therefore, police often feel that they must
work swiftly and sometimes brutally while society and press heap
abuse upon them, demanding in the same breath that a crime be solved
and condemning any interrogations of suspects.
Since police brutality and the use of "third degree" tactics admitted-
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ly exist, the next question concerns itself with confessions procured by
the police through the use of such methods. It is clearly seen that the
tests which evolved to exclude confessions on the grounds that they
are "untrustworthy" are not to be confused with the entirely separate
principle, the privilege against self-incrimination which arose as a re-
action to the "ex officio" proceedings of the Star Chamber and Ecclesi-
astical Court of England. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court,
the privilege protects the individual from
[t]he processes of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and
required to testify. Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is another
matter.
299
Thus, the privilege against self-incrimination protects the accused
from giving testimony under compulsion by making him non-com-
pellable at his trial and by giving him the right to claim his privilege at
other proceedings in which testimony is to be taken while the exclu-
sionary rule in regard to confessions is based upon the principle of un-
trustworthiness.
Some states have passed statutes300 which provide that confessions
obtained by "third degree" methods will be excluded from evidence
and the Supreme Court of the United States has introduced two more
principles under which a confession may be excluded from evidence
other than the privilege against self-incrimination or the principle of
untrustworthiness.
First, a confession will be excluded from evidence if the manner in
which it was procured violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If confessions
are procured by local or state police in such a way as to "offend some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked fundamental," the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been violated and the accused has a
remedy in the Federal Courts. In Brown v. Mississippi,3 1 the Due
Process Clause was held violated when physical abuse was used to ex-
tort a confession. In Chambers v. Florida,30 2 a confession after inten-
sive interrogation violated the Due Process Clause. Both of these deci-
sions can be interpreted in light of the classical test of untrustworthi-
ness. However, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,3  where the suspect had
299 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
300 For a collection of these statutes see 2 Baylor L. Rev. 131 (1950).
301297 U.S. 278 (1936). 302 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 303 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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been held incommunicado for 36 hours without rest or sleep, the Court
held inadmissible a confession obtained during this period and laid
down a new test. Violation of the Due Process Clause was based on
whether or not conditions and circumstances surrounding the making
of the confession were "inherently coercive." As Justice Jackson
pointed out in dissent,304 the Court did not find as a matter of fact that
the defendant's freedom of will was impaired but substituted the doc-
trine that the situation was "inherently coercive." In effect, the Court
disregarded the issue of untrustworthiness, though it is still implicit
within the term "inherently coercive" and engaged in a slight degree
of judicial legislation in state police administration.
This policy became more pronounced in Watts v. Indiana,3°5 where
the Due Process Clause was held violated when the accused was
arrested on a Wednesday and confessed on the following Tuesday
after interrogation in relays. He was held without arraignment, with-
out aid or advice and received little food or sleep. Again, the "total
situation" was considered and a new expression was coined, namely,
the confession must be the "expression of free choice." This decision
clearly indicates that trustworthiness is not the issue but, rather, the
emphasis is shifted to police tactics. More recently, in Payne v. Arkan-
sas 30 1 the Court has emphasized totality of conduct in relation to "ex-
pression of free choice." The accused was a dull 19 year old Negro
who was held incommunicado for three days with very little food and
threatened with lynching. The totality of conduct was held to violate
the Due Process Clause. In a recent case, 07 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in considering similar treatment stated:
This treatment, without convincing explanation of its reasonableness, is suffi-
cient to indicate that the resulting statement was involuntary.3°8
Such a test on its face goes beyond the present Supreme Court test.
Collateral to this major development in policy, a number of other
principles have been established in regard to the Due Process Clause.
First is the principle that the Federal Courts must make an independent
determination of the undisputed facts to see if the Due Process Clause
has been violated. 30 9 Secondly, even though there be sufficient evi-
304 322 U.S. 143, 162 (1944). 305 338 U.S. 49 (1949). 306 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
307 Wade v. Jackson, 256 F. 2d 7 (C.A. 2d, 1958).
308 Ibid., at 14.
809 Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945).
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dence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of
conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced
confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process
Clause.31 Another collateral principle is that in each inquiry, the
Court must weigh the circumstances of pressure against the power of
resistance of the person confessing."1'
Therefore, beginning with the proposition that physical or psycho-
logical coercion 312 will invalidate a confession and violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which will in turn
vitiate a judgment regardless of other evidence, the Court will then
determine the issue of coercion by an independent investigation of the
totality of circumstances surrounding the making of the confession in-
cluding the "power of resistance" of the person confessing.
The second principle of exclusion introduced by the Supreme Court
may be called the McNabb rule and is applicable only to Federal
police tactics. In McNabb v. the U.S.,31 3 the defendants had been held
incommunicado by Federal officers for several days and questioned
intermittently. The Supreme Court held their confessions inadmissible
even though they were not considered involuntary, untrustworthy or
even "inherently coercive." Justice Frankfurter reasoned that in Fed-
eral cases, the reviewing power of the Court is not confined to Consti-
tutionality, but rather that judicial supervision of the administration
of criminal justice in the Federal Courts implies the duty of establish-
ing and maintaining "civilized standards of procedure and evidence."
Thus, the confessions were held inadmissible because they were ob-
tained during a period of illegal delay irrespective of their voluntari-
ness or the absence of coercion. The purpose of the rule is not to
punish the Federal officers or exclude untrustworthy or coerced con-
fessions, but to eliminate the inducement to hold a suspect illegally for
the purpose of building a case against him. In Mallory v. United
States,314 the court held that detaining an arrested person for interro-
gation to establish probable cause prior to arraignment, constitutes un-
310 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
311 Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197
(1957); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953).
312 See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561 (1958); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
184 (1953).
313 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
314 236 F.2d 701 (App. D.C., 1956), rev'd 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Also see Rettig v. U.S.,
239 F.2d 916 (App. D.C., 1956).
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necessary delay within Title 18 U. S. C. §5(a), and that a voluntary
confession obtained during such delay must be excluded. More re-
cently the McNabb rule has been extended to prevent Federal officers
who have violated the Fourth Amendment in regard to search and
seizures from testifying in state courts in regard to the articles so
seized.
The Supreme Court, in effect, is using the same indirect method of
control over police administration that the English Courts use by vir-
tue of the Judges' Rules. While such exclusion rests upon the discre-
tion of the Judge in England, the Supreme Court has made the exclu-
sion, in certain respects, mandatory.
Generally speaking, the situation in America in regard to the ex-
clusion of confessions and "third degree" tactics by the police may be
summarized as follows:
1. Confessions may be excluded because they are untrustworthy, using any one
of the classical tests;
2. Confessions may be excluded because the privilege against self-incrimination
of either Federal or State Constitution has been violated;
3. Some state statutes hold "third degree" confessions inadmissible;
4. Federal Courts will scrutinize the totality of circumstances surrounding the
making of a confession in state proceedings to see if the confession was
coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause;
5. Federal Courts will consider not only Due Process but will also consider
"civilized standards of procedure and evidence" in rendering a confession
inadmissible when it is procured by Federal officers;
6. State courts under "prompt arraignment" statutes such as Title 18, U.S.C.
§ 5(a) have treated illegal delay as a mere circumstance in determining
whether a confession is "voluntary." Thus, state courts have rejected the
philosophy inherent in the Judges' Rules of England and the McNabb rule
which stand for judicial supervision of police administration.
Thus, the French, who have the soundest theory of police super-
vision fail in their practical application with the result that the police
judiciaire often use brutal methods. Confessions obtained by such
brutal methods will not necessarily be suppressed by exclusionary
rules which England and America have developed since everything is
kept for evidence in the French trial. It is strange to hear a Frenchman
state that he fears the police judiciaire but yet remain amoral to such
tactics and the use of evidence procured by such means at the trial of
an accused person.
In England, there is a certain degree of supervision over the police,
both by the officials in charge and by the indirect use of the Judges'
Rules. Their exclusionary principles in regard to confessions are based
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upon the doctrine of untrustworthiness and the privilege against self-
incrimination. Police brutality and the use of "third degree" tactics
are practically unheard of. It is strange to hear English policemen
address criminals as "gentlemen."
In America, the supervision of police forces is for the most part very
poor. However, all manner of exclusionary principles have been intro-
duced to suppress confessions taken by brutal or "third degree"
methods, including the use of the Due Process Clause and the McNabb
rule. The fact that such practice still continues indicates rather strong-
ly that the fault lies in supervision and the philosophy of the American
people. The great danger in the extension of exclusionary rules of
course lies in the release of hardened guilty criminals upon society
when in fact the Court knows they are guilty of the crime charged.
This anomaly of American criminal procedure will no doubt be
thought of as monstrous by our rational French friends.
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
It will be remembered that the English were faced with many
problems when drafting the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, which made
the accused a competent witness.
America has been likewise faced with the same problems among
which, the most vexing have been caused by the privilege against self-
incrimination.
In the general discussion of the privilege against self-incrimination
it was seen that the Federal Constitution and various State Constitu-
tions guarantee the privilege in almost all manner of proceedings in
which testimony is to be taken. During the trial the privilege protects
the accused from being compelled to take the stand and asked a single
question under the theory that no relevant fact could be inquired
about that would not tend to incrimiate him. But, if the accused volun-
tarily takes the stand, it necessarily follows that he will be cross-
examined and at this point the problem arises as to 'what he may be
cross-examined upon. In other words, has the accused waived his privi-
lege by taking the stand and how far does this waiver extend? These
same problems were handled in England by the Criminal Evidence
Act, 1898, which specifically set out the extent of waiver as well as the
limitations upon the prosecution to introduce evidence of the bad
character of the accused when he has not put his character in issue.
France, on the other hand, allows interrogation of the accused by offi-
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cials ranging from the police judiciaire to the president of the Cour
d'Assise the scope of which is, practically speaking, unlimited so that
the jury is fully aware of any and all past crimes of the accused as well
as bad character evidence. America has, on the whole, attacked the
situation differently.
It must be remembered that in America, when the accused does take
the stand, he occupies a double position, as the accused and as a wit-
ness. England has ignored this distinction. As the accused, there is a
well-established rule that the prosecution may not introduce evidence
of the character of the accused for the purpose of raising an inference
that the defendant is guilty of the crime for which he is being tried,
because such evidence would be prejudicial. Thus, as the accused, he
has the right to object to all evidence of the prosecution tending to
show his bad character unless he has put his character in issue by intro-
ducing evidence of his good character. As a witness, however, it has
been universally held that the accused may be impeached just like any
other witness according to the law in the particular jurisdiction.3 15
The attack upon the accused as a witness is directed at his veracity and
not as evidence that he committed the crime, which means that in some
jurisdictions the accused may only be impeached by his character for
veracity while others hold that he may be impeached because of gen-
eral bad character or a specific bad trait. Depending on the jurisdic-
tion, the prosecutor in seeking to impeach the accused as a witness is
limited to the particular methods specified for impeachment. Thus, in
attempting to attack the credibility of the accused as a witness on
cross-examination, questions may be asked, depending on the jurisdic-
tion involving general bad character, conviction of crime or specific
instances of misconduct. This attack upon the credibility of the
accused as a witness is not involved with the privilege against self-
incrimination unless, as will be seen, the prosecution attacks the verac-
ity of the accused by trying to prove another crime on cross-examina-
tion.
In his position as the accused, it is generally held that in volunteer-
315 "The defendant appeared before the Court in the dual capacity of an accused and
that of a witness. As an accused, his character was not subject to attack unless he opened
the question. As a witness, his position was different; his credibility was subject to
attack.... As a defendant, his character could not be impeached, that issue not having
been opened by him. As a witness, it could be impeached, as the character of any wit-
ness may be subjected to that test. In other words, he may be unworthy of belief, but
this unworthiness is not to be considered in determining whether or not he is guilty;
while the attack upon the character of an accused is for the purpose of establishing that
his plea is not supported by his attempt at proving character and that he is guilty."
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ing to take the stand, he waives the privilege against self-incrimination
in varying degrees in the different jurisdictions.
Thus, the problems of waiver and character that England solved by
clear statutory legislation, have been left unsolved in America because
of varying theories of waiver and dual capacity of the accused which
complicates the introduction of the bad character of the accused into
evidence.
SILENCE OF THE ACCUSED
During the discussion of the silence of the accused under English
law it was noted that it has long been a general rule in the weighing of
evidence that whenever a litigant is peculiarly able to offer evidence
which would elucidate the facts and fails to do so, an inference arises
that the production of such evidence would be unfavorable to his
cause. This principle can be justified upon the theory that the state
of the mind is evidence, and that refusal to testify might indicate the
state of mind of a given defendant. Accordingly, unfavorable infer-
ences have been drawn under the most varied circumstances; the
failure of a defendant to produce in court a jewel whose value was in
question;31 6 the failure of a defendant in an automobile case to call two
people who were riding with him;317 the failure of a defendant in a real
property action to call the party through whom he claimed title.318
The above examples are taken from civil cases but the same rule is
found to apply in criminal cases with regard to the failure of the
accused to produce evidence, other than his own testimony, when it is
in his power to do so.319 Further, the silence, speech or other conduct
316 Armory v. Delamiric, 1 Strange 505 (1722) where the jury was instructed to pre-
sume the jewels to the value of the best jewels as a measure of their damages. Lord
Mansfield, in Blatch v. Archer, 1 Cowp. 64, 65 (1774) states that: "It is certainly a maxim
that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power
of one side to have produced and in the power of the other to have contradicted." Best,
in R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 122 (1820) stated: "If the opposite party has it in his power
to rebut it by evidence, and yet offers none, then we have something like an admission
that the presumption is just.... The law does not impose impossibilities on parties; it
expects that a man who has the means of knowing who may be witnesses shall call
them."
317 Reetz v. Mansfield, 119 Conn. 563, 178 Ad. 53 (1935).
318 Hall v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa. 152, 26 Ad. 1069 (1893).
319 "Since it was obviously within the power of the defendant to produce such evi-
dence, his failure to do so gives rise to a presumption, under well-known rules, that if
introduced it would have been unfavorable to him.... It is, of course, now well settled
that our statute providing that no presumption of the guilt of the defendant shall arise
from his failure to testify in his own behalf, has application only to the personal testi-
mony of the defendant himself and does not extend to apparently available testimony
of others." Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S.W.2d 539, 541 (1945).
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of the accused outside of the courtroom and of legal custody with re-
spect to a crime of which he is accused have long been regarded as ad-
missible evidence at his trialY2 This principle is again sustained on the
theory that the state of mind of the accused is evidence and that such
conduct indicates the state of mind which results in the use of such
terms as "consciousness of guilt."'3 21 In civil cases, if a party opponent
remains silent when he could be a useful and natural witness, the
courts have almost unanimously held that this creates an adverse infer-
ence.3 22 Thus, it can be said that the failure of a party to a civil suit to
introduce evidence or to testify when it would be most natural for him
to do so will give rise to an adverse inference that may act as affirma-
tive evidence of his liability. In criminal cases, the acts or silence of the
accused outside of court or his failure to call evidence when it would
be natural for him to do so, may act as affirmative evidence of his guilt.
The privilege against self-incrimination permits the accused in a
criminal case to refrain from giving any testimony. In this light, the
problem is presented whether an adverse inference should arise if the
accused exercises his privilege. There should be no adverse inference
820 "From time immemorial the reply or silence of the accused person, when charged,
has been regarded as legitimate evidence on his trial for the consideration of the jury.
Any act of his, when charged, tending to sustain the charge, may be proved. Fleeing
from arrest, giving contradictory, untrue, or improbable accounts of the matters in
issue, and refusals to account for the possession of stolen property, are evidence of
guilt admitted upon the trial of the persons accused. These are proofs derived from the
prisoner's acts, sayings and silence." State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217, 218 (1867).
321 "The law says that a man is to be judged by his consciousness of the right or
wrong of what he does, to some extent. If he flees from justice because of that act, goes
to a distant country and is living under an assumed name because of that fact, the law
says that is not in harmony with what innocent men do, and jurors have a right to con-
sider it as evidence of guilt, because he is an eyewitness to the occurrence; he knows
how it did transpire; he is presumed to have consciousness of that act .... It is a prin-
ciple of human nature-and every man is conscious of it, I apprehend-that if he does
an act which he is conscious is wrong, his conduct will be along a certain line. He will
pursue a certain course not in harmony with the conduct of a man who is conscious that
he has done an act which is innocent, right and proper." Starr v. United States, 164
U.S. 627,631 (1897).
322 In Attorney-General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316, 134 N.E. 407, 423 (1922), a
district attorney was removed for misconduct of office. This type of case most closely
resembles a criminal prosecution. The court said: "Instant impulse, spontaneous anxi-
ety and deep yearning to repel charges thus impugning his honor would be expected
from an innocent man. Refusal to testify himself or to call available witnesses in his
own behalf under such circumstances warrants inferences unfavorable to the re-
spondent. It is conduct in the nature of an admission. It is evidence against him. The
principle of law has long been established and constantly applied. The reason is that
it is an attribute of human nature to resent such imputations. In the fact of such ac-
cusations, men commonly do not remain mute but voice their denial with earnestness,
if they can do so with honesty. Culpability alone seals their lips."
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simply because the accused exercises his privilege. If at all, the adverse
inference should arise because the accused has not disproved evidence
that it was in his power to disprove. That the jury may naturally gain
an unfavorable inference from the failure of the accused to testify
cannot be argued but to invite or demand such an inference through
comment by the prosecutor or judge presents a different problem.823
A majority of the states have statutes which contain express clauses
which provide that no presumption shall arise from the failure of the
accused to testify or that his silence shall not be subject to comment.824
However, several of the states, by design or inadvertence did not pro-
vide against comment by the prosecutor or judge so that today in these
states an inference may be drawn.
Generally speaking, these states whose decisions allow comment
will not permit an inference to be drawn unless the State has proved a
prima facie case in keeping with its burden of proof.32- Secondly, they
do not allow the inference to be drawn unless there is independent, ad-
verse evidence which it is in the power of the accused to explain or
refute.8 26 Theoretically then, these states do not permit comment upon
the mere fact of the accused's failure to testify but upon his failure to
deny incriminating evidence which it is in his power to deny.
In discussing the weight of such inferences, the Connecticut courts
have repeatedly held that the jury may draw any inference as to his
guilt which is reasonable under the circumstances.327 California has
held that the jury may consider the failure of the accused to deny or
explain the evidence against him as tending to indicate the truth of
such evidence.2  New Jersey has held that the failure of the accused
823 The federal test for comment is: "[Wihether the language used is manifestly in-
tended to be, or is of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take
it to be comment on accused's failure to testify." Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809,
810 (C.A.8th, 1925).
324 28 N.Y.U.L.Q. 1049 (1953).
825 "The question immediately arises as to how much evidence the state must pro-
duce before the trier is permitted to apply the inference. Obviously that state must
first produce some evidence of guilt. The state must produce a case where the evidence,
apart from the inference, would be sufficient to go to a jury.... If the state has sup-
ported its burden of proof, then the jury may throw its inference arising from the
failure of the accused to testify in his own defense into the scale to determine the ulti-
mate question of guilt or innocence." State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A.2d
582, 583 (1942).
826 State v. Christy, 26 N.J. Super. 459, 98 A.2d 118 (1953); People v. Greenberg, 73
Cal. App. 2d 675, 167 P.2d 214 (1946).
327 State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941).
328 People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946).
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to testify on his own behalf raises a strong presumption that he could
not truthfully deny those facts.3 29 Ohio indicates that such failure tips
the scales of evidence against the accused.330 Therefore, the probative
legal effect of the accused's failure to testify varies in degree depend-
ing on the jurisdiction.
The arguments in favor of comment are as follows:
1. An inference from the refusal to testify is inevitable; therefore why try futile-
ly to avoid it.33
1
2. An innocent defendant can have no reason for refusing to testify.
832
3. There is no compulsion to testify; for the accused has an option, and the exer-
cise of this option, by choosing silence, is therefore, a voluntary act of his
own.
3 33
4. In jurisdictions where comment is permitted, it has achieved most satisfactory
results.
The arguments against comment are as follows:
1. Comment is unjust when it results in the situation where the defendant must
choose between being subjected to a cross-examination of past offenses and
remaining silent.33 4
2. Right of comment would cause prosecutors to become less diligent.
3. The effect of comment is in violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
329 State v. Marinella, 24 N.J. Super. 49, 93 A.2d 620 (1952).
330 State v. Cott, 58 Ohio App. 439, 16 N.E. 2d 788 (1937).
331 "His declining to avail himself of the privilege of testifying is an existent and
obvious fact. It is a fact patent in the same. The jury cannot avoid perceiving it....
The silence of the accused-the omission to explain or contradict, when the evidence
tends to establish guilt is a fact-the probative effect of which may vary according to
the varying conditions of the different trials in which it may occur-which the jury
must perceive, and which perceiving they can no more disregard than one can the light
of the sun when shining with full blaze on the open eye." State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298,
300 (1871).
332 "The defendant in criminal cases, is either innocent or guilty. If innocent, he has
every inducement to speak the facts, which would exonerate him. The truth would be
his protection. There can be no reason why he should withhold it, and every reason
for its utterance." Ibid., at 301.
333 "The constitutional privilege goes no further historically or logically than to
prevent the employment of legal process to compel an accused to incriminate himself
by what he may say on the witness stand. He cannot be compelled to testify against his
will. The privilege of refraining from testifying, if he so elect, does not protect him
from any unfavorable inference which may be drawn by his triers from his exercise of
the privilege.. . . There is no actual compulsion upon the accused to testify, and, when
he elects not to do so, he is obviously not being compelled to give evidence against
himself." State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 Ad. 828, 830 (1929).
334 The unfairness of this situation is exemplified by those states which hold that by
taking the stand, the accused has waived his privilege of self-incrimination as to all facts
including other offenses which he is not then on trial for. It is also argued that: "[m]any
people, innocent or guilty, when called to the witness stand are timid, and do not
present the best side of their character, or the best side of their claim in the presence of
the judge and jury during the trial of the case." John C. Price in 13 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 293 (1922).
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CONCLUSION
THE DILEMMA OF PRINCIPLES
Because of the many collateral problems that arose when the accused
was made a competent witness, the Anglo-American trial might, in
some respects, be termed the "dilemma of principles."
The basic reason for making the accused competent was the wide-
spread feeling that the refusal to allow him to testify was an injustice.
Today, the accused has the right to testify while the privilege against
self-incrimination gives him the right to refrain from testifying. How-
ever, if the accused does not testify, he naturally suffers from an ad-
verse inference and, in some jurisdictions, from comment on his failure
to testify by the judge or prosecutor. Many jurists feel that such com-
ment acts as a moral coercion on the accused to testify and, in effect,
vitiates the privilege against self-incrimination. If the accused does take
the stand, he waives the privilege against self-incrimination to varying
degrees in different jurisdictions thereby opening the door to cross-
examination which, in many instances, goes beyond the crime for
which the accused is being tried. This cross-examination is often aggra-
vated by an "over-zealous" prosecutor. Finally, though the prosecutor
cannot introduce evidence of the bad character of the accused for the
purpose of raising an inference that the latter is guilty of the crime for
which he is being tried, the prosecutor can, by hypocritical legal ra-
tionalization, introduce the same evidence in many jurisdictions to
impeach the accused in his dual capacity as a witness.
French jurists, for the most part, are astonished at this hodgepodge
of hypocritical reasoning which characterizes the introduction of evi-
dence in an American criminal trial. They are shocked at the technical
application of rules such as those applied for suppression of evidence
and exclusion of confessions which will allow acknowledged guilty
persons to go free. However, to many jurists, the most bewildering
feature of the jurisprudence of American criminal procedure is the
fact that despite its irrationality, American jurists loudly acclaim the
justice of their system while gazing with horror upon the French sys-
tem.
French jurists will be quick to point out that in many aspects, the
practical effects of some American state criminal systems are nearly
the same as those in France. For example, in France, the accused does
not have to answer questions propounded to him at his trial, but if he
refuses, this fact will weigh heavily against him. The French feel that
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the effect is nearly the same in those American jurisdictions which
allow comment on the failure of the accused to testify. In France, the
accused has no privilege against self-incrimination, per se, and can be
questioned on almost anything, including other crimes. The French
feel that the effect is almost the same in those American jurisdictions
where the accused, by testifying, waives almost completely, his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. In France, the bad character of the ac-
cused, including past offenses, is considered by the jury in its delibera-
tions. The French feel the effect is almost the same in those American
jurisdictions where the bad character of the accused, as well as his past
offenses, are made known to the jury in order to impeach him as to
credibility. Furthermore, in France, the interrogation of the accused
is carried on by an impartial judge without cross-examination as
Anglo-Americans know it. French jurists feel that the American sys-
tem of cross-examination of the accused by a prosecutor is more likely
than their system of interrogation, to miscarry as a "test of truth."
In England, the legislature carefully considered the effects of
making the accused competent before adopting the Criminal Evidence
Act, 1898. They preserved the privilege against self-incrimination by
making the accused non-compellable and prohibiting comment by the
prosecution. However, the Act has been interpreted to allow com-
ment by the judge if the accused remains silent when it is peculiarly
within his power to elucidate or explain a prima facie case against him.
This is the rule in some American jurisdictions. England also pre-
served the right to make an unsworn statement which, though of
uncertain interpretation, is a valuable method by which the accused
may tell his story and yet escape cross-examination and also avoid any
adverse inferences which might arise from his failure to testify. The
Criminal Evidence Act specifically prohibits the introduction into
evidence of any past crimes or bad character of the accused unless:
(1) A past offense is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of
the offense wherewith he is then charged; or (2) He has asked ques-
tions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establishing
his own good character; or (3) Has given evidence of his good charac-
ter; or (4) Has made imputations on the character of the prosecutor
or his witnesses; or (5) Has given evidence against any other person
charged with the same offense.
Thus, in England, the accused does not waive his privilege against
self-incrimination except as to the crime charged where he takes the
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stand. The accused also does not occupy a double role as accused and
witness and therefore, cannot be impeached by proof of prior crimes
or bad character, as in the United States, unless he puts his character
into issue by one of the ways specified in the Act.
PROPOSALS
There are some who point out that most of the problems of Ameri-
can criminal procedure, discussed herein, would be solved if the ac-
cused was again made incompetent. No adverse inferences could arise
because the accused did not testify and no comment could be made
upon this fact since the accused would be powerless to testify. There
could be neither an over-zealous cross-examination of the accused nor
the problem as to the extent of waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Finally, character evidence, used to impeach the ac-
cused as a witness, could not be introduced into evidence. Though
some reactionaries feel that the testimony of the accused is valueless,
others feel that the accused should be allowed to tell his story in the
form of an unswom statement with cross-examination by the judge,
at his discretion, and comment thereon.
A more radical proposal would do away with the privilege against
self-incrimination at the trial and make the accused compellable at the
discretion of the judge. This would obviate any adverse inference or
comment on the failure of the accused to testify. If the accused is
compelled by the judge to testify, he should only be cross-examined
by the judge. The prosecutor and defense counsel should be able to
propose questions to the judge who may ask them of the accused as
he sees fit. A system such as this would eliminate problems as to the
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the over-zealous
prosecutor and character evidence. Such a proposal is supported be-
cause trials today are in public. The accused is tried by an impartial
judge and jury and is protected by counsel as well as countless other
safeguards by way of review and otherwise. Under circumstances such
as these, there is little danger of injustice. Society has changed since
the time when the privilege against self-incrimination grew out of a
fear of arbitrary power in the hands of the government. Today, in a
criminal trial, there can be no exercise of arbitrary power and, there-
fore, the privilege against self-incrimination, which in this regard has
outlived its purpose, often will act unjustly upon the accused as was
seen in the prior discussion.
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It would also seem that much benefit could be gained from a study
of the English Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 with a view to adopting
similar legislation. In any event, it is clear that the stagnant state of
present American criminal procedure can best be relieved by clear
legislation based upon intense study of the problems by groups such
as the Judicial Conference of the United States or the American Bar
Association.
Change and progress in criminal procedure will not come easily, nor
will it come swiftly. It is first necessary to dispel all the fears and
misgivings that a secure people have when they are asked to give up
or change some of their traditional methods of trial. This is made more
difficult because the arguments of progress are rational while those of
traditionalism are often emotional. To begin with, studies such as this
must be made to create a new sense of security in progress through
understanding so that public opinion will accept conservative change.
It is hoped that this historical and comparative survey will in some
measure contribute to that sense of security in progress and aid in the
achievement of clearer thinking in this age of complicated criminal
procedure.
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